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EARLY-INFORMATIONAL BIASES IN JUDGEMENT AND DECISION-MAKING: A 
DUAL-PROCESS AND A DYNAMIC-STOCHASTIC MODELLING APPROACH 
By Peter A.F. Fraser-Mackenzie 
The thesis herein explores the relationship between early and late information in judgement 
and  decision-making  and  tests  a  quantitative  model  of  this  relationship  based  on 
contemporary  dual-process  theory.  The  first  chapter  reviews  literature  regarding  early 
information as a potential biasing factor in judgement and decision-making, the neglect of 
dual-process theory in the domain and the tendency to rely on static modelling techniques 
derived from economic theory. The first empirical chapter concludes that a synthesis of a 
static-economic decision model (prospect theory) with contemporary dual-process theory 
principles can better predict choice behaviour than either one approach alone. I conclude that 
dual-process  theory  provides  a  strong  theoretical  basis  for  understanding  the  cognitive 
processes involved in early-informational biases, but also that the quantitative approaches to 
modelling choice behaviour can provide valuable additional insights. The third chapter acts 
on this conclusion by developing a dynamic-stochastic choice model (based on a sequential 
sample  process)  which  reflects  four  contemporary  dual-process  theory  concepts  that  are 
relevant to early-informational biases. Simulation results of the model are presented in order 
to demonstrate the choice behaviour predicted by this approach. The rest of the thesis is 
dedicated to empirical studies designed to test the implications of these simulation results 
and these predicted behaviours. The empirical studies cover a range of domains including 
biased predecision processing during evidence gathering, stereotype bias in multi-attribute 
decision-making under time-pressure and the impact of expectation and accuracy motivation 
on  visual-search  decision-making.  I  conclude  that  the  dynamic-stochastic  modelling 
approach demonstrates some clear value in understanding the cognitive processes involved 
in these domains and the results support the use of contemporary dual-process theory as a 
framework for understanding judgement and decision-making. Based on this conclusion I 
outline some future developments for a more nuanced dynamic model including integration 
with a more sophisticated way of modelling type 2 processing and expansion to account for 
hypothetical thinking principles. I also suggest future research domains for application of the 
model such as expert decision-making and multi-alternative decision problems. 
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Introduction – Thesis Overview 
Topic of Interest 
A well-known proverb tells us that “first impressions are the most lasting”. Indeed, 
common advice is that successful first impressions are often critical to achieving positive 
overall impressions. The notion that early information can play a special role in judgement 
and  decision-making  (JDM)  inspired  the  initial  direction  of  the  thesis.  By  necessity, 
therefore, much of this thesis focuses on the theories regarding the nature of the deliberation 
process as it unfolds over time. Tightly linked to the concept of early information is the idea 
that  early  information  used  during  deliberation  may  be  formed  based  on  a  degree  of 
intuition, or ‘gut feeling’, regarding judgements or decisions and the idea that we may gain 
some sense of a solution automatically, i.e. without an awareness of explicit reasoning. This 
early  impression  can  sometimes  be  confirmed  by  a  more  considered  evaluation  of  the 
problem. However, at other times we can find that our initial impressions are wrong and a 
more careful consideration of the facts can overturn our first evaluation. Accordingly, the 
much of this thesis involves exploring the literature related to the different ways that we can 
reason and form judgements, and the associated cognitive psychological theories. 
Much of JDM research has concerned itself with the concept of rationality and the 
comparison of the choices made by individuals against what might be expected based on 
‘normative’  benchmarks.  Indeed,  the  idea  that  individuals  sometimes  diverge  from 
normative measures is captured by the idea that our rationality is bounded by the limits of 
our  cognitive  resources  (Simon,  1957).  However,  the  focus  towards  early  versus  late 
information and the comparison of intuition versus more explicit decision-processes clearly 
demonstrates a need to explore more than just decision outcomes. For this reason the thesis 
involved an exploration of the nature and characteristics of the cognitive processes involved 
in deliberation, i.e. the processes involved in producing the final judgement or decision. 
A particularly important theory of cognition, which is strongly linked to this idea of 
initial  impressions,  is  the  dual-process  framework  (Evans,  2007a,  2007b,  2008,  2009; 
Stanovich, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2003; Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Sloman, 1996; Rolls, 1999). Theories such as default-interventionism (Evans, 2007a; 2007b) 
that relate to the way in which reasoning processes may change over time appear to be 
highly  relevant  to  the  topic  of  interest  in  this  thesis  (Evans,  2007a).  However,  these 
approaches received comparatively little attention in the domain of JDM (Evans, 2007a), 
especially in the JDM domains of formal decision analysis and quantitative models of risky 
choice in behavioural finance. 
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Development of Ideas and Novel Contribution 
The  thesis  began  by  contrasting  and  comparing  dual-process  explanations  of 
reasoning processes with explanations based on a highly successful quantitative of choice - 
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The results of the first empirical chapter 
revealed  a  synergy  between  the  dual-process  concepts  and  the  powerful  quantitative 
attributes of prospect theory. The first experiment revealed that dual-process theory could be 
used to predict when prospect theory effects should occur. The second experiment showed 
dual-process theory  could  predict the  kinds of  functions  produced  when fitting  prospect 
theory.  Finally,  and  most  importantly,  when  dual-process  concepts  were  used  to  adapt 
prospect  theory,  resulting  in  a  new  “synthesized”  model,  this  new  model  was  a  better 
predictor of choices than traditional prospect theory.  
However, while this first chapter demonstrated the value of dual-process concepts in 
developing and improving these quantitative models of decision-making, there were some 
important  limitations  with  the  approach.  Firstly,  these  formal-analysis  models  are  static 
models,  i.e.  they  do  not  explicitly  account  for  the  role  of  time  or  the  order  in  which 
information is evaluated. This would not be a problem if order effects played no role in 
decision-making. However, as introduced above and in Chapter I, there are strong effects of 
the order of information and the issues relating to how individuals deliberate over time. 
Indeed, as I argue in Chapter III and VII, the reliance on static models may related to the 
focus  towards the “Great Rationality  Debate” (Stanovich,  2011), and the  comparison  of 
choice outcomes to what would be expected based on rational economic theory. As I explain 
in  Chapter  III  this  deconstructive  approach  of  building  descriptive  models  by  adapting 
normative models when they fail to represent empirical choice data may not be the most 
effective means of advancing JDM theory in the future. Normative models ignore factors 
such as the order of information and the role of automatic reasoning processes in favour of 
mathematically provable strategies such as calculating expected values. Dual-process theory, 
on the other hand, considers automatic reasoning processes and how our decisions can be 
affected by processes beyond strategic, working-memory oriented, deliberation. It is perhaps 
for  these  reasons  that  these  dual-process  concepts  have  tended  to  be  neglected  in  the 
development of quantitative models of decision-making. 
 For these reasons, I changed the orientation of my thesis in Chapter III with another 
literature review and consider a dynamic, rather than static, approach to modelling some 
dual-process  concepts  in  decision-making.  The  rest  of  the  Chapters  aimed  to  test  and 
evaluate this dynamic modelling approach.  
It became clear from the outset that dual-process theory is a broad, over-arching, 
theory encompassing many different cognitive mechanisms and a large amount of literature 15 
 
from a range of disciplines. Therefore any attempt to represent the entirety of dual-process 
theory in a quantitative model is a task beyond a single thesis. Furthermore, some of the 
mechanisms  of  dual-process  theory,  e.g.  parallel-competition  versus  serial  default-
interventionism (Evans, 2009), are still under debate in the literature. Instead, the aim of the 
thesis  was  to  develop  a  dynamic-stochastic  quantitative  model  based  on  just  four  key 
default-interventionist features. I then produced some simulations to demonstrate the kinds 
of behaviour characteristics the model predicts and these formed the basis for the empirical 
studies. 
Due to the restriction of only four features, it must be recognized that the empirical 
studies cannot be seen as a test of default-interventionism or dual-process theory as a whole. 
There are aspects of the theories that exist outside the model’s scope and these are discussed 
in the final chapter. However, due to the inspiration of these theories in the model design, it 
was possible to discuss the model's various successes in light of the broader issues relating to 
current dual-process theory. 
Due to this approach, the primary aim of this thesis was re-evaluated in chapter III 
focusing on the assessment of the sequential sample model and the implications of dual-
process theory in each JDM domain. The simulations revealed four main characteristics, 
each of which has a related research question for empirical study: 
1)  The proposed sequential sample mechanism used to represent the role of type 3 
processing (Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2011), which involved the use of threshold 
parameters, made specific predictions regarding the volume of evidence collected 
and deliberation times. I assessed the extent to which empirical evidence volume/RT 
data support these simulation predictions? 
2)  The model predicted a congruency effect of early type 1 processing and subsequent 
type 2 processing. I assessed the evidence for this congruency effect observed in 
choice behaviour and response times? 
3)  The model was able to make continuous (as opposed to diametric, i.e. categorical) 
predictions. I examined whether empirical data appeaed to reflect these continuous 
predictions? 
4)  The characteristics of the sequential sample model also predicted an incongruency 
effect. This would not be predicted given an alternative way of modelling early-
informational biases (e.g. via a race model). I examined whether the data supported 
this incongruency effect or not, thereby, supporting the sequential sample model 




  The four characteristics outlined above were supported by the empirical choice data. 
In addition, as each empirical chapter focused on a different type of decision, the application 
of a quantitative approach to dual-process concepts clearly has implications for a wide range 
of JDM tasks. I discuss these implications for each domain in both the empirical chapters 
and the final discussion chapter. I conclude by discussing the limitations of the sequential 
sample model used in this thesis and how these limitations can be overcome in future model 
development. In particular, I provide potential ideas for extension of the model that may 
provide a deeper representation of dual-process theory for the JDM domain. 
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Chapter I – Literature Review 
“Logic: The art of thinking and reasoning in strict accordance with the limitations 
and incapacities of the human misunderstanding.” – Ambrose Bierce (American 
Writer, 1842-1914) 
Sources of Early-Informational Biases in Judgement and Decision Making 
The  idea  that  initial  impressions  have  a  special  influence  on  judgements  was 
demonstrated empirically through studies of order effects, whereby the same information 
presented to participants in a different order can have effects on judgements (Asch, 1946; 
Anderson, 1965; Jones & Goethals, 1972). In particular a primacy effect may occur in which 
in the information that happens to have been observed first appears to be more influential in 
the  judgement  than  information  examined  subsequently.  Tetlock  (1983)  provides  an 
overview of three main explanations that have been given to this phenomenon. First is the 
attention  decrement  interpretation.  This  is  the  concept  that  due  to  cognitive  fatigue  or 
boredom, individuals tend to pay less attention to late information (Anderson and Hubert, 
1968;  Hendrick  and  Constantini,  1970;  Stewart,  1965).  The  second  is  the  discounting 
interpretation. This is the suggestion that individuals assume that later information is in 
some way less reliable or valid than earlier information (Anderson and Jacobson, 1965). The 
third  suggestion  is  the  biased  assimilation  interpretation  whereby  people  form  instant 
impressions based on the information, and then later information is interpreted according to 
this mental frame (Tetlock, 1983).  
More  recently,  similar  biases  have  also  been  demonstrated  in  multi-attribute 
decision-making. Biased predecision processing (Brounstein, 2003, for review) occurs when 
decision  makers  restructure  mental  representations  of  the  decision  environment  in  ways 
which favour an early favourite alternative before making a choice. More detail of these 
theories are discussed in Chapter IV, but the central concept is that if an early favourite 
alternative can be identified prior to choice, subsequent information (e.g. attributes, cues, 
etc.) may be processed in a distorted manner such that the judgement of the attributes of an 
early favourite is bolstered compared to others. The reason for distortion of the alternatives 
in favour of an early favourite have been attributed to cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) 
in predecision stages, and the motivation to avoid some form of internal conflict regarding 
the alternatives (Janis & Mann, 1977); a need for some certainty in the choice (Mills, 1968), 
or a search for dominance (Montgomery, 1993, 1994; Montgomery & Willen, 1999), and the 
concept of cognitive coherence (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 
2004; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004).  
However,  the  primacy  effect  and  phenomena  related  to  biased  predecision 
processing theories are not the only sources of early information. As far back as the 1950s, it 18 
 
was suggested that individuals can bring about expectations regarding a particular stimulus 
which are integrated with the exposure situation (Kelley, 1950). Thus early information can 
arise,  not  only  from  the task-stimuli  themselves,  but  also  from  past  knowledge,  beliefs, 
expectations, etc. This is an example of how top-down information (e.g. past experience, 
beliefs, stereotypes, etc.) can play a part in our interpretation of new, bottom-up, information 
(i.e. stimulus data). This was used to explain what Nisbett and Ross (1980) termed as belief 
perseverance which describes the tendency to maintain pre-existing beliefs despite dissonant 
or  even  entirely  contradictory  evidence.  This  phenomenon  has  been  found  in  areas  of 
problem  solving  (Luchins,  1942),  attitudes  to  change  and  stereotype  perseverance 
(Hamilton, 1979; Allport, 1954). Studies have even revealed how individuals with polarised 
perspectives on issues (e.g. a group for and a group against capital punishment or nuclear 
weapons) can perceive the same information differently such that both their views are made 
stronger (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Plous, 1991).  
Similar  effects  even  appear  to  occur  in  other  domains  such  as  visual-stimulus 
decision-making.  Bruner  and  Potter  (1964)  presented  participants  with  blurred  pictures 
which were gradually brought into focus. If the stimulus began very blurry it was harder for 
participants to identify the image when fully focussed than if it had begun less blurry. It was 
suggested that people who use weak evidence to form an initial hypothesis have difficulty 
correctly interpreting subsequent, stronger, information (Rabin & Schrag, 1999). Even in 
important real-world decisions such as forensic fingerprint examination, initial impressions 
based on normatively irrelevant contextual information has been shown to affect experts’ 
visual judgement of forensic evidence (Dror & Charlton, 2006; Dror, Charlton, & Person, 
2006; Dror, Peron, Hind, and Charlton, 2005).  
The discovery of these various phenomena demonstrates that early information does 
not  simply  arise  from  the  impression  of  the  first,  normatively  relevant,  task-related 
information presented to the decision-maker. Other sources of early-informational biases can 
also arise from contextual information which happens to coincide with the relevant task 
stimuli as well as pre-existent beliefs, irrelevant pragmatic information, previous knowledge, 
expectations, etc., which can  influence the subsequent interpretation of the task-relevant 
choice information. Moreover, these kinds of early-informational biases as a result of the 
context  are  not  restricted  to  the  decision-making  domain.  In  the  domain  of  logic  and 
reasoning research, there are similar effects of initial impressions on the interpretation of the 
stimulus  information.  For  example,  Evans,  Barston,  and  Pollard  (1983)  showed  that 
individuals were less likely to agree with syllogisms that were logically valid but at first 
glance appear to be unbelievable, compared to those that were valid and also believable; a 
so-called belief bias. This belief bias has strong ties the ideas of early versus late information 19 
 
and yet the leading framework for explaining such effects in logic and reasoning research, 
dual-process theory, has tended to be neglected in the JDM literature (Evans, 2007a).  
The Dual-Process Framework 
Dual-process theory is not so much a single theory as a label for a broad range of 
more specific theories. Nevertheless, they can all be largely captured by the idea that we can 
process information in two ways: type 1 and type 2 processes. Type 1 processes can be 
broadly described as being fast, automatic, high processing capacity, and low effort (Evans, 
2009). Type  2  processes can  be  broadly  described as  being  slow,  controlled,  limited in 
capacity,  and  high  effort  (Evans,  2009).  Type  1  processes  therefore  capture  our  more 
evolutionarily primitive intuitive reasoning abilities which are sometimes described as being 
formed in the autonomic set of sub-systems, or TASS, (Stanovich, 1999; 2004) also termed 
system  1  (Stanovich,  1999).  Type  2  processing,  on  the  other  hand,  captures  our  more 
evolutionarily modern analytical thinking which tends to be more associated with language 
and rules. The question of defining where type 1 processing ends and type 2 processing 
begins  is  difficult,  therefore  Evans  (2008)  suggests  that  type  2  processing  could  be 
characterised  by  “requiring  a  single  capacity-limited  central  working  memory”  (Evans, 
2008; p.270) a requirement which is not apparent for type 1 processing.  
Type 2 processes are often referred to as processes arising from system 2 (Stanovich, 
1999). However, as discussed by Evans (2009), the terms system 1 and system 2 could result 
in  unnecessary  assumptions  regarding  the  origins  and  mediation  of  type  1  and  type  2 
responses.  Therefore,  as  suggested  by  Evans  (2008),  for  the  rest  of  this  thesis,  where 
possible, I shall restrict my differentiation to type 1 and type 2 labels. Given these two ways 
in which we can process information, the question that arises from this dual-process theory 
is how these responses interact; or the “dance of affect and reason” (Finucane, Peters & 
Slovic, 2003). More specifically, the literature related to the mediation of type 1 and type 2 
processing  should  help  predict  when  early-informational  biases  would/would  not  be 
expected to occur. 
Evans (2007a) states that in the situations in which both responses can input into the 
judgement, modelling the conflict between two responses becomes complex. Evans (2007b) 
outlines three ways in which this conflict may be resolved. A pre-emptive conflict describes 
an employing only one type of processing from the outset. However, in a decision-making 
task,  in  order  for  this  mechanism  to  perform  optimally,  it  must  know  precisely  what 
constraining factors will be present during every decision. This presents problems when one 
considers that such constraints cannot always be known a priori, but are discovered once a 
task is completed; i.e. when there is no longer any uncertainty. Whilst such a monitoring 20 
 
system could learn to predict decision constraints, it will never perform optimally due to 
errors arising from uncertainty. Therefore, I believe that this weighted-mediation mechanism 
suffers in optimising decision-making effectiveness.  
A  parallel-competitive  model  (Evans,  2007b)  describes  each  type  of  processing 
delivering a putative response resulting in some conflict that must be resolved. This allows 
both types of processing to provide a weighted input into the decision and balances the 
inputs  according  to  demands.  However,  in  many  decision  tasks  this  would  be  highly 
cognitively effortful as both types of processing would have to provide a response in every 
case in order for the final single preference state to be formed. Also it cannot easily account 
for temporal factors on deliberation as all decisions would have to wait for the slowest type 
of processing (type 2) to provide a response before the weighting can occur (see Evans, 
2009). Accordingly, for decision-making, I see this mechanism as having a problem with 
efficiency.  
 A third solution may be in the form of a default-interventionist conflict resolution 
model (2007a, Evans, 2007b, 2008, 2009). Under this process, type 1 responses are theorised 
to provide a default response prior to type 2 processing in the overall deliberation process 
(Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Zajonc, 1980). Type 1 processing, 
being  rapid,  involuntary  and  more  subconscious,  automatically  responds  to  the  task 
information before the higher-level type 2 processing. If a satisfactory decision can be made 
using the type 1 response, then higher level type 2 processing is not performed. In contrast, 
given an important decision with a great cost of error, or in which the individual is unhappy 
with the type 1 response, efficiency is traded off for effectiveness by allowing the more 
deliberate type 2 processing to intervene. As I shall explain, see this mechanism as having 
fewer problems that the previous two mechanisms for decision-making as well as being 
more representative of other JDM theories of early-informational biases.  
Figure 1 shows an example of a default-interventionist model and Evan’s (2006) 
view of how individuals may reason over time. It is proposed that individuals initially form 
the most plausible or relevant model which comes to mind from type 1 processing, based on 
the goals of the individual, their background knowledge, and the features and context of the 
task. This default model response is then appraised based on the satisficing principle for its 
adequacy.  The  satisficing  principle  derives  from  Simon’s  notion  of  bounded  rationality 
(Simon, 1982) which refers to an assessment of the initial response on the basis of “settling 
for what is good enough” (Evans, 2007a, p. 18). If the model does not satisfy, then explicit 
type  2  processes  may  intervene  and  develop  further  models  in  an  iterative  fashion  of 
hypothesis testing. Once a model is deemed satisfactory and sufficient, whether it is the first 21 
 
model produced by type 1 processing or a more laboriously constructed type 2 processing 
model, inferences and judgements can be made. 
 
 
Figure 1. The heuristic–analytic theory from Evans (2006). 
Note  that  in  the  heuristic-analytic  theory  shown  in  Figure  1  the  assessment  of 
whether or not the model “satisfies” is under the type 2 processes heading. However, as I 
shall discuss in Chapter III, both Evans (2009) and Stanovich (2011) have considered that a 
third type of processing (Evans, 2009), or at least a division of type 2 processing (Stanovich, 
2011) may better capture this assessment process. As shown in figure 1, if analytic system 
intervention is not required, the inferences/judgements will rely heavily on automatic type 1 
processes potentially resulting in early-informational biases. However, if analytic system 
intervention (type 2 processing) is employed then this late information may remove these 
biases. 
Dual-Processes and Motivated Reasoning 
What is clear from this dual-process approach is that individuals have the ability to 
vary their reasoning based on the satisficing principle. If the individual perceives a task to 
require  accuracy,  and  assuming  they  possess  the  time  and  sufficient  knowledge  and 
cognitive  abilities/knowledge  (termed  “mindwear”  by  Stanovich,  2011),  then  they  may 
attempt more logical processes involving type 2 processing such as hypothetical thinking 
(Evans,  2007a).  According  to  Stanovich’s  (2011)  interpretation,  hypothetical  thinking 
involves  a  degree  of  “decoupling”  (Leslie,  1987)  of  mental  models  from  the  current 
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environmental  stimuli  in  order  to  disengage  with  the  intuitive  solution  and  run  mental 
simulations, such as envisaging different states of the world, different hypotheses, outcomes, 
risks, etc. Therefore, in being able to employ effective hypothetical thinking, one is better 
able  to  solve  more  complex  tasks  (Evans,  2007a).  The  effect  of  employing  more 
hypothetical thinking is that it has the potential to reduce the role of initial impressions from 
the default response (i.e. the initial mental model elicited from type 1 processing) and in 
many cases increase the likelihood of a more accurate and rational response.  
This idea can be linked to theories of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). Although 
not explicitly expressed in terms of dual-process theory concepts, Kunda (1990) describes 
how motivation to be accurate has been shown to reduce primacy effects in impression 
formation, i.e. type 1 (early) processing is no more predictive of outcome than type 2 (late) 
processing. For example, accuracy motivation has been found to reduce the tendency to use 
ethnic  stereotyping,  and  also reduce  anchoring  in  probability judgements (Kruglanski  & 
Freund, 1983; Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985). It appears that accuracy motivation 
can  result in  participants using  more  complex  and time-consuming  strategies,  indicating 
more  type  2  processing  (McAllister,  Mitchell  &  Beach,  1979).  In  line  the  default-
interventionism account, it seems that the initial impression is not  satisficing due to the 
motivation to be accurate and hence more lengthy consideration occurs (i.e. employing type 
2 processing). 
An  opposing  factor  to  accuracy  motivation  appears  to  be  time  pressure.  Time 
pressure limits the ability to perform the time-consuming mental processes (such as type 2 
processing). Therefore, we should expect greater reliance on type 1 processing. Indeed, time 
pressure  is  associated  with  greater  emotional  thinking  and  affect  heuristics  (Finucane, 
Alhakami,  Slovic  &  Johnson,  2000),  and  the  consideration  of  moods  (Noda,  Takai,  & 
Yoshida, 2007). Therefore, time pressure and accuracy motivation appear to be important in 
dual-process  mediation,  broadly  acting  in  the  opposite  direction  (either  increasing  or 
decreasing the role of type 1 processing). 
In summary, the default-interventionist account seems to be the most flexible form 
of conflict resolution for the domain of JDM as it neither suffers from the effectiveness 
limitations of the pre-emptive conflict mechanism nor the efficiency limitations of parallel-
competition. The idea that early information is more associated with type 1 processing and 
late information is more associated with type 2 processing also fits well with the literature 
regarding  early-informational  biases  in  JDM.  Furthermore,  the  relevance  to  motivated 
reasoning  literature  and  how  certain  environmental factors  (e.g.  accountability,  accuracy 
motivation, time pressure, etc.) may play a role in the mediation of early-information biases 23 
 
suggest that the default-interventionist approach shown in Figure 1 should be particularly 
useful for this thesis. 
Quantitative Approaches to Judgement and Decision-Making 
An  important  part  of  the  JDM  domain  is  that  it  frequently  applies  quantitative 
approaches to modelling decision-making agents. Indeed, there are numerous choice models 
which  are  not  explicitly  reliant  on  dual-processes  in  their  design  but  nevertheless  seem 
capable  of  explaining  the  same  cognitive  biases.  Indeed,  in  some  cases,  dual-process 
explanations and these quantitative model explanations often co-exist with relatively little 
comparative analysis. I see the domain of risky decision-making as a particularly striking 
example of the same research questions being tackled in two different manners with only 
limited comparative work between the two. As I hope to explain, the quantitative approaches 
to understanding risky choice behaviour tend to approach the problem from what I will call a 
deconstructive  approach  whereas  dual-process  accounts  appear  to  follow  a  more 
constructive approach. I will define these terms later. First, I will explain how a leading 
theory of risky choice, prospect theory, was developed.  
Bernoulli’s  (1738)  expected  utility  (EU)  theory  proposed  that  individuals  will 
choose the option with the highest expected utility where p is the probability of the utility 
and u(x) is the subjective value assigned to the outcome: 
                     Eq 1. 
The curve of the utility function determines the risk-attitude of an individual. The 
most  common  is  usually  concave,  i.e.           ,  indicating  risk  aversion  whereby  an 
individual will prefer a certain $50 payoff option to a .5 probability of $100 or nothing 
option. However, individuals appear to violate some of the axioms of this normative model 
in  their  choice  behaviour  (Allais,  1953;  Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1979).  In  particular, 
individuals  appeared  to  demonstrate  different  risk  attitudes  (i.e.  risk  seeking  or  risk 
avoidant)  depending  on  whether  the  choice  involved  gains  and  losses  and  whether 
probabilities were low or high. In order to account for this, prospect theory was proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979; and later developed further into cumulative prospect theory 
by  Tversky  &  Kahneman,  1992). The theory  proposes that individuals’  choices  may  be 
better  described  by:  (1)  a  value  function        which  differs  in  concavity/convexity 
depending on whether x is a gain/loss from a reference point, and (2) a weighting function 
     which allows for divergences from the objective probabilities p, usually some form of 
S-shape  which  over-weights  low-probability  events  and  under-weights  high  probability 
events. 24 
 
                          Eq 2. 
This is an example of how a normative model was adapted just enough to account 
for the non-normative behaviour observed by participants in experiments. However, the first 
observation  is  that  prospect  theory  is  a  static-quantitative  model  and  therefore  does  not 
differentiate between information that is examined first and information that is examined 
last.  This  is  common  with  most  quantitative  approaches  to  JDM,  whereby  complex 
deliberation processes are summarized by static models. This would not be a problem if, as 
stated by the normative expected utility theory, the gathering of information played no part 
in individuals decision-making. However, as the literature concerning initial-informational 
biases demonstrates, the order in which information is processed can often have considerable 
impact. However, despite this important fact, theories such as prospect theory continue with 
a static framework to remain as close as possible to the primitives of expected utility theory. 
Indeed as Tversky and Kanheman (1992) state: 
 “Theories of choice are at best approximate and incomplete. One reason for 
this  pessimistic  assessment  is  that  choice  is  a  constructive  and  contingent 
process.  When  faced  with  a  complex  problem,  people  employ  a  variety  of 
heuristic procedures in order to simplify the representation and the evaluation 
of  prospects.  These  procedures  include  computational  shortcuts  and  editing 
operations,  such  as  eliminating  common  components  and  discarding 
nonessential differences (Tversky, 1969). The heuristics of choice do not readily 
lend themselves to formal analysis because their application depends on the 
formulation  of  the  problem,  the  method  of  elicitation,  and  the  context  of 
choice.” (p.317) 
This appears to show that Kahneman and Tversky were concerned that their formal 
analysis of choice behaviour was missing some of nuances that they knew to occur in the 
‘black  box’  that  contained  the  decision-makers’  deliberation  processes.  Prospect  theory 
accounts  for  decision  outcomes,  but  does  not  explicitly  model  the  cognitive  processes 
involved in those outcomes. Take, for example, the phenomenon of ‘loss aversion’ (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981). This is the phenomenon that individuals tend to weight losses as more 
serious than gains of the absolute magnitude, i.e. a loss of £100 may be treated as more 
significant to the individual than a gain of £100. Under prospect theory, losses are described 
by a convex weighting function for losses compared to a concave weighting function for 
gains.  However,  the  actual  cognitive  processes  which  result  in  this  ‘convexity’  are  not 
clearly defined in prospect theory. Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch’s (2001) landmark 
paper “Risk as Feelings” argues that this loss aversion is not ‘cognitively mediated’ (Chapter 25 
 
II will elaborate on this important concept) but rather has an emotional basis, taking a dual-
process view that both emotional (type 1) and analytical (type 2) processes can produce 
assessments of risk during decision-making.  
Indeed, this account has been supported by studies of brain damaged patients (Shiv, 
Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005). Neurological evidence suggests that in 
order to succeed in tasks that involve weighing up risk and reward, the experience of early 
type 1 emotional responses are important. Patients, who have lesions to the frontal cortex in 
an area which allows fear to be linked to risk information, appear to make mistakes in tasks 
of reward reversal (Berthoz, 2006). In these tasks, a patient has to respond to one stimulus, 
and avoid responding to another, to gain reward. After having learnt the task, the stimuli are 
reversed. Although the patient is aware of the switch, they are unable to respond correctly 
(Berthoz,  2006),  implying  that  fear  and  emotion  are  important  to  succeeding  in  this 
analytical  task.  It  is  argued  that these  patients  are unable  to  link  affective  responses  to 
potential future outcomes (Freeman & Watts, 1942). Indeed in direct comparison to  the 
discussion of prospect theory, research has shown that patients with this type of damage are 
less sensitive to severe loss in the Iowa Gambling Task than controls who were not brain-
damaged (Damasio, 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1997). The results showed 
that the patients were quicker to take the same risk after a sudden severe loss than controls 
who were more averse to that high risk gamble.  
Prospect  theory,  and  many  other  quantitative  approaches  which  follows  formal 
analysis, I describe as taking a ‘deconstructive’ approach to modelling JDM. What I mean 
by this is that they are deconstructing a normative model (e.g. expected utility theory) in 
order to create a behavioural model (e.g. prospect theory) which accounts for empirical data. 
This  deconstruction  usually  involves  adapting  the  normative  model  as  little  as  possible 
(following the law of parsimony) to account for the type of divergence from the normative 
model  observed  in  empirical  data.  Dual-process  theory,  on  the  other  hand  is  not  an 
adaptation  from  a  normative  model  like  expected  utility  theory.  Rather,  it  has  been 
developed over time from the ground up based on empirical observations and cognitive 
psychological  theory.  Therefore,  I  characterise  it  as  a  more  ‘constructive’  approach  to 
modelling.  
The  result  of  these  differing  approaches  is  two-fold.  Firstly,  deconstructive 
quantitative models tend to be static models and therefore do not necessarily reflect temporal 
effects  on  cognition  in  their  design.  Secondly,  there  is  frequently  a  void  between  the 
quantitative models in JDM and the models relating to the cognitive processes involved (see 
the loss aversion discussion above). I see two potential resolutions to this problem. The first 
is  to  seek  for  some  convergence  between  static-quantitative  models  and  cognitive 26 
 
psychological  theories  of  decision  processes.  For  example,  one  could  examine  whether 
recent advances in dual-process theory help us to better understand the causes of prospect 
theories value and weighting functions, or whether prospect theory can be adapted further 
based on the recent advances in dual-process concepts. The second solution is to develop a 
quantitative model of choice which is constructive rather than deconstructive, i.e. a model of 
decision-processes that does not begin from a formal decision-analysis standpoint, but rather 
begins with the basic elements of dual-process theory. Both of these resolutions would serve 
to bridge the gap between the quantitative models in JDM and  dual-process theories of 
cognition. 
While,  dual-processes  have  tended  to  be  neglected  in  the  JDM  domain  (Evans, 
2007a), there are some exceptions. Hammond (1996) has a cognitive continuum theory in 
which intuitive thinking is contrasted with analytical thinking. However, this theory does not 
differentiate between two types of reasoning but rather views them as two different ends of a 
spectrum of analysis (involving six modes) from strongly analytical, akin to a scientific 
experiment, to weak quasi-rational (intuitive) thought. As this theory does not differentiate 
between  type  1  and  type  2  processing  temporally,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  would 
contribute to a thesis on the role of early versus late information. Nevertheless, the notion 
that  decision-making  processes  can  be  more  than  simply  either  heuristic  or  logical  is 
representative of modern dual-process theory. 
The second example of dual-processing in JDM is the contribution of Kahneman 
and Frederick (2002, 2005) regarding heuristics and biases associated with assessing risk 
and  probability.  Kahneman  and  Frederick  (2002,  2005)  state  that,  when  faced  with  a 
judgement problem, ‘system 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgement problems as 
they  arise’ (type  1  processes)  which is  followed  by  system  2  (type  2  processes)  which 
‘monitors  the  quality  of  these  proposals,  which  it  may  endorse,  correct  or  override’ 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; p.269). Essentially, this theory argues that biases are the 
result of employing heuristics which tend to rely on type 1 processing, but the use of type 2 
processing could be used to override these effects. Take for example, the anchoring and 
adjustment  bias  first  discovered  by  Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1974).  Anchoring  and 
adjustment is a bias whereby beliefs, decisions, judgements, or attitudes generated through 
automatic (type 1) processes are altered by controlled processes (Gilbert, 1999). This has 
been shown to be a persistent bias and a clear example of default-interventionism at work.  
Conclusion 
  The literature review above attempted to explain why dual-process theory is a useful 
framework  for  understanding  deliberation  processes  in  JDM.  Principally,  this  thesis  is 27 
 
interested  in  the  role  of  early-informational  biases  in  decision-making  and  default-
interventionism, in particular, appears to be a promising account for this domain. However, 
dual-process theory, with its emphasis on explaining the moment-to-moment deliberation 
process is in stark contrast with the static-quantitative models such as prospect theory that 
have dominated the field. Indeed, it is perhaps for this reason that dual-processes have been 
somewhat neglected in JDM.  
However, due to limitations of the quantitative models, particularly with respect 
their reliance on static representations, it may be that a quantitative approach simply does 
not lend itself to understanding the role of early versus late information in JDM. In which 
case,  a  wholly  dual-process  approach  would  seem  the  most  appropriate  manner  of 
accounting for early-informational biases. Yet, given the strong reliance on such models in 
the  domain  as  well  as  the  additional  benefits  that  quantitative  predictions  can  afford  a 
scientific  investigation,  I  am  keen  to  examine  whether  or  not some  degree  of  synthesis 
between a quantitative modelling approach and a dual-process approach is possible. This 
may help to better understand the cognitive processes behind successful quantitative models 
such as prospect theory.  
Therefore,  the  initial  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  compare  and  contrast  dual-process 
theory with a leading quantitative JDM model, prospect theory. As discussed, both dual-
process theory and prospect theory are capable of explaining the role of contextual biases in 
decision-making. However, they both do so from very different standpoints. Dual-process 
theory has the strengths of explaining the cognitive processes involved in decision-making, 
particularly with regards to differentiating between early versus late information processing. 
Prospect  theory,  on  the  other  hand,  with  its  mathematical  framework,  can  provide 
quantitative predictions and measures of choice behaviour. I believe a comparative study of 
prospect theory and dual process theory may develop our understanding and prediction of 
early-informational biases in decision-making by identifying if and how one can bridge the 
gap between quantitative models of choice and cognitive psychological models of reasoning 
processes. 
Summary Points 
o  In the domain of JDM, the role of early informational biases is widely researched.  
o  Despite the clear relevance to this issue, much of the JDM literature has neglected to 
consider dual-process in the accounts. 
o  I suggest that this may be partially due to the tendency to rely on static-economic 
models which may not necessarily represent the decision processes involved.  
o  Therefore, the question remains as to whether dual-process theory has anything to 
offer static-economic models. For example, can the consideration of dual-process 28 
 
theory improve our understanding of why prospect theory’s functions are observed? 
More importantly, can the integration of dual-process theory concepts into a static-
economic model improve prospect theory predictions?   29 
 
Chapter II – Empirical Chapter 
“Do not indulge yourselves to judge of things by the first glimpse, or a short and 
superficial view of them; for this will fill the mind with errors and prejudices, and give it 
a wrong turn and ill habit of thinking, and make much work for retraction.” – Isaac Watts 
(English theologian, 1674 – 1748) 
 
As prospect theory is a quantitative model of risky choice, the first empirical chapter 
will  focus  on  numerical-based  decision-making.  Evans  (2007a)  states  that  pragmatic 
information (contextual features of the task) tends to be integrated with an individual’s type 
1,  initial  response  to  the task.  Thus,  contextual  features  are  considered  a  form  of  early 
information which can act to bias choices in cases when type 1 processing is relied upon. 
Prospect  theory,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  differentiate  between  type  1  and  type  2 
processing or between early versus late information. However, it is able to describe the 
nature and degree of bias that possible with respect to weighting and value assigned to 
alternatives. The following empirical chapter examines prospect theory and dual-process 
explanations of the role of this early contextual information in numerical decision-making. 
The  studies  demonstrate  that  predictions  based  on  prospect  theory  combined  with  dual-
process  concepts  are  often  better  than  predictions  based  on  prospect  theory  alone.  This 
suggests  that,  despite  its neglect,  dual-process  not  only  have  the  ability  to  improve  our 
understanding of theories such as prospect theory, but may also be important in its own right 
for the development of new quantitative models of decision-making. 
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Bounded Quantitative Judgement of Numerical Information: Providing Explanations 
for Distortions in the Evaluation of Forensic Evidence, Alternative Gambles, and 
Investment Performance via a Synthesis of Prospect Theory and Dual-Process 
Theory 
Abstract 
  This chapter aims to improve understanding of the effect of contextual task-features 
on the interpretation and judgement of numerical information. To this end, I considered a 
synthesis of prospect theory and dual-process theory concepts in order to better understand 
the nature and characteristics of bounded quantitative judgements. I demonstrate the value of 
this synthesized approach in interpreting the findings of three studies in different domains all 
involving  judgements  of  numerical  information.  The  first  study  explored  the  effects  of 
framing  and  risk-information  modes  on  forensic  evidence  in  court.  Prospect  theory  was 
beneficial in predicting the effect of risk-information modes on the perceived strength of 
evidence against the suspect. However, dual-process theory was required to predict when 
these risk-information mode effects would/would not occur. The second study explored the 
effects  of  risk-information  modes  in  gambling  on  horse-racing.  Again,  dual-process 
explanations complemented prospect theory, this time predicting the kinds of probability 
weighting functions we should expect to be found under each mode. The third study, which 
examined the judgement of investment performance, directly compared a normative model, 
traditional prospect theory, and a model based on a synthesis of dual-process concepts and 
prospect theory. The results showed that the synthesized model better predicted participants’ 
judgements of investment performance. In doing so, I also demonstrate evidence of a new 
type of bounded quantitative heuristic – the ‘place-value heuristic’.  
Introduction 
A  leading  framework  for  quantifying  bias  effects  in  risky  financial  decisions  is 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The ability of 
prospect theory to capture choice behaviour in mathematical functions based on quantitative-
economic models is a considerable strength. However, a major criticism is that “[v]irtually 
all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. 
They  assume  that  people  assess  the  desirability  and  likelihood  of  possible  outcomes  of 
choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based 
calculus  to  arrive  at  decisions.”  (Loewenstein,  Weber,  and  Hsee,  2001).  An  alternative 
approach stems from the various ideas that emerge from dual-process theories (Evans, 2006; 31 
 
Evans,  2009;  Stanovich,  2004;  1999;  2011;  Stanovich  &  West,  2003;  Hogarth,  2001; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996, Rolls, 1999). These theories allow judgements 
to  be  driven  by  one  of  two  “minds”:  a  more  evolutionarily  primitive,  rapid,  automatic 
assessment; or a more evolutionarily modern, slow, and analytical assessment. However, as 
discussed in Chapter I, dual-processes have generally been neglected in much JDM research 
(Evans, 2007a). A major reason for this may be that it is difficult to determine exactly how 
to  bridge  the  gap  between  quantitative  “cognitive  and  consequentialist”  (Loewenstein, 
Weber, and Hsee, 2001) models of decision-making (e.g. prospect theory) and descriptive 
cognitive psychological models of reasoning processes (e.g. dual-process theory).  
This  study  focuses  on  the  role  of  contextual  biases  and  how  they  act  on  the 
judgement of numerical information. The three task features considered in this chapter are 
frames, information modes, and the numerical values themselves. To establish connections 
between the two theories, I consider research examining levels of numerical processing and 
use this to bridge the gap between dual-process theory and prospect theory. Then, in three 
experiments, I demonstrate that the effects of contextual biases are better predicted by a 
synthesis of prospect theory and dual-process theory than by predictions made by prospect 
theory  alone.  I  demonstrate  that  this  synthesized  approach  has  the  potential  to  help  to 
understand the cognitive processes involved in the formation of prospect theory’s weighting 
and value functions, thereby extending the predictive scope of prospect theory into new 
domains. In addition, I show a synthesis of dual-process concepts and prospect theory can 
out-perform traditional prospect theory and a normative model.  I conclude by discussing the 
implications of the experimental results for the quantitative model of decision-making and 
future directions. 
Framing Effects 
The  framing  of  a  decision  refers  to  how  it  is  presented;  specifically,  which 
information  is  made  explicit  and  which  implicit.  Evidence  suggests  that  the  preference 
between two alternatives can be reversed by the effect of  framing. Levin, Scheider and 
Gaeth (1998) describe three  ways in  which framing  experiments  are  usually performed: 
Risky  Choice  Framing,  Attribute  Framing,  and  Goal  Framing.  Risky  Choice  Framing 
experiments usually involve one certain, or riskless prospect, and another all-or nothing 
risky prospect. The classic example of this was Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) ‘Asian 
Disease Problem’. Their findings indicated that presenting a positive frame (e.g., explicit 
information suggests the potential to save lives) is less likely to result in risk-taking than 
negative  framing  (i.e.  suggesting  the  potential  to  avoid  losing  lives).  Attribute  Framing 
experiments explore the effects of descriptive valence on the information processing of a 32 
 
prospect. Levin and Gaeth’s (1988) study provides an example of this: participants were 
asked  to  sample  identical  minced  beef  that  was  either  positively  framed  (75%  lean)  or 
negatively framed (25% fat). It was found that the positive (cf. negative) frame resulted in 
participants  rating  the  beef  as  better  (in  terms  of  taste  and  of  being  less  greasy).  Goal 
Framing experiments focus on the potential benefits (cf. loss) of approaching a goal (cf. 
avoiding  certain  behaviour).  In  these  experiments,  comparisons  are  made  between  the 
prevalence rates of the behaviour in question under the different frames. Overall, results of 
these experiments suggest that people are more likely to engage in the desired behaviour if 
the focus  of  the  framing  is  avoiding  loss  rather than  approaching  gain  (e.g.  Tversky  & 
Kahneman, 1991; Thaler, 1980). 
  In  summary,  framing  may  be  summarized  as  the  ‘glass-half-full/-half-empty’ 
property of information, whereby both representations of the same problem are normatively 
equivalent if we consider all implications of the information. However, being informed that 
a glass is ‘half full’ initially feels more positive based on our first impression of the stated 
information. 
Prospect Theory’s Value Function Explanation of Framing Effects 
  According to prospect theory, value is perceived relative to a reference point (rather 
than perceived in an absolute fashion), and framing is said to influence the position of this 
reference point. For example, a ‘glass-half-full/half-empty’ is considered a positive/negative 
frame because it implies an increase/decrease from ‘an empty/a full glass’ reference point. 
This relative valuation is important, particularly since individuals tend to perceive losses as 
more serious than gains; an effect termed loss aversion. Prospect theory attempts to capture 
this notion of loss aversion through the use of different value functions, which depend on 
whether the situation is perceived as a gain or a loss. For example, the perceived value v(x), 
of a payoff, x, predicted by prospect theory, is shown in eq 1, where ʱ, β > 0 measure the 
curvature of the value function for gains and losses respectively, and the λ is a coefficient for 
loss aversion, which acts to amplify the subjective absolute value of a loss compared to the 
subjective absolute value of a gain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992): 
       {
  
                
     
         [1] 
Risk-Information Modes 
While  framing  is  often  used  to  describe  any  form  of  bias  driven  by  the  way  a 
problem is described, I differentiate framing, as defined above, from that of the information 33 
 
mode. I define the information mode as the unit or scale representation of the information. In 
this chapter, the focus is on the modes used to represent risk information. Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage (1995, 1999) demonstrated that people perceive expected frequency data (e.g. a 1 
in  4  chance)  differently  to  objectively  equivalent  percentage  data  (e.g.  a  25%  change). 
Indeed,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  use  of  frequencies  may  improve  assessments  of 
probability as they are more intuitive (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). For example, Slovic, 
Monahan, & Macgregor (2000) demonstrated that estimates of risk are often higher when 
presented as relative frequencies (cf. in probability format). Rottenstreich and Kivetz (2006) 
argue that risk-information modes which elicit/do not elicit a probabilistic mindset tend to 
result in people relying on/neglecting judgements of likelihood. Indeed, it has been argued 
that individuals are generally more competent at reasoning based on a frequency mode than 
a probability mode (Cosimides & Tooby, 1996).  
However, Evans, Handley, Perhnham, Over and Thompson (2000, see also, Evans & 
Over,  1996)  argued  that,  while  frequency  formats  may  be  more  intuitive  to  our  more 
implicit, primitive, mental processes, one must also consider higher-level, explicit, mental 
processes and our ability to construct and manipulate mental models (Evans, et al, 2000). 
Therefore, the extent to which risk-information modes impact on performance may be more 
nuanced than the basic argument that frequency modes, per se, improve decision-making. 
For  example,  as  I  shall  expand  on  later,  modes  which  are/are  not  conducive  to  type  1 
processing are not necessarily beneficial/inhibitory in tasks which are type 2 processing 
oriented, such as complex reasoning about numerical information (Evans, et al, 2000). 
Prospect Theory’s Probability Weighting Function 
As the perception of numerical risk-information can potentially be influenced by 
risk-information  modes,  I  consider  how  prospect  theory  may  capture  these  distortions. 
Prospect theory incorporates the notion that individuals may not weight alternatives by their 
objective probabilities. This is captured by prospect theory’s weighting function, w, usually 
via  an  inverse  S-shaped  function,  resulting  in  low/high  probabilities  being  over/under 
weighted for values of ʳ < 1. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) employed the 
following weighting function:  
                                     [2] 
 According to prospect theory, the value an individual attaches to a prospect, V, is 
not  the  expected  utility  (EU),  i.e.  is  not  simply  a  probability  weight,  p,  applied  to  an 
individual’s utility function u(x) on a payoff, x: 
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rather, it is a function combining the weighting function, w, and the value function, v; 
                 .          [4] 
Prospect  theory  is  able  to  capture  the  degree  of  divergence  between  the  weight 
individuals  attach  to  likelihoods  and  the  actual  probabilities.  Indeed,  much  work  has 
stemmed from the comparison of eqs. 3 and 4, in an attempt to determine which model best 
accounts  for  behavioural outcomes.  In  order  to  understand  how  our  cognitive  processes 
might  produce  these  functions,  we  must  turn  to  cognitive  psychological  theories  of 
judgement and reasoning. 
Dual-Process Theory and Levels of Numerical Processing 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  I,  many  theories  are  inspired  by  the  concept  of  dual-
processes but they all have a common argument: individuals can process information in two 
generally  distinct  manners.  Type  1  processes  are  generally  fast,  automatic,  high  in 
processing capacity, and low in effort. These processes appear to be more instinctive in 
nature; a style of reasoning we share with animals (Evans, 2009). Type 2 processes are 
generally slow, controlled, limited by working memory, and high in effort. However, these 
processes  afford  us  the  ability  to  perform  abstract  reasoning  and  hypothetical  thinking 
(Evans, 2007a). These two types of reasoning are not necessarily separable into two distinct 
cognitive systems (Evans, 2009). However, they are often referred to as system 1 and system 
2 processing respectively (Stanovich, 2011, Frederick, 2005). 
As discussed in Chapter I, Kahneman and Frederick (2002, 2005) state that, when 
faced with a judgement problem, ‘system 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgement 
problems as they arise’ (type 1 processes) which is followed by system 2 (type 2 processes) 
which ‘monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct or override’ 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; p.269). This description has strong echoes of Evan’s (2007a; 
2007b; 2009) default-interventionism theory.  
Prospect  theory  and  dual  process  theory  originated  in  different  disciplines,  the 
former  being  behavioural  economics/finance  orientated  and  the  latter  developed  from 
learning, logic and reasoning research. Consequently, in order to form connections between 
these theories I examine how dual process theory might capture the processing of numerical 
information.  In  particular,  I  explore  how  type  1  processing  could  propose  an  intuitive 
response to numerical values without fully engaging type 2 processing.  
Levels of Numerical Processing 
Several studies have shown that we possess two distinct and dissociated quantitative 
processing  systems  (Lemer,  Dehance,  Spelke,  &  Cohen,  2003;  Pica,  Lemer,  Izard,  & 35 
 
Dehaene, 2004; Gordon, 2004). The lower level system is a primitive approximating system, 
which  enables  individuals  to  differentiate  between  quantities  and  to  order  according  to 
magnitude. Animals also appear to employ this system. For example, behavioural studies 
have revealed that monkeys can learn to order sets based upon their magnitude (Brannon & 
Terrance, 1998), and this has even been demonstrated in untrained animals (Hauser, Carey, 
& Hauser, 2000). Infants, even those less than one year of age (i.e. before the acquisition of 
words  for  numbers),  have  also  been  shown  to  exhibit  similar  approximate  number 
discrimination and comparison abilities (Brannon, 2002; Wynn Bloom, & Chiang, 2002). In 
addition, certain Native American tribes who do not possess consistent words for numbers 
above 4 and 5, have also been shown to succeed in non-verbal numeracy tasks (Pica et al., 
2004;  Gordon,  2004).  By  contrast,  and  apparently  unique  to  humans,  a  higher  level  of 
numeracy enables us to represent, learn, and manipulate specific numbers using symbols; 
allowing the complex calculations and hypothetical transformations required for higher level 
mathematics (Lemer et al., 2003). Studies of brain damaged patients reveal that this higher 
level numeracy appears to be distinct from other lexical-semantic components of knowledge, 
to the extent that it may be processed in a dissociated system. A study of a patient with 
semantic dementia (Cappelletti, Butterworth, & Kopelman, 2001) showed that the disease 
significantly reduced the patient’s conceptual knowledge and, thus, their ability to perform 
tasks such as being able to name, classify, match, and judge the size of objects in pictures. 
Despite this severe degradation in semantic knowledge, the patient could still perform well 
at reading, writing, and even transcoding Arabic and written verbal numerals, and was able 
to  compare  magnitudes  when  they  were  presented  as  numbers.  However,  the  patient 
performed poorly when asked to discuss the semantics associated with numerical ideas such 
as  arithmetical  operations  or  when  asked  questions  concerning  personal  number  facts 
(Cappelletti et al., 2001). 
  There appears to be a striking link between the two levels of quantitative processing 
and the two reasoning systems associated with dual-process theory. For example, using type 
1 processing we can rapidly and automatically order 645 and 215 in terms of magnitude 
without any need to calculate the exact difference. Similarly, just by a brief glance at Figure 
1 it is clear that the number of points in the left figure is larger than that of the right figure. 
However, should the need arise, we are also capable of employing type 2 processes in order 
to calculate the exact difference (430) or to discover the fact that the number of points in the 
left  box  is  exactly  three  times  as  many  as  in  the  right.  This  dual-process  approach  to 
numerical processing, a rapid and automatic, heuristic, assessment (type 1) versus slow but 
more  precise,  calculative,  assessment  (type  2)    may  help  to  explain  the  distortion  of 




Figure 1. The number of dots and the symbolic representation in numerals can be rapidly 
and automatically ordered by magnitude using type 1 processes but also type 2 processing 
allows complex calculations on the numbers to be made. 
 
A Dual-Process Model of Bounded Quantitative Judgement 
The  model  represented  in  Figure  2  shows  the  heuristic-analytical  (dual  process) 
theory of logical reasoning (Evans, 2006) with two additions (in italics) based on additional 
literature; the lower-level and  higher-level quantitative processes. Based on this default-
interventionist approach (Figure 2) the process of bounded quantitative judgement might 
occur as follows: (1) contextual information gathered by type 1 processing may combine 
with,  direct,  and  possibly  distort,  the  initial,  default,  heuristic  assessments  of  numerical 
magnitude  produced  by  a  lower-level  quantitative  system.  This  forms  the  initial  mental 
model of the choice problem (2). The accuracy of this initial, type 1, model relies heavily 
upon  whether  the  information  is  presented  in  a  manner  which  is  intuitive  to  type  1 
processing. If the information is not presented intuitively (i.e. in a format conducive to type 
1 processing), biases may occur. This initial model is then assessed (3) against a satisficing 
principle  (Evans,  2007a)  or  “feeling  of  rightness”  (Thompson,  2009),  which  determines 
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whether this low level heuristic assessment is perceived to be good enough
1. If “yes” (4) a 
judgement can be made based on this low level magnitude heuristic, if “no” (5) higher level 
quantitative calculations may have to be employed to improve the mental model’s precision.  
Therefore, if the default type 1 model is relied on for a decision (i.e. a (1), (2), (4), 
or a (1), (2), (3), (4) process in Figure 2) then numerical processing accuracy depends on the 
extent to which the risk information mode or frame is conducive to type 1 processing and 
has produced a rapid but accurate mental model. If, however, the default model is assessed 
to be not satisficing (3) and type 2 interventions are to be elicited, then the effect of the risk-
information modes or frames may have a reduced effect or be entirely removed at (5). This 
is likely to depend on the individual’s mathematical abilities. 
 
 
Figure 2. The heuristic–analytic theory (from Evans, 2006) with the addition of levels of 
quantitative  processing  (in  italics):  a  dual-process  account  of  bounded  quantitative 
judgement. 
 
                                                       
1 While his assessment is shown as a system 2 process, Stanovich (2011) recently proposed that this 
type of assessment should be separated from other system 2 processes (algorithmic versus reflective 
minds), and Evans, (2009) considered the potential for a third type of processing (type 3). See Chapter 
III for more discussion of these proposals. 
System 1  
Type 1 Processing 
 










Instruction Set  
General Intelligence 
Working Memory  
Time Available  














  System 2  
Type 2 Processing 
  38 
 
Linking the Dual-Process Explanation of Bounded Quantitative Judgement with 
Prospect Theory 
As  discussed  earlier,  some  risk  modes  (e.g.  relative  frequencies)  may  be  more 
conducive to type 1 processing than others (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1996; Rottenstreich & Kivetz, 2006). These risk modes may lend themselves to more 
effective low-level quantitative heuristic estimates (type 1 processing) of magnitude, i.e. 
assuming higher-level quantitative calculations (type 2 processing) are not involved. Those 
risk modes which are least conducive to type 1 processing should result in the greatest bias 
(assuming type 2 intervention does not occur). The degree of this bias ought to be captured 
by prospect theory’s weighting function, which can be estimated on the basis of a set of 
decisions. However, based on a default-interventionist view, such effects should be removed 
if type 2 processing is involved (Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005).   
The dual process approach discussed above can also account for loss aversion. As 
discussed in Chapter I, it has been proposed that loss aversion has an emotional (type 1 
processing) basis (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), and this has been supported 
by studies of brain damaged patients (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 
2005).  Accordingly,  I  hypothesize  that  type  1  (low-level)  magnitude  judgements  of  a 
number may more greatly exaggerated in loss situations than in gain conditions and that it is 
this effect which is captured by prospect theory’s coefficient for loss aversion, λ, in the value 
function (eq. 1). Importantly, it is not only real losses that may result in loss aversion, but 
also illusory losses, i.e. losses which, based on low-level (type 1) magnitude heuristics, 
appear to be greater than they are in reality.  
In order to test the hypothesized relationships discussed above, I consider, in three 
experiments, the impact of information frames and risk-information modes on numerical 
judgement. The first study is in the domain of forensic court evidence - a clear departure 
from the usual domain of prospect theory. Nevertheless, I do see potential for prospect 
theory to apply. The second study examines horserace betting, a domain which readily lends 
itself to the application of prospect theory. The third study explores investment performance, 
a  domain  strongly  associated  with  prospect  theory.  Despite  differences  between  the 
experiments  in  terms  of  their  proximity  to  domains  normally  associated  with  prospect 
theory, I demonstrate that prospect theory has some value in predicting the effects of the 
contextual  biases  in  all  three  cases.  However,  I  also  show  that  in  all  three  domains  a 
synthesis  of  prospect  theory  and  the  dual-process  approach  provides  the  most  effective 
account of the effects of contextual biases in quantitative judgement. Indeed even in the third 39 
 
study, the domain of which is most closely aligned to prospect theory, I demonstrate that the 
synthesized approach is better than a traditional prospect theory, or normative approach. 
Experiment 1 
Information Frames and Modes in Forensic Court Evidence 
The experiment focused on the presentation of probabilistic forensic evidence (e.g. 
the evidence suggests that there is a 90% chance that the defendant’s fingerprints match 
those found at the crime scene) and test the extent to which contextual biases influence 
innocent/guilty judgements based on this evidence. Given that forensic evidence could be 
presented in terms of a probability or frequency mode, as well as being framed in terms of 
the likelihood of the fingerprints matching or not matching those of the defendant, there is a 
2 x 2 set of ways to describe forensic evidence (see  Table 1). The aim is to use  dual-
processes and prospect theory to predict the effect of these alternative representations of 
information on innocent/guilty decisions. 
 
Table 1. A demonstration of how two modes of representation and two frames can result in 
four ways of representing objectively equivalent forensic evidence. 
  Type 1 Eliciting  Type 2 Eliciting 
  “Match” Frame  “Non-Match” Frame 
Type 1 conducive 
Frequency Mode 
9 in 10 chance that the two 
fingerprint marks originate 
from the same source 
1 in 10 chance that the two 
fingerprint marks do not 
originate from the same 
source 
Type 1 non-conducive 
Percentage Mode 
 
90% chance that the two 
fingerprint marks originate 
from the same source 
 
10% chance that the two 
fingerprint marks do not 
originate from the same 
source 
 
Studies in reasoning have demonstrated that negative propositions (i.e. propositions 
involving  ‘not’,  or  ‘non-’)  are  more  difficult  to  process  and  individuals  take  longer  to 
comprehend the information (Schroyens, Shaeken, Fias, and d’Yewalle, 2000). Accordingly, 
numerical  values  under  a  not-match  frame  (e.g.  probability,  p,  of  not  x)  may  be  more 
computationally demanding. Therefore there is a greater requirement for type 2 processing 
and  higher  level  quantitative  processing  in  order  to  convert  the  information  into  the 
likelihood of fingerprints matching. For example, given the probability of not-x, one must 40 
 
perform explicit mental processes to calculate the probability of x (i.e. probability of x = 
1−p)
2. Whereas, a frame which directly corresponds to the likelihood of guilt (i.e. the match 
frame), is already in the appropriate form (i.e. the probability of  x = p). Consequently, I 
expect  that  the  latter  information  may  be  more  readily  assessed  by  type  1,  low-level, 
processing without type 2 interventions being required. If this is true, I hypothesize that type 
1 processing is more likely to be relied upon in the “match” frame but type 2 intervention 
may be elicited in the “non-match” frame. Type 2 processing intervention should be better 
able  to  remove  any  negative  contextual  effects  associated  with  numerical  information. 
Consequently, I predict an attenuation of any distortive effect of risk-information modes in 
the non-match compared to the match frame on the evaluation of the evidence. In order to 
predict what these contextual distortion effects might be, I turn to prospect theory. 
 
Figure 3. An example of the expected effect of a typical S-shaped bias in prospect theory’s 
probability weighting function on the perceived strength, w(p), of forensic evidence (near 1 
indicates a strong “guilty” weight, whereas near 0 indicates a strong “innocent” weight). A 
high  probability  region,  within  which  forensic  evidence  would  lie,  is  highlighted.  The 
strongest bias would be expected when type 1 processing is relied on (match frame) and the 
mode is not conducive to type 1 processing (percentage mode). 
 
Prospect theory captures the impact of probabilities on assessment via the weighting 
function, w. The traditional prospect theory function involves the underweighting of high 
                                                       
2 Extrapolating from this effect, this theory would predict that numerical values associated with a 
double negation (e.g. probability of not, not x is p) would require even more type 2 processing to 
determine the probability of p (i.e. probability of x = 1− (1−p), therefore probability of x = p). 41 
 
probabilities and overweighting of low probabilities (S-shaped function); determined by the 
γ  parameter.  If  it  is  the  case  that  the  perception  of  probabilistic  information  is  more 
inaccurate when interpreting percentage (cf. frequency) modes, as found by Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage (1995), we should expect the percentage mode to result in a more pronounced S-
shape weighting function of objective probabilities.  
The more pronounced S-shaped weighting function under percentage (cf. frequency) 
mode  would  result  in  high  probabilities  being  more  underweighted.  In  fact,  forensic 
evidence, and hence the probabilities used in the following experiment, are only presented in 
court if they are of sufficiently high probability (evidence which is of low validity is of little 
value to a court). Therefore, I would expect lower perceived strength of forensic evidence 
under percentage mode than under frequency mode (see Figure 3a). If this is the case, the 
synthesis of dual-process theory and prospect theory would predict fewer guilty judgements 
under percentage (cf. frequency) mode as the evidence is afforded less weight in the match 
frame (see Figure 3a).  
Critically, as discussed earlier, dual-process theory predicts when the information 
mode should have less effect on the weighting function. Evans, Handley, Perhnham, Over 
and  Thompson  (2000)  argue  that  if  the  task  involves  type  2  processing  (e.g.  explicit 
reasoning about a numerical word problems) then such framing  modes ought to have a 
reduced  effect;  resulting  from  type  2  processing  intervening  and  remove  the  effects. 
Therefore, I predict that the intervention from type 2 processing, triggered to deal with the 
negation “not”, would reduce the contextual effect of the risk-information mode (frequencies 
versus percentages) on the perceived strength of evidence (see Figure 3b). Therefore, as 
shown in the comparisons of Figures 3a and 3b, I predict an interaction, in which there is a 
greater effect of risk information mode under the type 1 eliciting “match” frame than in the 
type  2  eliciting  “non-match”  frame.  These  predictions  are  tested  in  the  following 
experiment. 
Method 
A  fingerprint  from  the  scene  of  a  crime  was  presented  as  a  source  of  forensic 
evidence in a hypothetical court case. Participants were told the likelihood of the evidence 
matching that of the defendant and were asked to make judgements of the defendant’s guilt. 
The  only  objective  manipulation  involved  the  likelihood  of  the  forensic  evidence  being 
correct.  This  was  manipulated  between  subjects,  along  with  the  risk-information  mode 
(percentage or likelihood format) and the framing of the information (whether the numerical 
values represent the chance of the fingerprint matching or not matching; i.e. p(match) or 1-
p(match)). As the weighting function in prospect theory predicts an effect of the information 42 
 
modes  on  the  perceived  strength  of  evidence,  this  should  impact  on  the  proportion  of 
guilty/innocent verdicts. 
Participants 
In total, 123 undergraduate participants were recruited, including 80 females and 43 
males between the ages of 16 and 47 (M =18.9, SD = 6.6). They were given course credits 
for their participation.  
Design and Procedure 
Participants  were  undergraduate students  at the  University  of  Southampton 
rewarded with course credits. They were given an information and consent form 
prior to each task (see appendix A for an example) and were fully debriefed after the 
experiment.  The  experiment  was  carried  out  in  an  experimental  laboratory.  A 
description of a shoplifting case was constructed, with fingerprints being the only 
available  evidence.  The  participants  were  presented  with  an  instruction  sheet 
detailing what was required of them. Any questions they had were then answered. 
Once the participants were clear on the instructions, they were presented with a sheet 
of paper detailing the crime, alongside the evidence against and in defence of the 
accused. The participants were then given as long as they needed to read the case and 
to draw a verdict of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. Case description for experiment 1: 
 
‘A person was accused of shoplifting. According to a shop owner, when he 
closed up for the evening he found that a camera was missing from its display 
and it had not been paid for. During a police raid of a warehouse of stolen 
goods,  the  camera  was  recovered,  identified  by  its  serial  number.  Police 
recovered several partial finger marks that were deposited on the camera. One 
of the partial finger marks was searched for on a computer database and the 
accused  was  identified  as  a  possible  match,  and  then  further  analysis  was 
carried out by a fingerprint expert. The accused stated that he had not been 
shopping in the store on the day the camera was stolen, and that he had spent 
the day with a friend. His friend testified that this was true, but there was no 
further evidence to confirm this. A fingerprint expert testified that there was 
little clarity and quantity of comparable data within the crime scene mark, but 
went on to say that following his analysis, he estimated that in (… x% / x out of 
100…) cases similar to this case the accused (…would / would not…) have 
deposited the finger mark on the camera.’ 43 
 
Design 
The  experiment  used  a  between-subjects  design.  There  were  three  independent 
variables: the information indicating the likelihood that the fingerprint matched that of the 
defendant, the mode of representation, and the framing. Three levels of the likelihood i.e., 
quantitative information, were employed (p(match) = .93, .91, or .89). Both percentage (e.g., 
93% chance of it being a match) and frequency forms of representation were employed (e.g., 
in 93 out of 100 cases it was a match). The framing was either “match” (e.g., 93% chance of 
the  fingerprint  matching  that  of  the  defendant)  or  “not  match”  (e.g.,  7%  chance  of  the 
fingerprint not matching that of the defendant). The dependent variable was the participants’ 
guilty/innocent verdict. These different conditions were presented between participants such 
that there were twelve between-subjects experimental groups. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Probabilistic Evidence Data 
 
Figure 4. The percentage of individuals that judged the accused guilty under each frame, 
mode, and evidence probability condition 
The results of the experiment are summarized in Figure 4. In order to test the null 
hypothesis  that  the  frames  and  modes  of  presentation  do  not,  but  the  accuracy  of  the 
evidence does, influence judgements of guilt, logistic regression analysis was conducted, 
with  a  guilty/not  guilty  judgement  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  results  revealed  that 
objective probabilities were significantly predictive of choices at the 5% level (one-tailed), b 
= -24.32, SE = 12.97, p <.05. In addition, as predicted by the synthesis of dual-process and 44 
 
prospect theory, the percentage format resulted in significantly fewer guilty judgements than 
the frequency format, b = 1.59, SE = 0.63, p < .05. While the framing alone did not appear to 
influence guilty judgements, b = 0.84, SE = 0.58, p > .05. In addition, as predicted by the 
synthesis of dual-process and prospect theory, an interaction between framing and mode was 
a significant predictor of guilty judgements, b = -1.83, SE = 0.85, p < .05. Indeed, post hoc 
tests  revealed  that  while  there  was  a  significant  difference  between  frequencies  and 
percentages in the rates of guilty verdicts under the match frame (p = .012), there was no 
significant difference in the non-match frame (p = .700). 
The results are consistent with the hypotheses that formats of presenting information 
which elicit greater need for type 2 processing (i.e. the non-match frame) should reduce the 
overall effect of contextual biases on the weighting of evidence (i.e. the effect of frequency 
versus probability modes on the weighting of evidence). However, if a format does not tend 
to elicit a requirement for type 2 processing (i.e. the match frame), we should observe a 
greater effect of contextual biases on the weighting of evidence as type 1 processing is relied 
upon. This interaction is shown in Table 2. The results confirm the dual process theory 
prediction  that  there  should  be  a  greater  difference  in  guilty  verdicts  between  the  risk 
information  modes  under  the  match  frame  (i.e.  greater  effect  of  contextual  biases). 
Furthermore,  as  predicted  by  the  probability  weighting  function  in  prospect  theory,  the 
forensic  evidence  under  the  percentage  mode  appears  to  result  in  fewer  guilty  verdicts, 
indicating that participants were less convinced by the strength of the evidence. Again, as 
predicted  by  the  dual-process  approach,  this  effect  of  the  contextual  information  is 
attenuated  in  the  ‘non-match’  frame,  presumably  due  to  increased  reliance  on  type  2 
processing intervention.  
 
Table 2. The percentage of participants that chose the “guilty” verdict under the match and 
non-match frames for both frequency and percentage information modes.  
 
Percentage Guilty Verdicts 











While this study does suggest that the information modes used can influence the 
weighting of probabilities in line with prospect theory, this conclusion is only inferred from 
the comparison of the interaction in Table 2 and the predictions in Figure 3. It would be 
interesting to employ prospect theory more directly over a greater range of probability 
values. In doing so it would be possible to fit prospect theory functions to behavioural data 
and determine the extent to which the dual-process predictions regarding the effects of the 
information mode are correct. Specifically, I aim to determine whether fitted prospect theory 
parameters reflect the prediction that frequency modes should tend to be less biased than 
probability modes.   
Experiment 2 
The Effect of Pricing Modes in Racetrack Betting 
Experiment  2  involved  a  manipulation  of  the  information  mode  in  the  betting 
domain, and as such, provides an interesting development to the investigation of information 
modes in forensic court evidence. In particular, while horse odds are always applied in a 
single frame (i.e. the likelihood of the horse winning), the probabilities involved are of a 
much greater range than those associated with forensic evidence – especially that presented 
in criminal cases (which is associated with very high probabilities, in a narrow range) . By 
contrast, the winning probabilities of horses (calculated from their odds) tend to range from 
high  (the  favourite),  to  very  low  (longshots).  Accordingly,  while  the  forensic  evidence 
domain  can  provide  insights  into  the  effects  of  risk-information  modes  on  weighting 
functions in near certain situations (see Figure 2), the betting domain offers the prospect of 
developing insights into their effect over a range of likelihoods which allows for the fitting 
of model parameters. 
Normative Models and Violations of Stochastic Dominance 
  In order to evaluate whether risky choice behaviour is consistent with normative 
models, the concept of stochastic dominance is important. First-order stochastic dominance 
is said to hold if a gamble can be ordered as superior to another gamble based on expected 
return (the mean outcome). Second-order stochastic dominance is said to occur if a gamble 
can be ordered with respect to the variance of outcomes (i.e. risk). Normatively, the risk-
information mode should not affect objective measures of expected value or risk. Thus, for 
the same individual (i.e. with the same utility function), stochastic dominance should hold 
for both fractional odds and decimal returns. That is, three prospects which are ordered, a ≥ 
b ≥ c, under the fractional odds pricing mode, should be ordered identically, by the same 46 
 
individual, under a decimal returns format. If the same individual orders the same prospects 
differently  between  these  formats,  then  a  violation  of  first  or  second  order  stochastic 
dominance has occurred. Of course, one might expect random violations in this ordering 
simply  through  random  miscalculations.  Indeed, such  response  variability  is  common  in 
studies of risky choice, with a median rate of preference reversal of 23% (Scott, 2006). 
However, if the violations are systematically related to contextual factors then this would 
suggest that these factors distort the individuals’ perception of the risk information.  
Risk-Information Modes in Betting 
Fractional odds format is in an expected frequency format whereby X/1 implies that 
the horse should lose X and win one race out of a hypothetical X+1 identical races (i.e. “20 
to 1 odds” indicates that the runner will lose 20 times, and win 1 time, out of 21 races). 
Given that expected frequency formats appear to be more conducive to our type 1 
processing, we would expect individuals’ probability weighting of each runner’s winning 
prospects to be fairly accurate under this mode, whether or not type 2 intervention is 
employed. The fractional odds format also informs gamblers that they will win X times their 
stake, should the horse win (i.e. if they bet $1 they would win $20). The same information, 
presented in decimal returns format, is written ‘X+1’; this figure representing the potential 
payoff (return) in units (including stake), based upon a one unit stake bet. Importantly, 
determining the likelihoods under this format is not oriented to type 1 processing. 
Specifically, in order to determine the probability of the horse winning, one must calculate 
the reciprocal of the decimal return, i.e. 1/(X+1).  
Since the two information modes (fractional and decimal odds formats) are 
predicted to differ in respect of the degree to which they facilitate type 1 processing of the 
risks (i.e. the accuracy of type 1 assessment of probability), we can predict how prospect 
theory’s weighting function may reflect this effect. The first hypothesis is that the most 
accurate perception of the runners’ likelihoods should be made under fractional odds mode 
as this is in a relative frequency format. Therefore, I expect that the probability weighting 
function for this format should be relatively undistorted, with weightings which are likely to 
accurately reflect objective probabilities. However, the decimal returns format does not 
represent the likelihoods in a manner I expect to be easily interpreted by type 1 processing; 
specifically, because it requires the calculation of the reciprocals of the decimal return for a 
precise assessment. Therefore, I expect that the probability weighting function under 
decimal returns will be distorted to a greater degree compared to the fractional odds format. 
By  way  of  a  further condition,  I  also  consider  a third  price  mode  which  is not 
currently  used  for  horse-race  odds  but  which  may  provide  further  insight  into  risk 47 
 
information modes. This is a probabilities mode, which explicitly provides the probability of 
a horse winning in a decimal format (e.g. .048, indicating a 4.8% winning chance). This 
format is essentially the counterpart to the decimal returns format, as the decimal return 
(payoff)  can  be  calculated  as  follows:  decimal  return  mode  =  1/probability  mode. 
Importantly, while the probabilities mode clearly emphasizes the likelihoods at the expense 
of the payoffs (in direct contrast to the decimal returns mode), this likelihood information is 
not presented in a relative frequency format. Therefore, I still expect that there will be a 
greater bias in the probability weighting function under the probabilities mode compared to 
the frequency format (fractional odds). These predictions are tested in experiment 2.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty undergraduate students, 65 female, 84 male, and 1 gender 
not-reported, between the ages of 19 and 41 (M =23.24 SD = 4.34), were recruited during a 
class, and were given course credits for their participation.  
Design 
A series of two-horse races were constructed. Two independent variables, both 
within-subjects, were employed. The first related to the magnitude of the differences in the 
winning probabilities of the favourite and the longshot. In particular, participants were 
presented with seven races, ranging from a race in which the winning chance of the favourite 
was close to that of the longshot, to one where the longshot was very unlikely to win. The 
second independent variable was the mode of representation of the information: odds, return, 
and probability format. Each of the seven races was presented using all three representation 
modes. The 21 different permutations of races which were employed in the study are 
presented in Table 3. All the races had an expected value of 1. 
Procedure 
Participants were given a booklet containing an introduction and consent form (see 
Appendix A for an example), information pages describing the types of information 
representations in simple terms, and details of the races. A debriefing form was provided on 
the final page, describing the nature of the experiment. The experiment was carried out in an 
experimental laboratory. Participants were asked to read the booklet and to record their 
decisions in the spaces provided. In order to minimize confusion, the information types were 
presented separately but were counterbalanced between participants. Before each group of 48 
 
races, a page described the subsequent information representation in detail using simple 
language. This approach helped to ensure that participants were clear about the meaning of 
each representation.  
The order in which the items of information appeared was counterbalanced across 
the participants. Furthermore, the order in which the races appeared for each type of 
information was counterbalanced across all participants using a quasi-complete 7x7 Latin 
square. In order to exclude ordering effects, half of the participants received the information 
with the favourite presented above the longshot and the remainder received the information 
with the longshot presented first. Participants were asked to decide, for each race, on which 
horse they would place a hypothetical £1 bet, i.e. whether they would bet on the favourite or 
the longshot. 
 
Table 3. Outline details of the seven races as presented in the three information modes used 
in experiment 2 
    Three Information Modes   










Favourite  4/5  £1.80  .555   0.12 
Longshot  5/4  £2.25  .444  -0.12 
2 
Favourite  4/6  £1.67  .600   0.20 
Longshot  6/4  £2.50  .400  -0.20 
3 
Favourite  1/2  £1.50  .667   0.34 
Longshot  2/1  £3.00  .333  -0.34 
4 
Favourite  4/9  £1.44  .692   0.38 
Longshot  9/4  £3.25  .308  -0.38 
5 
Favourite  1/4  £1.25  .800   0.60 
Longshot  4/1  £5.00  .200  -0.60 
6 
Favourite  1/9  £1.11  .900   0.80 
Longshot  9/1  £10.00  .100  -0.80 
7 
Favourite  1/20  £1.05  .952   0.90 
Longshot  20/1  £21.00  .048  -0.90 
Expected value of each runner in each race = 1 
Modelling 
  In  order  to  test  the  hypotheses  it  was  necessary  to  compare  estimations  for 
probability  weighing  functions  under  each  of  the  three  risk  information  modes. 
Consequently, I used the aggregate proportion of longshot choices made by the participants 49 
 
under each pricing format to estimate prospect theory models for each frame. The fitted 
weighting functions were compared with the predictions outlined above. To achieve this, as 
the choices between bets in a given race involved comparing two potential net gains, only 
two parameters were required: a ʳ value for estimating the average weighting function w, 
and  an  ʱ  value  for  estimating  an  average  value  function,  v.  The  probability  weighting 
function used to compare to the predictions is shown eq. 2, and the value function used in 
the fitting of the models (employed by Köbberling, 2002) was defined as follows: 
    {
  
        
            
            
            
            
         [5] 
  Based on the weighting and value functions, a perceived value, V, for runner j where 
n outcomes are possible (win or not win in this experiment), can be estimated as follows: 
      ∑ [   (   )        ]  
             [6] 
Consequently, the subjective preference (P) for the longshot, l, over the favourite, f, can be 
estimated as follows: 
                            [6] 
  Of course, some degree of random preference reversal ought to be expected. Indeed, 
as differences between prospects become harder to discern (i.e. in race 1), the probability of 
choosing  the  longshot  over  the  favourite  should  near  .5  (Luce,  1959).  Accordingly,  I 
estimated the proportion of longshot (cf.  favourite) choices,  p(l,f), as a standard logistic 
function of the magnitude of preference, 
                                          [7] 
  A grid search was performed to determine which combination of ʱ and ʳ values 
resulted in the predicted proportion of longshots selected, p(l,f). This was achieved by best 
fitting (lowest root mean squared error of prediction, RMSE) the observed proportion of 
longshot choices in each of the pricing modes. The best fitting ʱ parameters for the value 
functions for fractional odds, probabilities and decimal returns were, respectively, −0.609, 
2.314 and 0.000. The best fitting ʳ parameters for the respective weighting functions were: 
1.806, 3.549 and 0.489. These parameters were then used to plot weighting functions for 
each mode; these were compared to the predictions. 
Results and Discussion 
  Figures 5a, b, and c show the proportion of longshot (cf. favourite) choices, p(l,f), 
made by the participants under each of the three risk information modes: fractional odds, 
decimal returns and probabilities. The related estimated average weighting functions are 
shown in Figures 5d, e, and f. The study employed a within subjects design. Consequently, 50 
 
the  data  was  analysed  using  a  repeated  measures  ANOVA
3. Races were ordered by a 
categorical factor (race factor 1 -7) based on the magnitude   of the  absolute  difference 
between alternatives in terms of their winning probability (see Table 3). The results confirm 
that, in terms of the proportion of longshot choices, there was a significant interaction 
between the risk-information mode and the race factor,  F (8.63, 708.02) = 8.30, p < .001. 
This suggests that a systematic reversal in stochastic dominance occurs, i.e. non-normative 
behaviour. The results also showed a main effect of risk-information mode on the number of 
longshot choices, F(2, 164) = 13.06, p < .001. 
Figures 5d, e, and f, display the estimated weighting functions (based on the fitted 
prospect theory models) for the three pricing modes. It is clear from these figures that the 
weighting functions have different shapes. The degree of bias is indicated by the divergence 
of the solid line from the dotted line in Figure 5. As found in experiment 1, the mode which 
appeared to result in the least bias in weighting function was the fractional odds (i.e. least 
divergent from the straight dotted line). Whereas, the decimal returns format results in an 
overweighting of the longshots and underweighting of the favourites (a classic S-shaped 
function), and the probabilities mode results in a stronger underweighting of longshots than 
favourites.  
It is evident from Figures 5 a, b and c that the three risk-information modes result in 
very different choice behaviours. The price formats which emphasize the risk (the fractional 
odds  and  probability  modes)  result  in  a  decline  in  longshot  (riskier)  choices  as  the 
differences  between  the  alternatives  in  terms  of  probability  increase.  In  addition,  as 
predicted, the decimal returns format, which emphasizes the payoffs (cf. risk), appears to 
result in a reversal of this stochastic dominance. Specifically, the same individuals appear to 
choose  the  riskier  longshot  (with  higher  payoff)  more  frequently  as  the  difference  in 
probabilities between the two alternatives increases. It seems likely that the overweighting, 
and hence choice preference towards the longshot in the decimal returns mode, may have 
resulted  from  some  form  of  bias  towards  longshots’  high  returns.  The  reversal  of  this 
preference and underweighting of longshots under probability mode may, similarly, be due 
to a bias towards the favourite’s high probability of winning.  
                                                       
3 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the race independent 
measure, χ
2 (20) = 71.97, p < .05. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .74). The assumption of sphericity had not been 
violated for the mode or representation independent measure, χ
2 (2) =1.93, p = .38. For the interaction 
between race and mode, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, 
χ
2 (77) = 160.53, p < .05. Consequently, the degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .72).  51 
 
The  first  two  studies  have  demonstrated  a  degree  of  confluence  between  dual-
process and prospect theory; a synthesis of these theories enabling better predictions and 
measurement of risky choice behaviour. However, these two studies have only focused on 
the probability weighting function. The next study focuses on the value function and the 
extent to which a synthesis of dual-process and prospect theories can better predict decisions 
evaluating  investment  performance,  i.e.  in  a  domain  which  is  apparently  well  suited  to 
prospect theory approaches.  
 
 
Figure 5. The proportion of longshots (cf. favourites) selected, with lines of best fit for 
(a)fractional odds (b) decimal returns and (c) probabilities price modes, and the impact of 
these modes on the weighting of favourites (p > .5) and longshots (p < .5) for (d) fractional 
odds (e) decimal returns and (f) probabilities. 
Experiment 3 
One of the most important aspects of prospect theory is the use of the loss aversion 
parameter. The parameter attempts to capture the robust funding that we tend to process 
losses  and  gains  differently.  According  to  prospect  theory  loss  aversion  heightens  our 
sensitivity  to  changes  in  perceived  value.  As  I  discussed  in  the  introduction,  this  loss 
aversion appears to be linked to type 1 processes and has been shown to have an emotional 
basis. However, while prospect theory has the loss aversion parameter, it does not capture 52 
 
other  dual-processes  that  might  be  involved  in  the  choice.  In  particular,  the  inputs  into 
prospect theories formulae are the actual calculated changes in value. However, this chapter 
proposes that the individuals could also simply employ low-level magnitude heuristics (see 
Figure 1).  
In this experiment, I consider whether prospect theory may be improved by allowing 
for  the  possibility  of  these  low-level  magnitude  heuristics  being  used  during  bounded 
quantitative judgements. I consider the idea that type 1 magnitude processing might lead to a 
higher  response  to  changes  in  values  which  traverse  higher  place-values  (e.g.,  changes 
across 100s, in values ranging from 100-999) than equal changes at lower place-values (e.g., 
equal changes across 10s in values ranging from 100-999). I define this bounded quantitative 
heuristic,  which  I  term  the  place-value  heuristic,  as  follows:  a  difference  between  two 
numerical values is perceived to be greater in magnitude if the change results in a traversal 
at a higher unit place-value, than a difference which traverses lower unit place-values. For 
example, an increase in value from $490 to $500 might feel more significant at first glance 
than an increase from $480 to $490. This is hypothesized to arise from a greater type 1 
response to a change at the hundred’s (cf. ten’s) place-value level. However, if higher level 
numeracy processing intervenes, by calculating the true percentage changes, it is in fact the 
second alternative that has increased by the most (2.08% compared to 2.04%). 
The  same  could  be  possible  for  losses.  Based  on  the  place-value  heuristic,  a 
reduction in value from $500 to $490 might feel more significant at first glance than a 
reduction  from  $490  to  $480,  whereas  the  percentage  changes  indicate  the  opposite 
conclusion (-2.00% for the first but -2.04% for the second). So the first hypothesis is: if 
individuals use the place-value heuristic, they may make difference choices than would be 
expected  if  they  used  type  2  processing  and  the  normative  strategy  of  calculating  the 
percentage changes.  
Prospect theory, however, has more to say with respect to the above scenarios and in 
particular how it predicts the valuation of the losses compared the gains. Due to the loss 
aversion parameter in prospect theory, the percentage changes in value for losses may be 
perceived to be higher than the actual changes based on the normative strategy. To illustrate, 
I use prospect theory parameter values identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), i.e. ʱ = 
.88, β = .88, λ = 2.25. As shown in Table 4, the absolute percentage gains for a and b are a 
marginally larger than the absolute percentage losses shown in c and d. Therefore, based on 
a normative assessment, the gains are marginally more significant. However, due to the 
exaggeration of the losses by in c and d by the loss aversion parameter, λ, the subjective 
valuation, v(x), of c and d ought to be perceived as more significant than the gains of a and 
b. As the magnitude of the perceived difference between alternatives is usually found to 53 
 
impact on individuals ability to discriminate between choices (Luce, 1959, Fox & Poldrack, 
2008; Luce, 1959; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), this loss aversion effect is likely to 
impact  on  the  probability  of  individuals  choosing  each  alternative.  Thus,  the  second 
hypothesis  is:  individuals  will  be  more  likely  to  differentiate  between  choices  in  loss 
compared to gains situations due to this heightened sensitivity. 
 
Table 4. Predictions derived from traditional prospect theory contrasted with those derived 
from synthesizing dual-process and prospect theories (via recoding the observed changes in 
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However, based on the dual-process concepts I described earlier it seems unlikely 
that individuals would actually calculate the relative differences in all instances (i.e. relying 
on type 2 processes). Rather, I expect that the loss aversion effect may be linked to other low 
level  type  1  processes  such  as  the  use  of  the  place-value  heuristic  I  described  above. 
Accordingly, I consider a synthesis of the place-value heuristic and prospect theories loss 
aversion parameter in an alternative model called the synthesized prospect theory model. 
Specifically, while the traditional prospect theory model uses “percentage change from a 
reference point” input x, the synthesised model replaces the input, x, with the number of 
high-place value traversals. As shown in table 4, while traditional prospect theory would 
order a > b and d > c, the synthesized model would order b > a and c > d due to this change 
in inputs. Note, however, that the loss aversion parameter plays a role in subjective values 
for  both  these  models  when  compared  to  the  normative  model.  Accordingly,  the  third 54 
 
hypothesis is: loss aversion may be associated with the use of place-value heuristics - i.e. if 
the place-value heuristic is used, then this effect ought to be strongest in loss versus gain 
scenarios. These hypotheses were tested in the following experiment. 
Method 
This experiment compared three models (1) a normative model (NRM) based on 
only the percentage change of values, (2) a traditional prospect theory (TPT) model which 
retains this “relative change from a reference point” input but which also considers the role 
of affective processing in the form of sensitivity to losses, and (3) a bounded quantitative 
judgement model, synthesized prospect theory, which retains this loss-sensitivity concept but 
rejects the assumption of higher-level calculations as inputs into the model, replacing them 
with low-level magnitude processing inputs in the form of the place-value heuristic.  
 
Participants 
Ninety-three participants were recruited during a break in class. The mean age was 
23.98 (SD = 3.71) and there were 49 female and 44 male participants. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were undergraduate students at the University of Southampton rewarded 
with course credits. The experiment was carried out in an experimental laboratory. They 
were given an information and consent form prior to each task (see appendix  A for an 
example) and were fully debriefed after the experiment. In total there were twelve binary 
choices, six involved judging gains and six involved judging losses (see Table 5). Each of 
the choices had the same absolute change in value of  +/- 2,204. However, as shown in table 
5, the place values traversals were counterbalanced with the percentage changes such that 
the percentage changes would be congruent and incongruent with the place-value heuristic 
choices across both gain and loss situations. To eliminate ordering effects, a 12 × 12 latin 
square design was used resulting in 12 different orders of the questions whereby each of the 




Table 5. The twelve binary choices offered to participants with the mathematically optimal choice (Relative Difference) the Rational Prospect Theory 
predictions (TPT), and the synthesis of the place-value heuristic with prospect theory (SPT) predictions. 
 
























NRM/TPT and SPT 
1 
A  17,911  20,115  0.123 
B > A 
0.1582 
B > A 
3  2.63 
A > B  Incongruent 
B  17,098  19,302  0.129  0.1648  2  1.84 
2 
A  17,010  14,806  -0.130 
B > A 
-0.3726 
B > A 
-3  -5.92 
B > A  Congruent (B) 
B  17,901  15,697  -0.123  -0.3562  -2  -4.14 
3 
A  18,089  20,293  0.122 
B > A 
0.1569 
B > A 
2  1.84 
B > A  Congruent (B) 
B  17,900  20,104  0.123  0.1583  3  2.63 
4 
A  17,908  15,704  -0.123 
B > A 
-0.3561 
B > A 
-2  -4.14 
A > B  Incongruent 
B  18,004  15,800  -0.122  -0.3544  -3  -5.92 
5 
A  97,904  100,108  0.023 
B > A 
0.0355 
B > A 
3  2.63 
A > B  Incongruent 
B  97,098  99,302  0.023  0.0358  2  1.84 
6 
A  102,911  100,707  -0.021 
A > B 
-0.0764 
A > B 
-2  -4.14 
A > B  Congruent (A) 
B  102,001  99,797  -0.022  -0.0770  -3  -5.92 
7 
A  96,902  99,106  0.023 
A > B 
0.0358 
A > B 
3  2.63 
A > B  Congruent (A) 
B  97,030  99,234  0.023  0.0358  2  1.84 
8 
A  101,903  99,699  -0.022 
B > A 
-0.0771 
B > A 
-2  -4.14 
A > B  Incongruent 
B  102,030  99,826  -0.022  -0.0770  -3  -5.92 
9 
A  7,098  9,302  0.311 
A > B 
0.3573 
A > B 
2  1.84 
B > A  Incongruent (A) 
B  7,911  10,115  0.279  0.3248  3  2.63 
10 
A  10,001  7,797  -0.220 
B > A 
-0.5945 
B > A 
-3  -5.92 
B > A  Congruent (B) 
B  10,911  8,707  -0.202  -0.5507  -2  -4.14 
11 
A  7,098  9,302  0.311 
B > A 
0.3573 
B > A 
2  1.84 
B > A  Congruent 
B  6,911  9,115  0.319  0.3658  3  2.63 
12 
A  12,001  9,797  -0.184 
A > B 
-0.5064 
A > B 
-3  -5.92 
B > A  Incongruent 
B  11,911  9,707  -0.185  -0.5098  -2  -4.14  
 
Models 
The  normative  model  (NRM)  is  simply  based  on  the  relative  difference  in  the 
prospects. It will always choose the gaining prospect that has the largest relative gain and the 
losing prospect with the smallest relative loss. The relative difference (r) was calculated as 
following, whereby xn is the current value of the stocks and xn-1 was the original value, 
11 ( ) ( )/max( , ) n n n n r x x x x x   .         [8] 
A probabilistic prediction is determined as follows: the probability of choosing A over B, 
P(A,B), is predicted by 
( , ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) N P A B F d F r A r B    ,        [9] 
where F is a function (see below) of the difference between the alternatives in their objective 
relative changes in value (see Luce, 1959, Fox & Poldrack, 2008; Luce, 1959; Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993). Note that for a deterministic prediction, A would be chosen when dN > 0, 
B is chosen when dN < 0. 
The  traditional  prospect  theory  (TPT)  model  makes  the  same  deterministic 
predictions as the normative  model. However, the loss aversion parameter in the model 
means that it predicts stronger preferences in loss, compare to gain, situations as the loss 
aversion parameter heightens perceptual sensitivity. The value functions for gains and losses 
for the traditional model are, vT, is as follows (where ʱ = .88, β = .88, λ = 2.25): 
( ) ( ) T v x r x
  ,  in gain scenarios,        [10] 
( ) ( ( )) T v x r x
     , in loss scenarios.       [11] 
Thus,  ( , ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) T T T P A B F d F v A v B            [12] 
For the synthesized prospect theory (SPT) model, the inputs are not the relative difference 
between  alternatives  but rather the  number  of  high  place  value  traversals t made by the 
prospect x. Thus, the value function under the synthesized model, vS, is as follows: 
( ) ( ) S v x t x
  , in gain scenarios,        [13] 
( ) ( ( )) S v x t x
     , in loss scenarios,        [14] 
Thus,  ( , ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) S S S P A B F d F v A v B    .        [15] 
Again, as a deterministic prediction, A would be chosen when dS > 0 and B is chosen when 
dS < 0. 57 
 
The three models (NRM, TPT, and SPT) aimed to predict the likelihood that A would be 
chosen over B based on the perceived difference dX which was different for each model (dN, 
dT, or dS). As our participants each answered 12 questions (a within-subjects design) there 
was the possibility of correlation within participants across questions. This was controlled 
for  by  using  a  linear  mixed  model  methodology  which  allowed  the  participant  to  be  a 
random  variable  entering  on  the  intercept.  The  probability  of  choosing  A  over  B  was 
predicted as follows. 
( , ) ( ) [ ( ) ] X j Xij ij P A B F d f d        ,      [16] 
jj p   .            [17] 
where  the  intercept ʱ  can  vary  depending  on  the  participant  pj  resulting  in  the  random 
intercept ʱj, the coefficient β acts on the difference function, d specified by model X, (where 
X may be N for the NRM model, T for the TPT model, and S for the SPT model), for 
question  i. The function f is a standard binomial function on this linear term. 
Results and Discussion 
Having fitted each of the three probabilistic models they were compared based on 
log-likelihood  tests  (see  Table  6).  The  intercept  model  simply  assumes  that  the  best 
prediction of the data is the intercept, or aggregate mean percentage of ‘A’ choices. This is 
the  null  hypothesis  that  none  of  the  experimental  manipulations  have  an  effect  with 
individuals choosing A over B at a constant rate across each condition. The NRM model is 
compared  based  on  improvements in  Log  Likelihood  (LogLik)  and finds that  the  NRM 
model does not significantly improve on this null hypothesis model. This suggests that the 
percentage change in prospects is not a significant predictor of choices overall and that 
participants are therefore, not behaving in accordance with this normative strategy.  
Table 6. Chi Squared Model Selection Tests. NRM indicates the normative model, TPT is 
the traditional prospect theory model, and SPT is the synthesis of prospect theory and the 
place-value heuristic. Chi Squared (Chisq) tests evaluate the current model against the mode 
from the previous row for significant decreases in Log Likelihood (LogLik). 
Model  Df  AIC  BIC  LogLik  Chisq  Sig 
intercept  2  1546.4  1556.4  -771.19  -  - 
NRM  3  1546.5  1561.6  -770.26  1.8725  0.1712 
TPT  3  1541.4  1556.5  -767.71  5.0902  < 2.2e-16 *** 
SPT  3  1523.7  1538.8  -758.86  17.692  < 2.2e-16 *** 
 58 
 
However,  the  results  in Table  6  do show  that  traditional  prospect theory  model 
(TPT) can more accurately predict the probability of choosing A over B than the normative, 
NRM, model. As the only difference between the NRM and the TPT models is the use of a 
loss aversion coefficient in the model (λ) which results in a greater perceptual sensitivity to 
losses compared to gains, this indicates that loss aversion is important in predicting choice 
behaviour. This supports the traditional prospect theory concept of loss aversion impact on 
perceptual  sensitivity  towards  gains  versus  losses.  Essentially,  while  the  relative  change 
overall  does  not  significantly  predict  choices,  when  the  percentage  change  is  linked  to 
prospect theories loss aversion coefficient choices are better accounted for.  
More importantly, however, was the finding that the synthesised model, SPT, was 
an even better predictor than the traditional prospect theory model. This indicates that while 
loss aversion is important in predicting the results, the place-value heuristic inputs are a 
stronger predictor of choices than the relative change in value inputs. This suggests that both 
the place-value heuristic (a dual-process theory factor) and loss aversion (a prospect theory 
factor) are both important when attempting to account for choices. In order to find out where 
this effect lies, Figure 6 shows the percentage of A choices made by participants under the 
congruency and gain/loss conditions. 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of A choices under each 2 × 2 congruency conditions of the actual 
percentage change and the number of place value traversals for gains and losses. 
 
Figure 6 shows why the synthesized model was the better predictor as the place-
value shows a greater effect on choices than the relative change. Furthermore, the effect of 
place-value heuristic appears to be greater in the loss than in the gain situations. This reveals 
why it is that the synthesis of the place-value heuristic combined with prospect theories loss 
aversion parameter was the best account of choices. Also, note that overall there appears to 
be a congruency effect in losses whereby there is a stronger effect on choices when type 1 59 
 
processing (in the form of the percentage change) and the type 2 processing (in the form of 
the place-value heuristic) are congruent than when they are incongruent, but that this is only 
observed in the choices involving losses.  
This study demonstrates that low-level magnitude processes such as the place can be 
better predictors of choices than assuming the use of higher-level calculations. Furthermore, 
while prospect theory can improve our prediction over normative models due to its ability to 
model the impact of the loss aversion on sensitivity to changes, its weakness is that it relies 
on assumptions of higher-level calculations falling into the “cognitive and consequentialist” 
trap discussed in the introduction to this chapter. When some of the principles of prospect 
theory  (sensitivity  to  losses)  are  combined  with  dual-process  ideas  such  as  low-level 
magnitude heuristics, the results show that predictions of choices can be greatly improved. 
General Discussion 
The aim of this article was to improve our understanding of contextual biases in the 
evaluation of numerical information. I attempted to achieve this via a synthesis of dual-
process concepts and prospect theory. The predictions based on this synthesized approach 
were shown to be effective predictors of the effects of contextual biases on judgements and 
decisions concerning numerical information. In particular, I believe the approach provides 
an  effective  means  of  better  understanding  the  nature  and  characteristics  of  bounded 
quantitative judgements. 
The  first  experiment  employed  a  combination  of  dual-process  theory  and  a 
traditional  S-shaped  probability  weighting  function  from  prospect  theory  to  predict  the 
perceived  strength  of  forensic  evidence  under  different  risk-information  modes  (under 
“match” vs. “not-match” frames). It was revealed that individuals were more likely to be 
influenced by the type of risk information mode in “match” frames than in “non-match 
frames”. This was hypothesized to result from a greater use of type 2 processing when faced 
with  “non-match”  framed  information.  The  effect  of  the  risk  information  modes  in  the 
“match” (cf., “non-match”) frame was consistent with the idea that probabilistic information 
presented as percentages is less effectively processed by type 1 processing than as relative 
frequency format. In particular, the reduction in guilty verdicts under the percentage (cf. 
relative frequency) formats was consistent with the underweighting of high probabilities 
attributed  to  prospect  theory’s  S-shaped  probability  weighting  curve.  This  clearly  has 
important implications for the recent adoption of probabilistic evidence in court and how 
contextual factors, such as information modes and frames, can have a significant effect on 
individuals’  perceptions  of  the  strength  of  forensic  evidence  and  ultimately  on  their 
guilty/innocent judgements. 60 
 
The  second  experiment,  associated  with  a  betting  task,  assess  the  role  of  risk 
information  modes  in  more  detail  measuring  the  impact  on  the  estimated  weighting 
functions in prospect theory. Dual-process theory was able to predict the nature of fitted 
prospect  theory  probability  weighting  functions  which  indicated  that  the  least  distorted 
weighting of probabilities was, again, under a relative frequency format (fractional odds 
mode). The weighting function under decimal returns mode was distorted following the 
classic  S-shaped  prospect  theory  probability  weighting  function.  The  third  type  of  odds 
format, which explicitly presented the probabilities (probabilities mode), resulted in a greater 
distortion  in the  weighting  function  compared to that  induced  by  the relative  frequency 
format. Overall, these distortions in the perception of the alternatives resulted in preference 
reversal and reversal of stochastic dominance such that riskier alternatives were preferred 
under decimal returns format, and safer alternatives were preferred under fractional odds and 
probabilities format. I interpret this effect as evidence of a bias brought about by the modes: 
decimal  returns  result  in  a  bias  towards  the  longshot  (highest  paying),  whereas  the 
probabilities mode results in a bias towards the favourite (lowest risk). 
The third experiment considered how the dual-process inspired idea of a low-level 
numerical processing, the place-value heuristic, could be integrated with prospect theory’s 
value weighting function to predict overreaction to changes in investment value. The results 
showed  that  participants  were  more  sensitive  to  changes  in  high  place-value  than  in 
percentage  changes  in  value  and  that  this  effect  was  most  strongly  observed  in  loss 
scenarios. Accordingly, the synthesized prospect theory model was superior to the traditional 
prospect  theory  model  or  the  normative  model.  This  finding  has  clear  implications  for 
understanding overreaction in market behaviour, especially in times of falling market prices.  
  The fundamental aspect of the dual-process theory employed in these studies was 
default-interventionism, the idea that our deliberation process evolves over time depending 
on assessments against the satisficing principle (Evans, 2007a). Initially, our default process 
in handling numbers tends to be heuristic, involving type 1 processing (low-level magnitude 
heuristics). This, I believe, is important in resulting in the value and weighting functions 
observed in the fitting of prospect theory functions. If the decision-maker perceives that this 
initial, heuristic, mental model is not sufficiently effective or that the task requires a more 
careful and calculative approach. The latter approach is more time consuming but produces 
more precise calculations which may have the effect of removing the biasing effects of 
presentational  formats  and  perhaps  reducing  or  eliminating  the  distortions  displayed  in 
prospect theory’s value or weighting functions. 
Support for the idea that type 2 processing can be used to remove contextual biases 
in numerical processing is found in a set of experiments performed by Peters, Västfjäll, 61 
 
Slovic,  Metz,  Mazzocco,  and  Dickert  (2006).  The  studies  compared  individuals  with 
different levels of numeracy (type 2 processing ability: determined by scores in a probability 
test), on common framing/mode tasks. The results demonstrated that individuals with high 
(cf. low) numeracy tended to retrieve and use appropriate numerical principles and thus were 
better able to remove contextual biases. This fits with the default-interventionism idea of the 
dual-process framework in which those individuals that can employ effective higher level 
numerical processes should be better able to override the effects of task-irrelevant features.  
Further evidence in support of the dual-process approach to gain/loss framing is 
found in studies of brain activation. Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, and Just (2005) employed 
brain  activation  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI)  to  reveal  that  different 
frames resulted in different levels of cognitive effort (measured by brain activation). This, in 
turn, mediated the likelihood that a participant would calculate expected values (higher-level 
calculations) or would simply rely on emotional (type 1) heuristics. This finding is exactly as 
would be expected based on the dual-process model shown in Figure 2. 
In  conclusion,  a  wide  variety  of  real-world  decisions  regarding  numerical 
information may be made under contextual bias, and this study has demonstrated how a 
synthesis  of the theory  of  cognitive  processes (dual-process  theory) and  static-economic 
models  of  choice  (prospect  theory)  can  offer a  powerful approach  for predicting  choice 
behaviour. In contrast to relying purely on “cognitive and consequentialist” models that only 
employ “expectation-based calculus to arrive at decisions” (Loewenstein, Weber, and Hsee, 
2001), this synthesized approach proved useful in three diverse tasks derived from three 
different real-world domains.  
In the domain of JDM, dual-processes are often neglected in the literature in favour 
of quantitative-economic approaches such as prospect theory (Evans, 2007a). It is hoped that 
the  synthesized  approach  outlined  in  this  study  may  go  some  way  towards  a  more 
encompassing  theoretical  approach  to  decision  analysis.  Finally,  it  is  hoped  that  the 
consideration of dual-processes may further extend the recent interest into how we may 
enhance individuals’ ability to employ numerical information (Peters, Dieckmann, Västfjäll, 
Metz, Slovic & Hibbard, 2009) to improve their decision-making. 
 
Summary Points 
o  Dual-process  theory  has  much  to  offer  quantitative  JDM  modelling;  both  in 
explaining why certain functions are required to account for choices as well as in 
developing new, more effective, quantitative models of decision behaviour. 
o  Far from considering dual-process theory and prospect theory in isolation, I aimed to 
demonstrate the benefits of a synthesized approach to decision-analysis. 62 
 
o  Based on this study, I conclude that dual-process theory combined with quantitative 
approaches  to  decision  modelling  may  be  useful  in  exploring  the  role  of  early 
information biases. 
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Chapter III – Literature Review and Model Simulations 
“Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious, than to be able to decide.” 
- Napoleon Bonaparte (1769 - 1821) 
Introduction 
Chapter I sought to introduce the topic of early-informational biases during JDM 
and  a  potentially  useful  dual-process  theory  concept;  default-interventionism.  Chapter  II 
considered  how  a  default-interventionist  view  of  numerical  processing  and  the  static-
quantitative model, prospect theory, may be synthesized to account for the role of contextual 
biases  in  risky  decisions  involving  numerical  information.  An  important  finding  was  a 
synergistic  effect  whereby  behaviour  could  be  best  predicted  by  a  dual-process  account 
combined with prospect theory.  
The experiments clearly demonstrated that dual-process concepts have much to offer 
JDM research, particularly with respect to developing more effective quantitative models. 
However, while Chapter II did indicate that a dual-processes and quantitative JDM models 
can  work  together,  prospect  theory  demonstrated  some  limitations  for  modelling  early-
informational  biases.  For  example,  prospect  theory  could  predict  the  nature  and 
characteristics of certain biases but could not predict when the biases should/should not be 
observed. For this the consideration of dual-processes was required. Prospect theory could 
be used to predict and measure the nature of some of the processes (e.g. relative frequency 
versus probability modes) but it failed to predict others (e.g. the use of the  place-value 
heuristic). Furthermore, it could not predict the removal of the bias effects due to type 2 
intervention  as  shown  in  the  “non-match”  condition  in  experiment  1.  Also,  given  that 
default-interventionism is strongly tied to the temporal differences between the rapid type 1 
processes and the slow type 2 processes, I feel that the static modelling approach is likely to 
be limited in its capacity for representing some of the most important aspects of default-
interventionism. 
Based on this initial conclusion, in this chapter, I examine the dual-process theory 
literature in more detail with particular interest paid to the recent theories regarding the 
mediation of default-interventionism. Based on this literature I depart from a static-oriented 
modelling approach, and instead focus on dynamic modelling techniques. Thus, while the 
previous chapter used dual-processes to adapt prospect theory (a deconstructive approach by 
my definition), this chapter considers how it might be possible to build a dynamic model 
based on dual-process principles (a constructive approach by my definition). 
  64 
 
The Satisficing Principle: A Third Type? 
As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  the  dual-process  mechanism  that  seems  most 
relevant to the focus of this thesis is default-interventionism. Under default-interventionism, 
individuals form early impressions based on type 1 processes and the involvement of this 
early information in the final judgement has something to do with the satisficing principle 
(Evans, 2007a) and the intervention of type 2 processes.  
According to the satisficing principle, the influence of early, type 1, responses may 
depend on whether an individual judges the early response is sufficient to form a judgement 
or make a decision. For this to be true there must be some degree of assessment made by a 
monitoring system which forms this satisficing judgement. Thompson (2009) proposes that 
the assessment of the initial type 1 response may be triggered by a ‘feeling of rightness’ that 
is processed in parallel with the content of the type 1 process. Indeed, recently it has been 
suggested  that  we  may  be  required  to  account  for  a  third  type  of  processing  (type  3 
processing) which is concerned with resolving the conflict between both type 1 and type 2 
responses (Evans, 2009) and relates to individuals’ cognitive styles (Stanovich, 2011). On 
this  basis,  Stanovich  (2011)  has  presented  a  tripartite  development  of  the  dual-process 
account. System 1 remains the same as the original dual-process theory, often referred to as 
the TASS (the autonomic set of sub-systems). The proposal was that system 2 should be 
separated into two sub-systems: the algorithmic and the reflective systems. The algorithmic 
system  is  much  closer  to  the  traditional  set  of  systems  involved  in  type  2  responses; 
performing  hypothetical  thinking,  abstract  logical  reasoning,  higher-level  quantitative 
calculations, etc. The reflective system represents the monitoring system (type 3 processing) 
which evaluates an individual’s judgements according to the satisficing principle. 
Stanovich  (2011)  based  his  proposal,  in  part,  on  some  important  problems  he 
observed with tests of executive functioning and other traditional intelligence or aptitude 
tests. His central argument was that these tests measure the algorithmic system but not the 
reflective system. In traditional intelligence tests, the performance level is dictated by the 
test which generally attempts to detect the limits of an individual’s algorithmic thinking 
ability.  Differences  in  the  efficiency  (some  tasks  are  measured  by  response  time)  and 
effectiveness (e.g. whether mistakes were made or not) of the algorithmic system strategies 
employed by candidates represents the variation in their performance. However, in the real 
world, the performance level is usually self-defined. Individuals may not extend to the limits 
of their algorithmic thinking ability due to ‘cognitive miserliness’. Thus, individuals may 
perform below their maximum potential in real world tasks due to the employment of the 
satisficing principle. Indeed, Stanovich (2011) describes how individuals with high scores in 65 
 
intelligence tests (i.e. high algorithmic thinking abilities) are not necessarily immune from 
type 1 biases in experiments. According to his theory, these biases are not the result of a lack 
of effective tools, what Stanovich (2011) refers to as mindwear, as they are individuals with 
high algorithmic thinking abilities. Rather, the biases are due to a lack of motivation to use 
them. The reflective system therefore determines whether the individual will be a cognitive 
miser or not, i.e. whether the individual will tend towards more rational, careful, thinking or 
more ‘quick-and-dirty’ heuristics
4.  
The concept of a third type of processing also reflects the large amount of literature 
regarding thinking dispositions (Stanovich & West, 1997). For example, some individuals 
tend to have a greater  need for cognition than others (see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & 
Jarvis,  1996).  In  accordance  with  Stanovich’s  (2010)  argument  that  general  intelligence 
measures tap a different cognitive system to the systems relating to the satisficing principle, 
the relationship between a desire for a conclusive answer and intelligence has been observed 
to be non-significant (r = -.17; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Furthermore, while individuals 
can differ in their cognitive miserliness based on personality differences (such as a need for 
cognition), as outlined in the introduction, motivated reasoning research also reveals that 
individuals  can  adapt  their  thinking  in  different  situations  due  to  external  pressures  or 
motivations.  
All these ideas are critical to the investigation into the role of early information as it 
appears as though individuals have the ability to employ the third type of processing to 
determine whether they will be more or less cognitively miserly in different situations. The 
general idea is that when an individual constrains their cognition they will rely on the early 
information from type 1 processing. Those that are motivated to cognize  more carefully 
about a problem may rely less on the early information and instead employ more careful 
reasoning using the type 2 processing.   
Strategy-Oriented versus Criteria-Oriented Decision Theories 
  In introducing a third type of processing, this new tripartite model differs in a subtle 
way to the traditional conceptualization of bounded decision-making in other JDM theories.  
Adaptive JDM behaviour refers to the concept of employing different decision strategies 
based on motivational and stress reasons. The cost/benefit approach (Beach & Mitchell, 
1978; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988) which argues that individuals trade off accuracy 
and cognitive effort. The stress approach (Janis & Mann, 1977) proposes that environmental 
                                                       
4 Note that, as pointed out by Evans (2009), while the term ‘heuristics’ could be applied to type 1 
responses it could also refer to a ‘rule which is consciously learnt and applied’ (Evans, 2009, p.36), 
i.e. type 2 processes can also be heuristic. 66 
 
pressure  induces  stress  which  in  turn  forces  individuals  to  switch  strategy.  Finally,  the 
evolutionary approach (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), argues that individuals tend to prefer the 
fastest and most frugal strategy and adapt according to the environment and context of the 
decision. All these theories propose that there is only one aspect to adaptive decision-making 
processes, and that is that individuals change the strategy they employ. For example, Payne, 
Bettman & Johnson’s (1993) adaptive decision-maker theory argues that individuals may 
select from a variety of strategies to make judgements and choices. These strategies are seen 
as a “toolbox” of strategies each of which may vary in terms of speed-accuracy tradeoff 
criteria. For example, there are models of simple heuristic processes, such as take-the-best 
(TTB) which reflects the employment of a simple rule of thumb, such as relying on one 
attribute seen to be a reasonably valid indicator (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). At the other 
end of the scale, there are more complex models which would require extensive  type 2 
processing to arrive at a solution such as weighted-additive rules and lexicographic ordering 
rules. For example, the weighted-additive-rule (WADD) is a compuationally costly strategy 
whereby all relevant attributes for each alternative are weighted for importance and then 
summed and the highest valued alternative is selected (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  
The  difference  between  this  toolbox  approach  and  the  default-interventionist 
approach is the role of type 3 processes in each. Under a toolbox approach, it is unclear as to 
howt the agent is expected to select a satisyficing strategy for the task prior to performing 
any judgement behaviour. Indeed it is often assumed that when we observe an individual 
making a judgement, then they must have chosen a strategy a priori and are simply then 
enacting it. For more details on the adaptive decision-maker theory refer to Payne, Bettman, 
and  Johnson  (1988,  1993).  However,  the  role  of  type  1  processing  is  not  clear  in  this 
account. If a type 1 reponse is considered to be just another type of “strategy” from the 
toolbox, the the theory implies that type 1 processing can only be employed if it is assessed 
to have been strategically more appropriate than  for the decision being made. This clearly 
does not capture the automaticity of type 1 processes and such a theory of type 1 processing 
falls into the “cognitive and consequentialist” trap discussed earlier. 
 The  default-interventionist  approach  outlined  in  Chapter  I  differs  from  this 
strategic-oriented view of bounded rationality. Instead of allocating type 1 processes via 
strategic thinking, individuals default to more type 1 driven responses if they are available to 
make  the  decision,  and  subsequent  strategic  behaviour  is  enacted  in  an  interventionist 
capacity depending on an ongoing and iterative assessment based on the satisficing principle 
(see Figure 1 in Chapter I). Thus, the final “strategy” that we observe in an individual’s 
choice behaviour (e.g. a quick heursitic response versus a slow analysis) need not be clearly 
defined and selected at the outset (a pre-emptive conflict model), but may rather be the 67 
 
product of the point at which type 3 processing deems the judgement to be satsifycing. This 
resolves  the  rather  difficult  problem,  seemingly  ignored  by  the  adaptive  decision-maker 
theorists, regarding how the appropriate strategies can be selected a priori. Simply, the so 
called  “decision  strategy”  does  not  have  to  be  always  selected  from  the  outset  from  a 
toolbox.  Rather,  an  adaptive  strategy  may  be  employed  which  begins  more  type  1  and 
heuristic-orientated and evovles into a more type 2 and anlytic-oriented strategy during the 
course  of  the  decision.  The  evovling  deliberation  is  assessed  iteratively  against  some 
statisficing criterion during the course of the decision only stopping the deliberation process 
once the statisficing criterion is met (See Figure 1 in Chapter 1). Accordingly, in contrast to 
the toolbox approach, the strategy does not necessarily define the judgement criteria. Rather, 
the criteria – the point at which the judgement is deemed satsifycing – determines the extent 
of the strategy that ends up being employed.  
If decision-making strategies do indeed follow this default-interventionist approach, 
the modulation of type 1 responses versus subsequent type 2 responses requires a criterion-
oriented, rather than strategy-oriented, mechanism. I define this criterion as some measure of 
the  current  mental  model  based  on  a  satisficing  assessment  made  by  a  third  type  of 
processing.  The  question  remains  as  to  how  best  to  model  this  type  3  processing  as  a 
criterion-dependent mechanism in a quantitative model. 
Sequential Sample Models and Four Default-Interventionism Characteristics 
Four Characteristics 
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, I consider how one might be able to 
draw more concrete links between the quantitative JDM approaches and dual-process theory. 
In doing so I considered that a criterion-oriented, rather than strategy-oriented mechanism 
better represents default-interventionism, particularly with regards to the notion of a third 
system (type 3 processing). Based on this literature, I outline four key default-interventionist 
principles (see Table 1) that I believe would be important in capturing this view of adaptive 
decision-making. Note that there are many other aspects of dual-process literature that are 
not captured in Table 1. However, I consider these four aspects to be most relevant to the 
goal  of  developing  an  initial  quantitative  model  for  understanding  early  versus  late 
information JDM. The successes and limitations of a simplistic quantitative model based on 
these features will form the basis of the rest of this thesis and serves as a starting point for 
future research. I shall return to these limitations and future directions in Chapter VII. 
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Table 1. The four default-interventionist characteristics that I shall attempt to capture in a 
criterion-oriented dynamic decision model 
Characteristic  Description 
(1) Dynamic  The model must be dynamic (rather than static) in order to capture 
default-interventionism; i.e. the idea that early type 1 processing 
tends to occur in the first instance and is then followed by 
subsequent type 2 processing as required.  
(2) Type 1 Default Response  Type 1 response should be rapid, automatic, and default 
 
(3) Type 2 Intervention  Type 2 processing should be slow, effortful, time consuming, and 
subsequent to the type 1 response 
(4) Type 3 Processing - 
Satisficing Principle 
The impact of type 1 and type 2 processing will be determined by a 
satisficing criterion mechanism (type 3 processing), rather than a 
priori selection. 
 
Sequential Sample Models 
In the domain of mathematical psychology, there are dynamic-quantitative models 
termed sequential sample models which are derived from models of memory, perception, 
and categorisation (Link & Heath, 1975; Nosofsky & Pameri, 1997; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff 
& Smith, 2004; Vickers, 1979). I believe that these models may be useful for capturing the 
four elements described in Table 1. 
 The basic premise is that our ability to perceive differences and distinguish stimuli 
from noise depends on whether the perceived stimulus can elicit a strong enough response to 
pass the criterion threshold and trigger a response. Considering a two-choice decision (A or 
B),  sequential  sample  models  propose  that  individuals  will  attend  to  attributes  or  cues 
relating to the decision and that this elicits a valence value, e.g., VA(n) – VB(n) (Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993), in the decision maker’s mind. This random variable represents a singular 
evaluation of one aspect of the choice problem at a specific point in time resulting in a 
momentary bias towards one choice over another. This sample, n, constitutes just one of the 
many samples taken during deliberation. 
The decision maker will then consider other aspects of the choice problem in a 
sequential manner, each time forming valence values. The sum, at a particular point in time, 
of all these individual samples from the choice problem defines the accumulated preference 
(P) state at that time. A positive value,  P > 0, indicates a momentary bias towards the 
positive threshold, say choice A, and a negative value, P < 0, indicates a momentary bias 
towards  the  alternative,  say  choice  B.  As  more  valences  are  gathered  over  time,  the 69 
 
preference state fluctuates over time; sometimes in favour of choice A and at other times in 
favour  of  choice  B.  Busemeyer  and  Townsend  (1993)  describe  a  basic  process  of  the 
accumulation of valence states into changing preferences. 
Initial preference state, P(1) = [VA(1) – VB(1)],                                 [1a] 
Second preference state, P(2) = P(1) + [VA(2) – VB(2)],                 [1b] 
nth preference state, P(n) = P(n-1) + [VA(n) – VB(n)],          [1c] 
To summarise the overall effect across individuals and within an individual across 
different  trials,  these  numerous  samples  of  valence  are  accumulated  in  a  random  walk 
fashion resulting in an average drift which defines the general direction and velocity of the 
accumulation  and  overall  preference.  This  drift  occurs  until  the  accumulation  reaches  a 
threshold,  θ,  which  ends  the  deliberation  and  a  choice  is  made  (for  a  more  detailed 
explanation, see Albert, Aschenbrenner, & Schmalhofer, 1988; Aschenbrenner, Albert, & 
Schmalhofer,  1984;  Busemeyer  &  Townsend,  1993;  Diederich,  1997;  Diederich,  2003; 
Wallsten & Barton, 1982).  
Figure 1 shows a depiction of a random walk in which an individual’s preference 
varies  over  time  fluctuating  between  choices  A  and  B  until  finally  the  preference  state 
reaches a threshold. Presumably, the individual first considers some aspects in favour of 
choice A and then considers some positive aspects of B over A. Finally, a strong attribute in 
favour of A is enough to accumulate the preference state past the decision threshold for A. 
The arrow shows the general drift direction which defines the average time taken to choose 
and  the  probability  that  A  will  be  chosen  over  B.  For  the  purposes  of  this  review  the 
discussion will be restricted to three critical elements from these models; the general change 
in preference state over time (drift), the threshold, and the initial preference state. Although 
this will allow a broad discussion of the general nature of the models, it should be noted that 





Figure 1. A depiction of a sequential sample decision in which preference state fluctuates 
between choice alternatives and cues are considered and a choice is made once the 
accumulation reaches one of the thresholds; in this case, choice A. 
Drift 
The drift represents the mean path traced by the preference state across trials and 
individuals and is normally distributed with mean (ʶ) and variance (s
2), also referred to as 
the diffusion coefficient (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Due to the variability of the drift during 
evidence accumulation, the same drift rate may pass the threshold at different times and may 
pass the wrong threshold simply due to chance. If the drift is strong (i.e. low variance and 
high  mean),  the  chances  of  the  drift  passing  the  correct  threshold  (defined  as  being 
congruent with the mean drift rate) is higher than if the drift is weak (i.e. high variance 
and/or low mean). As the model is dynamic, the drift not only determines the probability that 
an alternative will be chosen but also the deliberation time. For a difficult decision in which 
alternatives are very similar, it will take longer as each sample of valence will be small 
resulting in a slower drift. In contrast, for an easy choice when one option is obviously better 
than  the  alternatives,  the  decision  time  is  much  quicker  as  the  faster  drift  reaches  the 
threshold at a quicker rate. For example, Diederich (2003) revealed how such a model can 
accurately predict deliberation time as choice conflict increases. Finally, due to the geometry 
of the process, the models correctly predict that the distributions of deliberation times are 
right skewed (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Furthermore, note that this refers to the Weiner 
Diffusion model in which the drift is constant over time. Ornstein-Uhlenbeck types of model 
define the drift rate as decaying to an asymptote as the drift nears the threshold (Ratcliff & 
Smith, 2004). Accordingly, the drift rate is a representation of task complexity and choice 
discriminability  (i.e.  the  ability  to  accurately  order  choice  options).  Also  note  that  the 71 
 
variance  of  the  drift  rate  results  in  choice  being  a  probabilistic  function  of  the  model 
parameters and not a deterministic expression. 
Decision Thresholds 
In  addition  to  the  effect  of  drifts,  the  threshold  parameter,  θ,  influences  choice 
probability and deliberation time. The threshold may be conceived as a modulator for the 
speed-accuracy tradeoff. For a very high threshold, more samples of evidence need to be 
taken in order for accumulation to be sufficient to make a decision. Accordingly, the time 
taken to make a decision increases, yet this increase in decision criteria will increase the 
likelihood  that  the  accumulation  will  cross  the  correct  decision  threshold.  For  a  low 
threshold, fewer samples are required before a choice can be made, thus decisions will be 
quicker and made based on less evidence. Accordingly, a lower threshold will increase the 
likelihood that the choice will cross the wrong threshold. Hence, this threshold parameter is 
used  to  describe  the  effects  of  time-pressure  whereby  individuals  must  make  quicker 
decisions based on less information (Dror, Busemeyer, & Basola, 1999), and an individual’s 
desired level of confidence (Hausmann & Lage, 2008). Essentially, deliberation time (i.e. 
response time, RT) may be conceived of as follows (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993): 
      
        
       ,        [2a] 
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 .          [2c] 
Bias Parameter 
The final important element of these models is that the decision does not need to 
always begin in an unbiased fashion. The initial preference state (i.e. the first impression), z, 
which in Figure 1 is equidistant between choice options, may begin closer to one threshold 
than the other (see Figure 2). Note that this parameter is referred to by a number of different 
names in different accumulative models such as; the start point, the anchor point, the initial 
bias,  the  initial  preference  state,  or  the  resting  activation  (Albert,  Aschenbrenner,  & 
Schmalhofer, 1988; Aschenbrenner, Albert, & Schmalhofer, 1984; Busemeyer & Townsend, 
1993; Diederich, 2003; Dror, Busemeyer, & Basola, 1999; Link & Heath, 1975; Nosofsky & 
Palmeri, 1997; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Vickers, 1979; Wallsten & Barton, 
1982). According to Busemeyer and Townsend (1993), 
P(0) = z,                                                                                     
P(n) = P(n – 1) + [VA(n) – VB(n)]                                              72 
 
              = z + Σk [VA(k) – VB(k)], k         …   n.           [2] 
As a result of a bias towards choice A, the number of samples required to reach the 
B threshold increases and the probability of choosing B decreases, whereas, the number of 
samples required to reach the A threshold decreases, increasing the choice probability. As 
the number of samples required determines the response time, the model states that a bias 
like this has an effect on both decision likelihood and deliberation time. This parameter can 
be used to describe systematic preference reversals under time pressure (Busemeyer and 
Townsend, 1993). Appendix B outlines Busemeyer and Townsend’s (1993) decision field 
theory model in more detail. 
Relating Sequential Sample Models to the Four Characteristics 
Returning to default-interventionism, the concept of a criterion threshold may be 
used to represent some of the aspects of the satisficing principle and the concepts associated 
with  variation  in  individuals’  thinking  dispositions  (type  3  processing).  The  satisficing 
principle states that individuals do not always employ all the resources at their disposal and 
may instead be “settling for what is good enough” (Evans, 2007a, p. 18), but the formal 
mechanism by which this assessment is made is still under debate (see Evans, 2007b; Evans, 
2009).  However,  if  we  envisage  decision-making  as  an  on-going  process  of  evidence 
accumulation, as described in the sequential sample models, we can envisage the threshold 
as a satisficing level. Until the threshold is met, the individual is unsatisfied and feels they 
need  more  evidence  or  to  produce  more  hypotheses,  i.e.  the  “feeling  of  rightness” 
(Thompson, 2009) has not been met. Once the threshold is met, the satisficing principle is 
met, and the individual feels capable of making their judgement.  
In addition to delivering a potential way of accounting for type 3 processing, the 
sequential sample  model  framework  is  also  useful  because  it  enables  us  to  differentiate 
between early versus late information by formally identifying preferences state by order of 
consideration over time. The preference state at the current time is the nth sample P(n), the 
accumulation up to the present time is the accumulation P(n – 1), and future preference 
states  are  P(n  +  1,2,3,...,i,  etc.).  This  enables  us  to  identify  a  piece  of  evidence  being 
gathered during a decision via its serial position index.  
Furthermore,  we  can  differentiate  between  the  default,  type  1  response,  and 
subsequent slow and effortful type 2 responses. Recently, it has been suggested that an 
effective means of differentiating between type 1 and type 2 processing is via the role of 
working  memory  by  each  (Evans,  2009). Type  2  processing  appears  to  rely  heavily  on 
working memory and these results in a slow, serial, processing of information which occurs 73 
 
over a period of time. Type 1 processing on the other hand, does not appear to rely on 
working  memory  and  so  can  provide  rapid  responses  with  little  awareness  of  cognitive 
effort. Assuming that the rapid, automatic, type 1, response to a choice problem provides the 
initial  valence  value,  this  default  response  can  be  assigned  to  the  first  preference  state 
between  options  A  and  B  at  time  zero.  This  type  1  response  is  assigned  the  special 
parameter, z. 
Default (Type 1) response= P(0) = z = [VA(z) – VB(z)],                  [1a] 
Type 3 processing of this type 1 response may determine that the preference state is 
not yet convincing enough to make a decision and intervention from type 2 processing is 
required.  This  assessment  can  be  described  using  the  satisficing  decision  threshold,  θ, 
parameter which must be passed by the preference state before a decision can be made. 
Thus, if the type 1 response is satisficing enough |P(0)|, |z| ≥ θ, then a choice is made based 
on the valence of the preference state entirely driven by type 1 responses. If the type 1 
response is not satisficing enough, |P(0)|, |z| < θ, then more evidence must be gathered to 
make the choice whereupon type 2 processing intervention is triggered resulting in greater 
involvement of working memory. In order to capture the slow, sequential, working memory 
intensiveness of type 2 processing, valence values are generated over time which accumulate 
as preferences states as follows: 
   Default (Type 1) state, P(0)=z                          [1a] 
First Type 2 state, P(1) = P(0)+[VA(1) – VB(1)],                   [1b] 
Second Type 2 state, P(2) = P(1) + [VA(2) – VB(2)],                   [1b] 
Third Type 2 state, P(3) = P(2) + [VA(3) – VB(3)], etc.                 [1b] 
nth preference state, P(n) = P(n-1) + [VA(n) – VB(n)],          [1c] 
The  more  type  2  samples,  the  more  likely  that  the  drift  will  pass  the  correct 
threshold  (assuming  type  2  processes  are  capable  of  detecting  the  correct  choice  given 
enough time) and the less the type 1 response will predict the decision outcome. The fewer 
the type 2 samples, the greater the impact of the type 1 response. I define this intervention 
mechanism, therefore, as an outweighing mechanism in which the default type 1 response is 
not ignored or taken  “offline”  but  simply  has  a reduced  overall  weight  as  more type 2 
processing is allowed by the threshold. The higher the satisficing threshold, the more type 2 
processing contributes to the overall preference state and therefore the less type 1 processes 
contribute.  
Given  that  the  number  of  samples  taken  may  vary  depending  on  the  decision 
threshold, a sequential sample model can be used to predict the total evidence required by an 74 
 
individual. This is expected to correlate with the individual’s satisficing criterion level. For 
example,  with  a  low  satisficing  threshold  the  individual  may  be  satisfied  by  the  early 
information, i.e. the initial preference states they form. Therefore, such an individual might 
be expected to gather only a small amount of information. Whereas, if an individual has a 
high threshold then they may not be satisfied by the early information and may therefore 
gather more evidence in order reach this higher threshold. Thus, it is possible to predict how 
type 3 processing should impact on the total evidence volume required by the individual. As 
time  increases  with  the  number  of  samples  accumulated  (due  to  working  memory 
limitations), a potential correlate with this type 3 processing may be the deliberation times 
(or RTs). The sequential sample model approach may therefore enable us to predict RTs and 
how RTs might be affected by certain factors relating to satisficing thresholds and initial 
dispositions. 
Of course, it should be apparent that dual-process theory as a whole is far more 
nuanced  in  regards  to  the  relationship  between  type  1  and  type  2  processing.  Indeed, 
reducing type 2 processing to being represented simply by drift rates does not fully represent 
dual-process theory literature. However, the intention of building this model is not to attempt 
to capture all aspects of dual-process theory or default-interventionism. Rather the aim is to 
initially construct a simplified quantitative model inspired by dual-process concepts and then 
test the extent to which this basic quantitative model may improve our understanding of the 
roles of early-informational biases in JDM. Following the law of parsimony, I believe it is 
more beneficial to demonstrate the value of a simplistic model and then consider adding and 
evaluating further complexity in subsequent development stages only if required. In order to 
demonstrate how a simplified version of default-interventionist concepts can be of benefit to 
our understanding of both early versus late information in JDM, I now present the results of 
some simulations using this model. 
A Sequential Sample Model Simulation of Default-Interventionism 
In order to demonstrate how a quantitative model of default-interventionism can 
provide  predictions  of  the  impact  of  early  information  on  decision-making  in  different 
circumstances, I now present the results of some sequential sample model simulations. The 
simulations were run in R (http://www.r-project.org/) and the code is shown in Appendix C. 
The model simulates 100 individuals choosing between choice A or choice B. Choice A is 
the better of the two choices and therefore is assigned a positive drift rate (ξ > 0). This 
assumes that, on average, individuals will tend to observe that choice A is favourable but 
that errors in this assessment will occur and these random variations are captured by the 
variance in the drift rate. This is accounted for by setting a high standard deviation (σ = 4), 75 
 
i.e. the degree of volatility in preference state based on the same evidence. For the default 
type 1 response, the initial start point parameter z is assigned a value; z = 0, 10, or -10. If the 
z value is positive (z > 0) then the individual’s type 1 response favours choice A, i.e. it is 
congruent with the normatively optimal choice (Choice A). If the z value is negative (z < 0) 
then the individual’s type 1 response is incongruent, favouring the worst choice B. When z = 
0 the type 1 response is uninformative and the individual has no intuitive response regarding 
the  alternatives.  Subsequent  to  the  type  1  response  are  the  type  2  processes  which 
accumulate over time as evidence is gathered, interpreted, and evaluated. As these responses 
are accumulated, each preference state is iteratively evaluated by the type 3 processing in 
order to determine whether a choice can be made, that is, whether or not the satisficing 
principle is deemed to have been met. In the model, this type 3 assessment is based on the 
threshold  parameter,  θ,  as  a  criterion.  A  high  threshold,  e.g.  θ  =  20  in  this  simulation, 
indicates  that  the  individual  has  a  strong  need  or  motivation  for  cognition,  and  a  low 
threshold, e.g. θ = 5, indicates a low need for cognition either due to a lack of motivation or 
some external pressure such as time pressure. 
Simulation Results 
The results of the first simulation in Figure 2 show a case in which the threshold is 
high (θ = 20) and there is no bias from the type 1 response. The simulation shows that 93% 
of the participants correctly chose the correct alternative (A) but some made mistakes due to 
the difficulty of the task, represented by the drift rate and standard deviation parameters. The 
median deliberation time for choice A is shown by the blue vertical bar and the median 
deliberation time for choice B is shown by the red vertical bar. Those that finally chose A 
are shown as blue lines and those that finally chose B are shown as red lines.  
Figure 3 shows the results of the second simulation which replicates simulation 1 
but  with  a  stronger  drift  rate  (ξ  =  2).  This  would  represent  a  situation  in  which  the 
information examined is more strongly indicative of choice A. This may be a result of a 
change in task itself but also may represent a shift in sampling behaviour. For example, it 
may be the case that, for some reason, individuals tend to bias their investigation of choice 
information in ways which tend to favour one choice over another. This would result in a 
bias towards choosing A because the information examined is biased in favour of A and this 
is  demonstrated  by  the  increase in the  probability of  choosing  A  over  B  (from  93%  in 
simulation 1 to 98% in simulation 2). However, the sequential sample model indicates that 
this would not only impact on choice probabilities but also decrease deliberation times (i.e. 
the speed at which the satisfying criterion is met) because preference states can reach the 76 
 
threshold more rapidly. Thus, A in Figure 3 is chosen more readily based on less information 
when compared to A in Figure2. 
 
Figure 2. Simulation 1: ξ=1, σ=4, z=0, θ=20. The blue bar indicates the median deliberation 
time for those that chose A, and the red bar indicates the median deliberation time for those 
that chose B. A choosers are shown in blue; B choosers are shown in red. 
 
Figure 3. Simulation 2: ξ=2, σ=4, z=0, θ=20. The blue bar indicates the median deliberation 
time for those that chose A, and the red bar indicates the median deliberation time for those 
that chose B. A choosers are shown in blue; B choosers are shown in red. 
  Figure  4  shows  the  results  of  a  simulation  in  which  the  satisficing  threshold  is 
drastically reduced. In this simulation, choices are made very quickly (both vertical bars are 
low compared to the simulation in Figure 1) and this increase in speed comes at a price of 
accuracy. Now, only 69% chose the correct alternative. Due to the low threshold, individuals 77 
 
may happen to consider good aspects of B and thus pass the wrong threshold before they 
have carefully considered the good aspects of A. Due to the fact that the type 1 response is 
uninformative (z=0), they cannot use their intuitive thinking to help them deal with this low 
threshold. This is a traditional speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
 
Figure 4. Simulation 3: ξ=1, σ=4, z=0, θ=5. The blue bar indicates the median deliberation 
time for those that chose A, and the red bar indicates the median deliberation time for those 
that chose B. A choosers are shown in blue; B choosers are shown in red. 
 
 
Figure 5. Simulation 4: ξ=1, σ=4, z=10, θ=20. The blue bar indicates the median deliberation 
time for those that chose A, and the red bar indicates the median deliberation time for those 
that chose B. A choosers are shown in blue; B choosers are shown in red. 
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The results in Figure 5 show the effect of a strong type 1 response that is in favour 
of the normatively correct choice, i.e. their intuition is correct. This is represented by a z-
parameter which is biased towards choice A (z = 10). Essentially, the type 1 response means 
that they have partially made their mind up already but, due to the high threshold, they hold 
off making a choice until they have confirmed/disconfirmed this belief. Nevertheless, the 
results  show  that  very  few  individuals  choose  B  because  they  have  two  sources  of 
information driving them towards the correct choice – the type 1 initial bias towards A and 
the drift towards A from type 2 thinking. Therefore, the simulation models a congruency 
effect of type 1 and type 2 responses. Furthermore, not only do more individuals make the 
correct choice but they do so faster than they did in simulation 1, reducing their deliberation 
time from 19 samples down to 10, as shown by the vertical blue bar. Thus, congruency is 
also related to the rate at which the satisficing criterion is met. 
 
Figure 6. Simulation 5: ξ=1, σ=4, z=10, θ=20. The blue bar indicates the median deliberation 
time for those that chose A, and the red bar indicates the median deliberation time for those 
that chose B. A choosers are shown in blue; B choosers are shown in red. 
The results of the fifth simulation (Figure 6) show an incongruency effect, i.e. the 
effect of different type 1 and type 2 responses. This impacts on the performance resulting in 
more errors as individuals are biased by an erroneous first impression. Again, the effects are 
not only observed in the choices but also in the deliberation times. Now, the bias towards the 
B threshold means that the individual only needs a small amount of evidence in favour of B 
to sway them, whereas in order to choose A they need much more evidence. This impacts on 
deliberation times as well whereby errors towards B are due to the small distance between 
the type 1 response towards B and the B threshold, whereas A choices take longer (blue 79 
 
vertical bar is beyond the red vertical bar) due to the preference accumulation having to 
outweigh the initial bias towards B (an incongruency effect). 
Discussion of Simulation Results 
   These simulations demonstrate how it might be possible to represent some of the 
aspects  of  default-interventionism  for JDM  through  a  quantitative  model  and how  early 
(more type 1 oriented) and late (more type 2 oriented) information may be modulated via a 
satisfying  threshold  (type  3  processing).  The  results  demonstrate  four  potential  areas  of 
interest which are suitable for empirical study. 
(1) Evidence of type 3 processing: the satisficing principle 
The first benefit of such a model is that we can make predictions regarding the 
recently  proposed  type  3  processing  for  JDM  tasks  (Evans,  2009;  Stanovich,  2011).  In 
particular, the sequential sample approach can model evidence volumes and response times 
and these are proposed to be correlated with type 3 processing and the satisficing principle. 
In  JDM,  these  have  tended  to  be  neglected  in  favour  of  measures  which  relate  to  the 
algorithmic, type 2, processes; for example, biases in information types sought, preference 
reversal, etc. The first application of the sequential sample model, therefore, is that it can be 
used to predict when and how we might observe evidence of type 3 processing. For example, 
simulation 2 shows how a higher drift rate should result in quicker decisions based on less 
samples of evidence. Therefore, any behaviour which results in an increase in drift rate, i.e. 
an increase in the change in preference state per sample of evidence, should impact on the 
time taken to meet the satisficing threshold. If an individual was to consider evidence in a 
biased manner, i.e. ways which promote one outcome over another, the average perceived 
benefit of that alternative compared to the other may be exaggerated. Therefore, the average 
increase in preference state per sample (drift rate) towards the biased alternative should be 
higher. Based on this, the model can predict that in a JDM task in which sampling is biased 
towards a certain outcome, the drift rate will be higher, and therefore the satisficing principle 
will be met based on fewer items of information. As the number of samples is related to the 
overall  deliberation  time,  response  times  should  therefore  also  shorten  compared  to  a 
scenario in which evidence gathering is fair and balanced.  
This  clearly  has  direct  application  to  studies  of  biased  predecision  processes 
(Brounstein,  2003)  and selective  sampling  of  information  described  in  Chapter  I.  While 
these studies have explored the types of evidence gathered when biased precision processing 
occurs, I am unaware of any that have also focused on the volume of information required 
when biased predecision processing occurs. This not only has the potential to develop our 80 
 
understanding of the nature of biased predecision processing by examining the implications 
of type 3 processing in a study of biased predecision processing. This issue is explored in 
Chapter IV. 
(2) Congruency of type 1/type 2 processing in JDM: the congruency effect 
Stanovich’s (2011) model of dual-process mediation is based on overriding type 1 
responses through an individual’s need for cognition or reflectiveness. However, it is unclear 
as to exactly how this overriding takes place. It might be that a type 1 response is simply 
“taken offline”, i.e. it is actively suppressed or ignored in the deliberation process. However, 
the  sequential  sample  model  outlined  above  captures  a  different  method  for  default-
interventionism which is a process of outweighing rather than active suppression. Under the 
sequential sample mechanism the early type 1 responses (z parameter) still input into the 
judgement  when  type  2  processing  is  engaged,  but  the  overall  impact  of  the  type  1 
processing  in  the  final  judgement  reduces  as  more  type  2  processing  is  employed.  If  a 
threshold is reached after only a few type 2 processing samples, the initial type 1 response 
may have a greater overall weight than if the threshold requires dozens of samples from type 
2 processing. Such a proposal can be tested. For example, as shown in simulations 3 and 4, a 
sequential sample framework makes predictions regarding the effect that congruency of type 
1 and type 2 processing has on evidence volumes and hence RTs (i.e. related to type 3 
processing).  The  geometry  of  the  sequential  sample  model  means  that  the  number  of 
samples required to correct an incongruent type 1 response should be more than the numbers 
of samples required to reinforce a congruent type 1 response. This is the congruency effect. 
If it was the case that type 1 processing is ignored in type 2 intervention scenarios, such a 
congruency effect would not occur as the z-bias would be removed rather than outweighed.  
The simulations of the congruency of the z and ξ parameters predict similar results 
to those found by Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983) in their study of belief bias. In their 
experiment they gave participants statements and conclusions which were either believable 
or unbelievable from experience, and either valid or invalid by formal logic. Under the 
assumption  that  believability  is  related  to  type  1  processes  and  logical  validity  is  more 
related to type 2 processes, their study revealed that more correct decisions are made when 
both  responses  agree  than  when  they  do  not  (see  Table  2).  This  was  the  case  despite 
participants being asked to use strict deductive reasoning, a motivation to use just type 2 
processes.  The  results  of  the  simulations  echo  these  findings.  The  question  remains, 
therefore, as to the extent to which the sequential sample model prediction of congruency in 
JDM reflects empirical behavioural data. The congruency effect is examined in both chapter 
V and chapter VI. 81 
 
Table 1. Evidence of belief Bias in Syllogisms from the work of Evans, Barston, and Pollard 
(1983) with percentage of correct conclusions. The table shows positive signs for type 1/type 
2 responses that indicate validity and negative values to responses indicating invalidity. 
Example  Congruency  Accuracy  Correct Response 
Valid/Believable = Type 2 + Type 1  Congruent  89%  Valid (+) 
Valid/Unbelievable = Type 2 – Type 1  Incongruent  56%  Valid (+) 
Invalid/Believable = (– Type 2) + Type 1  Incongruent  29%  Invalid (−) 
Invalid/Unbelievable = (– Type 2) – Type 1  Congruent  90%  Invalid (−) 
 
(3) Continuous rather that diametric/categorical predictions of dual-process effects: 
continuous predictions 
The third aspect relating to this sequential sample approach is that the model can 
make predictions over a range of values. Many JDM studies are restricted to categorical or 
diametric predictions. For example, the studies of time pressure are usually restricted to 
“present”  and  “absent”  time  pressure  conditions.  In  such  studies  it  is  observed  that  the 
individuals  make  their  decisions  using  different  information  in  the  pressured  and 
unpressured conditions. For example, under time pressure conditions, compared to no time 
pressure  conditions  there  is  a  greater  use  of  emotional  thinking  and  affect  heuristics 
(Finucane,  Alhakami,  Slovic  &  Johnson,  2000),  and  the  consideration  of  moods  (Noda, 
Takai, & Yoshida, 2007) as well as primacy effects in impression formation, the tendency to 
use  ethnic  stereotyping,  and  anchoring  in  probability  judgements  (Freund  et.  al,  1985; 
Kruglanski  &  Freund,  1983).  These  findings  do  fit  the  “toolbox”  account  of  adaptive 
decision  behaviour  as  there  are  clearly  differences  in  kinds  of  information  used  in  the 
different conditions. However, as discussed, the same behaviour could equally, and in my 
view  more  parsimoniously,  be  explained  via  a  default-interventionist  approach  and  a 
criterion-oriented mediation (i.e. satisficing principle).  
The sequential sample model uses a satisficing threshold parameter, i.e. criterion-
oriented strategy, selection based on the ideas of default-interventionism. Thus, rather than 
selecting a more heuristic versus normative oriented strategy based on an expectation of time 
pressure (i.e. the adaptive decision-maker hypothesis), default interventionism simply occurs 
which automatically selects a reasonably optimized strategy for the level of time pressure. I 
refer to this default-interventionist modulation as optimized rather than optimal as currently I 
am  unaware  of  any  study  which  evaluates  the  effectiveness  of  a  default-interventionist 
approach against adaptive decision strategies. Nevertheless, the ability to adapt cognitive 
effort  within  a  decision  without  a  priori  strategy  selection  would  appear  to  be  a  more 82 
 
effective means of adapting behaviour to constraints, especially in novel or unexpectedly 
constrained situations (see Chapter VII). When there is high time pressure the threshold is 
low and so type 2 processing does not get much of a chance to outweigh the rapid default 
response. Whereas, under no time pressure a higher satisficing threshold allows a great deal 
of type 2 processing which either outweighs an incongruent type 1 response or confirms a 
congruent type 1 response. Critically, any degree of time pressure between these two ends of 
the spectrum is catered for simply by raising or lowering the satisficing threshold (i.e. via 
type 3 processing). 
The  continuous  predictions  made  by  this  model  could  be  combined  with  the 
congruency  effect  predictions  to  determine  whether  the  predicted  relationship  between 
congruency/incongruency of type 1 and type 2 processing over a range of time pressures 
matches the behaviour observed in the empirical data. This issue is tested in Chapter V. 
(4) A proposed mechanism for type 1 bias in two-choice decision-making: sequential 
sample versus alternative race model – an incongruency effect 
  The  sequential  sample  model  above  may  be  envisaged  as  a  “tug-of-war”  game 
between two alternatives. The type 1 processing defines whether the game begins with both 
alternatives equidistant from their respective thresholds or closer to one threshold than the 
other (i.e. an unfair tug-of-war game). As shown in Figure 5, the sequential sample model 
represents a type 1 response towards one alternative as a shift in the start point towards the 
threshold for that alternative. Most importantly, the structure of the mechanism also involves 
a  movement  away  from  the  threshold  for  the  other  alternative  (see  Figure  5).  Thus,  in 
addition to the role of congruency of type 1 and type 2 processing in reducing deliberation 
times  and  increasing  decision  accuracy  (if  type  1  and  type  2  processing  favour  the 
normatively correct choice), there is also a hypothesised incongruency effect. Whereby, if 
type 1 processing goes against the type 2 processing information, then the sequential sample 
model predicts increased deliberation times and potentially reduced accuracy (depending on 
the level of the satisficing threshold and assuming that type 2, but not type 1, processing 
favours  the  normatively  correct  decision).  This  is  a  result  of  the  sequential  sample 
mechanism, but is not the only way that type 1 biases may be modelled. 
An alternative version would be to consider a race model (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004) 
in which a bias from type 1 processing in favour of one alternative (B in Figure 6) does not 
negatively impact on the distance that the other (A in Figure 6) alternative must travel (see 
Figure 6 as an example of an unfair race model). Rather the two threshold distances are 
independent such that a bias towards one does not impact on the distance to the other. Again, 




Figure 5. A “Tug of War” depiction of the sequential sample model proposed in this chapter 
and the effect of a bias from type 1 on the distance to each threshold. A bias towards one 
threshold (A) negatively impacts on the distance to the opposing threshold (B). 
 
Figure 6. An alternative, race model, depiction of type 1 bias showing the effect of a bias 
from type 1 processing on the distance that must be travelled by each choice. A bias towards 
one threshold (A) does not negatively impact on the distance to the other threshold (B). 
   The sequential sample model I outlined in this chapter is based on the tug of war, 
rather than the race model mechanism. Therefore, it would be interesting to test which of 
these approaches is a better representation of type 1 bias in two choice tasks. This should be 
very simple to test. If it is found that a bias towards one conclusion influences the time taken 
to form the opposite conclusions then there is strong evidence that a sequential sample, 
rather  than  a  race  model  mechanism,  is  more  likely.  This  is  because  the  RTs  for  the 
incongruent hypothesis would only be affected if a tug of war, rather than race, mechanism 
is being used. This question is addressed in Chapter VI. 
Conclusion 
The sequential sample approach outlined in this chapter is a basic quantitative model 
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understanding the bias of early information and the role of type 3 processing in mediating 
these  biasing  effects.  In  particular,  the  sequential  sample  approach  allows  for  the 
investigation of four predicted characteristics inspired by dual-process concepts.  
Chapter IV will focus on the first question: acquiring evidence of type 3 processing. 
Based on the sequential sample model, I predict that measuring the volume of information 
gathered and response times may provide a valuable insight into this type 3 processing and 
the point at which a decision-maker attains a “feeling of rightness” or meets their satisficing 
threshold. As discussed in this chapter, studies investigating biased predecision processing 
focus  on  biases  in  the  types  of  information  gathered  but  do  not  consider  dual-process 
explanations  and  especially  the  recently  proposed  type  3  processing.  However,  the 
sequential sample model simulations (comparison of simulations 1 and 2) make predictions 
regarding how this selective evidence gathering might impact on the total evidence gathered 
and also the correlated measure of deliberation times (RT).  
Chapter V seeks to explore the second and third aspect relating to the sequential 
sample  model.  In  particular,  I  seek  to  explore  the  interaction  between  time  pressure 
(simulation 2) and the congruency effect (simulations 4 and 5). However, more than simply 
exploring categorical predictions, I aim to examine whether the characteristics of empirical 
choice data match the characteristics of the sequential sample model over a range of time 
pressures. The evaluation of the sequential sample model will be based on whether or not the 
changes in choices, as a result of changes in time pressure, are similar to the predicted 
changes based on the sequential sample model. This chapter, therefore, involves descriptive 
evaluation of the sequential sample model. 
Chapter  VI  will  focus  on  the  congruency  effect  as  well,  but  this  time  in  a 
competitive  models  situation.  The  aim  is  to  determine  whether  the  sequential  sample 
model’s tug of war mechanism is a better description of the effect of early informational 
biases than a race model mechanism. Both mechanisms make different predictions regarding 
how  early  information  in  favour  of  one  hypothesis  should  impact  on  distance  to  the 
alternative hypothesis threshold. Therefore, it is possible to test these predictions against 
empirical data. In contrast to Chapter V, which is simply a descriptive evaluation of the 
sequential  sample  model,  this  chapter  involves  competitive  evaluation  of  the  sequential 
sample model. 
The evaluation of the simulation predictions of JDM behaviour will form the central 
aim of this thesis from this point onwards. As the sequential sample model is based on the 
four aspects outlined in Table 1, successes using this model have implications for dual-
process  theory,  and  default-interventionism  in  particular.  Weaknesses,  however,  may  be 
attributable to two causes: (1) limitations of default-interventionism in the JDM domain, or 85 
 
(2)  limitations  in  the  sequential  sample  model  to  adequately  represent  default-
interventionism. I will conclude by assessing both the application of dual-process theory to 
the various JDM domains studied in this thesis, as well as assessing the strengths/limitations 
of the sequential sample model and how it may be improved. 
 
Summary Points 
o  The  recent  proposals  in  the  dual-process  literature  regarding  type  3  processing 
(reflective mind reasoning) seems highly relevant to the aim of understanding when 
early (type 1 processing) informational biases might/might not occur. 
o  The emphasis in the JDM domain on choosing between “strategies” neglects the role 
of  implicit  type  1  processing  and  leads  to  unresolved  questions  relating  to  the 
mechanism by which these strategies are effectively and efficiently selected. 
o  I introduce a basic dynamic modelling approach for accounting for default early 
type 1 biases, the intervention of the working-memory intensive, type 2, processing 
and type 3 processing mediation of this intervention via a satisficing threshold (a 
criterion-, rather than strategy-oriented, adaptive decision mechanism). 
o  The aim of the thesis is now to assess the strengths and limitations of this sequential 
sample  model  approach  for  representing  the  role  of  dual-process  concepts  in 
understanding the early-informational biases in JDM. 
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Chapter IV – Empirical Chapter 
“Prejudice is a great time saver. You can form opinions without having to get the facts.”  
-  E. B. White (American writer, 1899-1985) 
As  discussed in  Chapter  I,  there  are  many  sources of  what  I  describe  as  early-
information biases. One such source may be an initial disposition towards the item being 
judged. On approaching information concerning an item, an individual may have a degree of 
background knowledge or previous encounters with the item. For example, an interviewer 
may have read a candidate’s curriculum vitae prior to interviewing them or a consumer may 
have heard someone’s opinion regarding a car prior to taking a test drive. Studies into the 
effect of this early information often results in biases in evidence gathering strategies. In 
particular, theories of cognitive coherence (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, Krawczyk, & 
Holyoak,  2004;  Simon,  Snow,  &  Read,  2004)  and  biased  predecision  processing 
(Brownstein, 2003) relate to these biases and will be the focus of this chapter. These theories 
attempt  to  explain  why  it  is  that  individuals  tend  to  employ  biased  evidence  gathering 
strategies  which  tend  to  result  in  reinforcement,  rather  than  challenge,  of  the  initial 
disposition. Based on this research the following empirical chapter will explore the role of 
early  information  in  evidence  gathering  strategies  and  which  types  of  information 
individuals tend to select depending on their initial dispositions.  
As  discussed  in  Chapter  III,  dependent  measures  which  focus  on  the  types  of 
information used to form a judgement capture elements of type 1 and type 2 processing. 
However, the sequential sample model simulations in Chapter III also discussed the notion 
of  measures  of  behaviour  which  may  relate  to  a  third  type  of  processing  regarding  the 
“feeling of rightness” or the satisficing principle (type 3 processing). I hypothesised that we 
may be able to gain evidence of the effect of this third type of processing by exploring the 
total volume of evidence gathered depending on the early information. As interventionist 
type 2 processing is said to be slow and effortful, I also discussed the potentially correlated 
indicator  of  type  3  processing  effects,  deliberation  time  (RT).  Explanations  of  biased 
predecision processing (see Chapter I) have tended to ignore dual-process theory in their 
accounts.  Therefore,  the  following  empirical  chapter  will  examine  whether  dual-process 
concepts  are  useful  in  this  domain  of  research.  In  particular,  this  chapter  shall  test  the 
sequential sample model predictions regarding the effects of early information on evidence 
volumes and deliberation times (i.e. evidence of type 3 processing).  
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This study investigates the amount and valence of information selected during single 
item  evaluation.  One  hundred  and  thirty-five  participants  evaluated  a  mobile  phone  by 
reading hypothetical customers’ reports. Some participants were first asked to provide a 
preliminary rating based on a picture of the phone and some technical specifications. The 
participants who were given the customer reports only after they made a preliminary rating 
exhibited valence bias in their selection. In contrast, the participants who did not provide an 
initial  rating  sought  subsequent  information  in  a  more  balanced,  albeit  still  selective, 
manner. The preliminary raters used the least amount of information in their final decision, 
resulting in faster decision times. This finding is in support of the hypotheses relating to type 
3 processing based on the sequential sample model simulations presented in Chapter III. The 
results appear to support a dual-process account of selective exposure to information and the 
development of subjectively coherent mental models. Such dual-process explanations have 
tended to be neglected in biased predecision processing accounts. 
Introduction 
In order to make accurate judgements it is critical that decision-makers limit any 
biased processing of evidence prior to the final choice which may be detrimental to a fair 
assessment of all the information available. Yet, evidence suggests that biased processing of 
information frequently occurs during judgement and decision-making (Brownstein, 2003). A 
number of studies have demonstrated that people use both selective exposure to information 
(e.g., Schulz-Hardt, Frey,  Luthgens, & Moscovici, 2000), and selective  processing (e.g., 
Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996), biasing their decision-making. Virtually all current theory 
of  biased predecision processing  (see Mills  &  O’Neal, 1971; Kuhl,  1984;  Beckmann  & 
Kuhl, 1984; Montgomery, 1983, 1989; Svenson, 1992, 1996, 1999; see Brownstein, 2003, 
for review) involve the identification of an early favourite prior to the final judgement. In 
multi-alternative decisions, this early favourite may be an alternative which initially looks 
promising. Individuals are then said to employ biased processing of the alternative attributes 
by  bolstering  their  evaluation  of  the  favourite’s  attributes  in  comparison  to  the  other 
alternatives. Furthermore, subsequent information searching is often biased, which helps to 
support the view that this early favourite is indeed the best alternative. This study will focus 
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on this second phenomenon; “selective exposure” to information during evidence gathering. 
Selective Exposure means that people select evidence in a fashion which neglects certain 
valences  of  information  in  favour  of  others  resulting  in  an  imbalance  in  information 
gathering. For example, an individual restricting their exposure only to positive aspects of a 
potential course of action may result in neglect of negative aspects potentially distorting 
their impressions. 
Selective exposure to information 
Explanations of selective exposure to information are frequently discussed in terms 
of  cognitive  dissonance  theory  (Festinger,  1957,  1964)  and  motivational  processes.  The 
theory proposed that, having made a choice, negative affect is experienced as a result of the 
negative  aspects  of  the  choice  and  the  positive  aspects  of  alternatives.  Thus  selective 
exposure to information is driven by a form of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) in order 
to avoid negative affect. Although cognitive dissonance theory was initially assumed to be a 
post-decisional process, more recent theorists argue that that selective exposure can occur 
before making a final choice (see Brounstein, 2003, for review). According to Brounstein 
(2003),  biases in processing  prior  to  making  a  choice  may  derive  from  the competition 
between the competing alternatives and hence the need to differentiate between the early 
favourite and the competing alternatives. Essentially, the biases are hypothesised to derive 
from some form of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), whereby individuals engage in a 
degree of selectivity of exposure or biased evaluation of information to support one choice 
over others.  
However, many everyday tasks involve evaluating single items with no alternatives. 
For  example,  we  may  be  deciding  whether  or  not  to  buy  an  auction  item,  we  may  be 
evaluating a piece of evidence as a member of a jury, we may be judging a speech made by a 
member of parliament, or attempting to evaluate a person’s character. Whilst motivational 
theories can account for pre-decision biases prior to choice between competing options or 
where some personal stake in the outcome is expected, it is more difficult to understand how 
motivational processes could account for hypothesis testing in the evaluation of a novel 
single  item.  Instead,  Bond,  Carlson,  Meloy,  Russo,  and  Tanner  (2007)  cite  a  cognitive, 
rather than motivational, explanation based on the concept of cognitive coherence (Holyoak 
& Simon, 1999; Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004). The 
essence of the theory is that the mind tends to dislike incoherent information and is designed 
to naturally form connections between pieces of information in order to build a subjectively 
coherent,  although  potentially  inaccurate,  mental  model.  The  mind  is  said  to  “shun 
cognitively  complex  and  difficult  decision  tasks  by  reconstructing  them  into  easy  ones, 90 
 
yielding strong, confident conclusions” (Simon, 2004). The cognitive coherence hypothesis, 
therefore, predicts pre-commitment biases in the evaluation of attributes prior to judging a 
single  novel  item.  Surprisingly,  despite  the  new  focus  towards  cognitive  psychological 
accounts, dual-process theories have been neglected in this field. 
Dual-Processes  
As discussed, biased predecision processes appear to involve the identification of an 
early  favourite  alternative  (in  multi-alternative  decisions)  or  hypothesis  (in  single  item 
evaluation). This is also predicted by one of the fundamental principles of Evan’s (2007a) 
theory of hypothetical thinking: the singularity principle. This principle argues that, due to 
the limits of working memory, we tend to consider one hypothesis at a time. The relevance 
principle  (Evans,  2007a)  proposes  that  individuals  will  initially  consider  the  most 
subjectively relevant cues (initially triggered on type 1 processing) based on task features, 
the current goal, and background knowledge. So suppose one is attempting to decide how 
we rate a potential new product (e.g. a mobile phone). Our initial mental model of our 
personal rating of the phone is likely to be formed based on our past experiences, or perhaps 
the way the phone is presented to us, or whether the phone appears to meet our current 
needs. This first hypothesis must be assessed against the third of Evans’s (2007a) principles: 
the satisficing principle, i.e. an assessment of this initial hypothesis regarding whether more 
evidence gathering is required (type 3 processing)? If more evidence is required (i.e. the 
satisfying threshold is not met) then the individual may engage in type 2 processing to gather 
more information. Due to the singularity principle, however, this type 2 processing will tend 
to naturally focus on the information which relates to the current hypothesis (i.e. the type 1 
produced hypothesis) due to the relevance principle. This searching continues until either the 
individual  feels  satisfied  with  the  judgement  of  the  phone  or  they  find  some  contrary 
evidence which forces them to change their mental model. 
This cognitive process, which is based on the singularity, relevance, and satisficing 
principles, appears to reflect the kinds of biases observed in studies of biased predecision 
processing:  (1)  the  identification  of  an  early  favourite  (i.e.  the  initial  type  1  triggered 
hypothesis); (2) that subsequent evidence gathering is focused around this hypothesis; (3) 
often resulting in the neglect of alternative options and imbalances in evidence gathering 
(see, Mills & O’Neal, 1971; Kuhl, 1984; Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984; Montgomery, 1983, 
1989; Svenson, 1992, 1996, 1999). 
Sequential Processing and Selective Exposure 
The theory of cognitive coherence also has similarities to dual-process theory, in 
particular, regarding the nature of the hypothesised type 3 processing discussed in Chapter 91 
 
III.  In  Chapter  III,  I  described  deliberation  as  a  sequential  process  of  collection  and 
evaluation of information. The argument here is that during the evaluation of a single novel 
item, evidence is selected with the aim of increasing the cognitive coherence of the current 
mental  model  until  the  satisficing threshold is  met.  Evidence  in  support of this  view  is 
demonstrated by Jonas et al. (2001) who explored selective exposure to information with an 
accumulative paradigm comparing a sequential search task against a simultaneous search 
task. A sequential search task allows participants to read each selected item of information 
before they move on to the next. A simultaneous search task forces participants to select all 
the information they think they would like to read before they see any of the results of their 
selections. Jonas  et al.  found  that  when the  information  was  presented  sequentially,  the 
selectivity of exposure was greater than when the information was presented simultaneously. 
The fact that selective exposure effects are facilitated by a sequential task suggests 
that information selectivity is not simply based upon carrying out an a priori, predefined 
search strategy, but instead represents an ongoing and accumulative process of evidence 
gathering, type 3 assessments, and feedback (see Chapter III and Chapter VI for further 
discussion  of  a  priori  strategy  selection  versus  criterion-oriented  adaptive  decision 
mechanisms). When individuals gather evidence, they develop their mental representation of 
the novel item through this information and further evidence gathering is selected based on 
an  expectation  of  which  information  types  the  searcher  believes  may  most  effectively 
develop  this  mental  representation.  This  iterative  process  of  evidence  accumulation  and 
hypothesis  evaluation  fits  nicely  with  the  heuristic-analytic  theory  shown  in  Figure  1 
Chapter I. Interestingly, the descriptions of theories of biased predecision processing have 
some strong similarities to the sequential sample model approach outlined in Chapter III and 
some degree of type 3 assessment. The theories suggest: maximising choice certainty (Mills 
& O’Neal, 1971), bolstering intention until ready to act (Kuhl, 1984; Beckmann & Kuhl, 
1984), restructuring the decision environment until full dominance occurs (Montgomery, 
1983, 1989), or differentiating until a sufficiently superior alternative emerges (Svenson, 
1992, 1996, 1999). Essentially, all these theories imply that the decision-maker must reach a 
critical point of coherent differentiation between elements at which point the judgement can 
be made. I hypothesise that this point may depend upon the perceived cognitive coherence of 
the current hypothesis reaching the satisficing threshold, i.e. the individual feels that their 
mental representation of the differences between alternatives is coherent to a level which 
meets their satisficing criteria. 
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Based on the dual-process account described above, I predict that a weak initial 
hypothesis, based on limited background knowledge or uninformative early information, 
may result in more variation in evidence gathering. This is because there is little background 
information for the type 1 processing to provide a firm initial starting point. Therefore, 
individual may change their initial hypothesis more frequently as they explore, and engage 
with, the various sources of information. In comparison, an individual with a stronger initial 
hypothesis,  based  on  past  experiences  or  salient  initial  information  (type  1  processing), 
would be predicted to be less varied in their evidence gathering focusing. In agreement with 
both the dual-process, and biased predecision processing literature, these individuals may 
focus more towards information that relates to that initial hypothesis. 
Based on simulation 2 (cf. simulation 1) in Chapter III, I would expect this selective 
exposure to information to result in a more rapidly evolving mental model, i.e. cognitive 
coherence should reach the satisficing threshold at a faster rate. Therefore, the point at which 
this hypothesis is deemed to be strong enough to pass the satisficing threshold should occur 
sooner under selective exposure than under a more varied search pattern. This means that 
those  individuals  that  display  strongly  selective  exposure  should  make  their  judgements 
based on fewer items of information and possibly also make their judgements in less time. 
This prediction regarding type 3 processing, based on the simulations in Chapter III, is tested 
in this empirical study. 
Experiment 
The task chosen was rating a hypothetical mobile telephone as one might in an 
online shop like Amazon.com, i.e. rating the phone on a five-point scale. The search task 
involved  searching  through  a  number  of  opinionated  hypothetical  reviews  written  by 
customers  concerning  the  phone.  The  reviews  ranged  on  a  five-point  scale  from  highly 
negative  to  highly  favourable.  In  order  to  generate  a  measurable  initial  disposition, 
participants were asked to provide an initial rating based upon limited specifications, before 
asking  them  to  examine  the  opinionated  reviews.  This  may  result  in  different  selective 
exposure between different preliminary raters. Also, participants who were asked to provide 
an initial rating may demonstrate different patterns of information exposure, compared to a 
control  group  that  viewed  the  same  specifications  but  did  not  provide  an  initial  rating. 
Although the control group did not outwardly provide a rating, they may have formed a 
disposition nonetheless. Therefore, a second control group was used that did not even view 
the specifications prior to the information search. 
Thus, there were three groups that differed in their experience prior to information 
searching. Preliminary raters (PR) viewed specifications and then provided an initial rating. 93 
 
Specification-only controls (SOC) viewed specifications but did not rate the phone. Finally, 
No-experience controls (NEC) neither viewed specifications nor rated the phone. I predict 
that preliminary raters should be most likely to form a more concrete initial disposition. This 
group should therefore demonstrate more selective exposure in line with the Evan’s (2007a) 
three hypothetical thinking principles. Furthermore, based on the simulations in Chapter III, 
this increased selective exposure should result in the satisficing principle being met based on 
less information overall, and possibly, therefore, faster deliberation times. 
Method 
Participants  
In total, 135 university students were recruited via an online advertisement and were 
rewarded with course credits. There were 96 female and 39 male participants; their ages 
ranged from 18 to 59 (M =21.94, SD = 6.05).  
Design  
There  were  three  different  between-subjects  groups  (Preliminary  raters, 
Specifications-only controls, and No-experience controls). There was one within-subjects 
independent variable, the type of opinionated review, of which there were five levels. 1-Star 
opinions hated the phone and reported its worst features in their reviews. 2-Star opinions did 
not like the phone and mainly reported its bad features. 3-Star opinions thought the phone 
was okay and reported equal amounts of positive and negative attributes. 4-Star opinions 
liked the phone and mainly reported its good attributes, and 5-Star opinions loved the phone 
and only reported its good attributes. Three reviews were written for each type of opinion 
resulting in 15 items of information for the decision-maker to search through. The initial 
rating by the preliminary-rater group and the final ratings by all participants were recorded. 
Thus it is possible to observe any differences in search pattern by both how participants 
finally rated the phone and how preliminary raters first rated the phone.  The number of 
reviews selected for reading in each opinion type and the amount of time spent reading each 
review was recorded. 
Procedure  
Participants were undergraduate students at the University of Southampton rewarded 
with course credits. They were given an information and consent form prior to each task (see 
appendix A for an example) and were fully debriefed after the experiment. The experiment 
was carried out in an experimental laboratory. All groups were informed that they were to 
evaluate  a  cell  phone.  The  preliminary-rater  group  and  specifications-only  group  were 
presented  with  a  screen  showing  a  picture  of  the  mobile  phone  and  non-opinionated 94 
 
specifications about its size, weight, battery time etc. (Figure 1). They clicked on an arrow 
when they were ready to continue. The preliminary raters were then shown a screen asking 
them to provide a preliminary rating of the phone. They were then taken to the review menu 
page. The specifications-only control group skipped the preliminary rating page and went 
straight to the review menu. The no-experience controls were taken straight to the review 
menu and were not shown the specifications or the preliminary rating page. 
 
Figure 1. The stimulus of the phone and the specifications 
 
The review menu displayed 15 boxes, with each box representing one of the 15 
reviews in a 3 x 5 grid with the five opinion types clearly identified across the top and the 
three reviews of each positioned vertically underneath each other. So, for example, to view 
the second review by the user who thought the phone was “okay” (3-stars), the participant 
would click on the second review down in the third column. After reading a review the 
participant clicked on the arrow, which led back to the review menu. The program recorded 
which reviews were read and for how long. Participants in all groups could click on and read 
as many reviews as they liked until they were satisfied, whereupon they clicked on the arrow 
at the bottom, which took them to the final rating page. Here the participants were asked to 
make their evaluation of the phone on the five-point scale, indicated by stars.  
Materials  
The image and the specifications of the mobile phone were fabricated for the study 
(see Figure 1 for an example). Each review was the same length, of 100 words. This allowed 
us to compare reading times between reviews. The following is an example of a 1-star 
review See Appendix D for more details. 
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“I absolutely hated this phone. I used to have a nice top-of-the-range phone but had to use this as an 
interim measure. It was a big step down from what I was used to. It was bigger and heavier, which 
was surprising as there was less in it, and it looked ugly. I also found it difficult to use in loud 
environments because the sound quality was so bad. In the end, I got rid of it as soon as I could. I 
would never get one of these again! Don’t buy this phone, it is absolutely horrendous!” 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics  
One hundred and thirty-five participants were recruited with the greatest number in 
the  preliminary  rater  group.  This  larger  preliminary  rater  group  was  recruited  to  allow 
analysis between different preliminary ratings. Table 1 shows the number of participants in 
each group and their mean preliminary and final ratings. A one way ANOVA showed no 
significant difference between the groups in their final rating, F(2, 134) = .661, p >.05.  
Table 1. Participants recruited for each group and their mean preliminary and final ratings 
















Raters  60  2.77  .65  2.83  .668 
Specification- 
Only Controls  28  -  -  2.75  .645 
No-Experience 
Controls  47  -  -  2.94  .763 
All 
Groups  135  2.77  .65  2.85  .697 
 
Exploration of search patterns — Measures of the Selective Exposure  
This analysis examined the distribution of search patterns between the preliminary 
raters, the specifications-only controls, and the no-experience controls. As the initial concern 
was  in  regards  to  the  valence  selectivity  of  their  total  search  time,  we  examined  the 
proportion of reviews read in each opinion category by each participant. So, the proportion 
of 1-star opinions read for each participant would be the total number of 1-star reviews that 
they read, divided by the total number of reviews read by that participant. This controls for 
the predicted variances in volume between groups or individuals. 
Figure 2 (top left graph) displays the proportion of reviews selected for reading 
based upon the experience prior to the search task. The results appear to demonstrate a 
consistent quartic (w-shaped) search pattern across all groups. This was supported by a 2-96 
 
way,  mixed-design,  repeated  measures  ANOVA  which  compared  the  different  groups 
(preliminary  raters,  specification-only  controls,  no-experience  controls)  by  their  search 
pattern (proportion of reviews read from each category). The first part of the analysis found 
a significant overall effect of star rating on the proportion of reviews read across all groups 
(search strategy), F(3.46, 456.12)
6 = 15.50, p < .001. Bonferroni post hoc tests confirmed the 
quartic pattern revealing significantly more reviews read in the 1-, 3- and 5-star categories 
than in the 2- and 4-star categories (p < .001 for all). No other comparisons were significant. 
 
Figure 2. The top left panel displays the overall search pattern distributions of the three 
groups. The other panels display the three groups separately, showing their search patterns 
according to their final rating. 
                                                       
6 Degrees of freedom were corrected for all ANOVA tests using Greenhouse-Geisser correction due 
to a violation of the sphericity assumption. 97 
 
There was also a significant interaction between the search pattern and three groups 
(preliminary  raters,  specification-only  controls,  and  no-experience  controls),  F(6.91, 
456.12),  =  2.08,  p  <  .05.  This  indicates  that  there  may  be  some  effect  on  information 
selection depending upon the experience prior to the main search task. The quartic search 
pattern in Figure 2 (top left panel) indicates a degree of selective exposure by all groups, not 
in the sense of search biased by an initial tendency, but selective in the sense of sampling 
central and extreme cases more than others. 
A 2-way, mixed-design, repeated measures, ANOVA was performed on the controls 
data (both groups) to explore their search patterns alone. The test revealed a significant 
difference  across  reviews  F(3.05, 222.36),  =  24.97,  p  =  .000.  Bonferroni  post  hoc tests 
confirmed the quartic pattern revealing significantly more reviews read in the 1- and 5-star 
categories than in the 2-, 3-, and 4-star categories (p < .001 for all). In addition, significantly 
more reviews were read in the 3-star category than the 2-star (p < .01) and 4-star (p < .04) 
category but also significantly less than the 1-star (p < .01) and 5-star (p < .05) category. 
However, no significant difference between the two control groups in their overall search 
pattern was found, F(3.05, 222.36), = 1.98, p > .05. As there was no difference between 
controls in terms of their overall search patterns, both were combined into one control group. 
A  further  2-way  repeated  measures  ANOVA  found  a  significant  difference  between 
preliminary raters and combined controls in their overall search pattern F(3.33, 436.11), = 
3.16, p < .05. This indicates that, based on the search pattern, there is a significant effect of 
making a preliminary rating on subsequent information exposure. 
In order to determine where these effects might lie, all three groups (preliminary 
raters,  specification-only  controls  and  no-experience  controls)  were  divided  into  further 
subgroups based upon their final rating. As only two participants finally rated the phone with 
one star and no participants rated it with five stars, these participants were excluded from the 
subsequent analysis. Figure 2 (top right and bottom graphs) shows the search patterns by 
each group and their final ratings. A three-way, mixed- design, repeated measures ANOVA 
was performed on the data revealing a significant interaction between the group and the 
search pattern depending on the final rating, F(13.78, 427.08), = 2.62, p < .001.  
From Figure 2 it is clear that when participants are asked to make a preliminary 
rating,  their  search  patterns  are  significantly  different  than  if  they  simply  viewed  some 
specifications or have no experience. Specifically, the quartic pattern is replaced by selective 
exposure which strongly relates to the final judgement. To determine how the preliminary 
rating affected the participants’ selective exposure, the preliminary raters were also explored 
by themselves. A 2-way repeated measures ANOVA examining the differences between the 
preliminary raters showed that they exhibited significantly different search patterns based 98 
 
upon their initial rating, F(8, 220) = 5.410, p = .000. A further linear regression analysis 
determined that the initial rating was highly predictive of final rating, F(1, 59) = 110.49, p 
<.001, R=.81. 
The  results  confirm  that  providing  initial  ratings  changed  the  way  subsequent 
information was sought. However, this analysis does not reveal precisely what information 
was important to preliminary raters. Thus a subsequent analysis was performed, ordering the 
information depending on whether the review rating would have least dissonance (align with 
the preliminary rating), most dissonance (furthest distance from the preliminary rating), or 
reside somewhere in between. 
The means, shown in Figure 3, were compared using a repeated measures ANOVA, 
which  found  a  significant  effect  of the  distance  between  the  preliminary  rating  and  the 
review  valence  on  the  proportion  of  reviews  read,  F(2,  118)  =  12.44,  p  <  .001,  which 
appears as a U-shaped relationship. Indeed, Bonferroni post-hoc t-tests revealed that, while 
there  was  no  significant  difference  between  the  number  of  most  dissonant  and  least 
dissonant reviews asked for (p > .05), significantly more information was sought in the least 
and most dissonant categories than in the categories between these two poles (p < .001 for 
both). 
I argue that these results demonstrate the use of selective exposure. The results are 
in line with Evans’ (2007a) hypothetical thinking principles as only evidence which directly 
related to the current hypothesis is examined. Given no initial disposition (no-experience 
controls)  or  a  possibly  weak  or  undefined  one  (specifications-only  controls),  selectivity 
appeared more driven by the task structure. Thus, the quartic search strategy of the controls 
represents attention to information that appears as if it would increase the coherence of the 
representation, that is, increase differentiation of opinions. This is achieved by viewing the 
worst and the best reviews and to a lesser extent a middle anchor point. The 2- and 4-star 




Figure 3. Mean number of reviews read by preliminary raters depending upon the distance 
between the preliminary rating and the valence of the review 
It  seemed  that  a stronger,  or  at  least  more  defined,  initial disposition is formed 
through a preliminary rating. Now, following the dual-process account, the only relevant 
information is the strongest evidence for the hypothesis and the most dissonant evidence (i.e. 
strongest evidence for and against the individual’s initial hypothesis). This finding is in line 
with both the dual-process account and the theory of cognitive coherence. 
Effect on Decision Time — Type 3 Processing Effects 
Figure  2  shows  that  preliminary  raters’  search  patterns  differ from  the  control’s 
quartic  trends,  suggesting  some  change  occurring  in  the  approach  evaluators  have  to 
collecting evidence after providing an initial rating. As selective exposure may be a tool to 
increase  cognitive  coherence,  it  was  hypothesised that  this  may  also  have  a measurable 
impact on decision times. In order to examine volume differences in evidence collection, I 
examine the total amount of information sought as a function of group (preliminary raters, 
specifications-only controls, and no-experience controls). The results are shown in Table 2. 
Simulation 2 in Chapter III, based on the sequential sample model, predicts that the more 
selective the exposure to information, the quicker the overall search time should be. 
The results of a one-way independent ANOVA demonstrate that for the “mean total 
time spent information searching” dependent measure there was a significant effect of the 
experience prior to information searching F(2, 132) = 6.75, p =.002, with the preliminary-
rating group taking the least amount of time. For the mean total number of reviews read 
dependent measure there was also a significant effect of initial experience, F(2, 132) = 3.89, 
p =.023, with the preliminary-rater group reading fewer reviews. Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
revealed a significant difference between the preliminary-rater group and the no-experience 
control  group  for  both  dependent  measures  (p  <  .001,  p  <  .05  respectively).  The 100 
 
specifications  only  control  was  not  significantly  different  from  either  group  in  either 
measure (p > .05 for both) although a significant linear trend was found across groups for the 
dependent measures (p < .05 for both). 
These results indicate that a preliminary judgement (which is associated with strong 
selective  exposure)  leads  to  quicker  decisions  based  on  fewer  items  of  information, 
compared to a control with no experience. Due to a lack of statistical difference between the 
specification-only group and the others we cannot be sure whether the volume difference is 
due to forming an initial judgement or simply viewing evidence. Nevertheless, these results 
are  still  important  as  they  demonstrated  that  the  amount  of  information  required  at  the 
review stage is dependent on initial experiences. This quicker decision time is precisely what 
would  be  expected  if  a  decision  threshold  was  being  met  faster  due  to  the  satisficing 
principle being met at a faster rate than controls (see simulations 1 and 2 in Chapter III).  
Table 2. Total time (in seconds) and amount of information sought prior to the final rating 
depending on initial experience 
    Mean total time spent 
information searching (sd) 
Mean total number of 
reviews read (sd) 
Preliminary Raters  45.98 (36.20)  4.42 (2.86) 
Specification-only Controls  56.32 (48.62)  4.96 (3.31) 
No-experience Controls  74.72 (39.74)  6.13 (3.45) 
 
General Discussion 
In summary, the control groups demonstrated a strong preference to explore the 1- 
and  5-star  ratings  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  3-star  ratings.  The  no-experience  controls 
sought the most information in the review stage. The preliminary rater group was biased 
towards reading reviews with the same star rating as the participant’s initial judgement, but 
this  group  also  examined  the  most  dissonant  information.  Furthermore,  this  selective 
exposure  that  was  specific  to  that  preliminary  rating  was  observed,  a  between-subjects 
selectivity  effect.  These  results  are  in  line  with  the  dual-process  framework  and,  in 
particular,  Evans’  (2007a)  three  hypothetical  thinking  principles  indicating  that  dual-
processes may have a role to play in theories of biased predecision processing.  
The results of this study also support a more cognitive (i.e. dual-process or cognitive 
coherence  approach)  rather  than  motivational  (cognitive  dissonance)  approach  to  biased 
predecision processing when only a single item is involved. The study demonstrated that 101 
 
individuals  would  prefer  information  that  was  related  to  the  hypothesis  they  were 
considering  (i.e.  strongly  confirming  and  strongly  dissonant,  but  little  in  between).  The 
consideration of strongly dissonant information appears to go against the motivation-based 
theories. Most recent studies have found biases in selective exposure towards confirming 
information (Jonas, et al., 2001; Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995; Lundgren & Prislin, 
1998; Frey, 1981; Johnston, 1996), a view which supports the motivational and cognitive 
explanations. Interestingly, early studies also found that people were frequently interested in 
dissonant information. For example, Gerard (1967) found that participants spent more time 
looking at the alternative they eventually rejected than the alternative they accepted. Indeed, 
in  a  study  during  the  1964  American  Elections,  participants  were  offered  brochures 
supporting either their favoured candidate or his rival (Lowin, 1967). When the arguments in 
the sample were strong, it was found that participants ordered more brochures from their 
candidate.  However,  when  the  arguments  in  the  sample  were  weak,  it  was  found  that 
participants were more likely to select brochures from the rival (Baron, 2008). In a similar 
study, Albarracin and Mitchell (2004) investigated the relationship between attitude strength 
and selective exposure. Specifically, it was found that participants who felt confident in their 
ability to defend their argument were more likely to select dissonant information. However, 
if this motivational explanation was the case, I would have expected individuals to avoid the 
strongly dissonant information and perhaps consider weakly dissonant information. In the 
study this was not the case, as weak dissonant evidence was ignored in favour of the strongly 
dissonant  evidence.  The  dual-process  explanation,  however,  does  not  suffer  from  this 
problem. The dual-process account would predict that individuals would be more inclined to 
consider consistent information first just as the motivational explanation. However, if the 
satisficing criterion is not met by early deliberation and more complex type 2 reasoning is 
engaged,  the  dual-process  account  would  also  predict  (as  found  in  the  results)  that 
individuals may be inclined to test the hypothesis by exploring the most relevant dissonant 
information (the strongest opposite opinion). Therefore, at least for the evaluation of single 
novel items, I find that a dual-process account has a stronger argument for the explanation of 
these results. Interestingly, while these dissonant reviews were examined individuals rarely 
changed their opinions, as the initial rating was highly predictive of the final rating (R
2 = 
.81). Thus, although individuals were inclined to read the opposite reviews, it is possible that 
some degree of biased interpretation was involved as well. 
The  focus  towards  type  3  processing  is  a  novel  step  in  understanding  biased 
predecision processing. The results were in line with predictions based on the simulations in 
Chapter III. The total amount of information gathered appeared to depend on the degree of 
selective sampling of evidence resulting in faster decisions based on less information when 102 
 
selective exposure occurred most strongly (preliminary raters). This appears to show some 
value in the sequential sample model described in Chapter III and that the consideration of 
deliberation times as a measure of the effects of type 3 processing may be useful in this 
domain. 
Future Directions 
On the basis of this study it is possible offer some considerations of future studies. 
The study demonstrated that preliminary ratings influence selective exposure. However, it 
would be interesting to determine how initial dispositions are formed during single item 
evaluation. Perhaps a study could provide different sets of specifications, presenting either a 
strongly positive or negative first impression, and explore whether selective exposure similar 
to the preliminary raters can be observed without the need for an initial rating. Another 
example would be to explore whether there is a difference between search patterns based 
upon the source of bias (e.g., either by oneself or by another). It would be interesting to 
explore the extent to which other examples of biased predecision processing appear to be 
motivationally or cognitively driven. 
A major limitation of the sequential sample model was that it summarizes selective 
exposure in quite a course manner. It simply increases drift rates (see simulation 2) under 
selective exposure. However, the dual-process explanations are far more nuanced involving 
the  singularity  and  relevance  principles.  Therefore,  there  is  a  clear  gap  between  the 
sequential sample model and these important dual-process concepts. On the basis of this 
study I see these as important factors in JDM, I believe that further development of the 
sequential sample model could be made with respect to this issue. Indeed, in Chapter VII, I 
discuss how I believe that these two principles may be integrated into the model. 
Another potential limitation with this study is that we inferred reading from the 
interval between clicks on the screen. This has clear limitations and a more effective means 
might  be  to  replicate  considering  more  sophisticated  techniques  such  as  eye  tracking 
monitors. Finally, the study explored a novel contribution to selective exposure, through the 
examination of deliberation time and differences in the volume of information sought. The 
focus towards type 3 processing highlights the potential benefits of dual-process theory in 
biased predecision processing research. Further studies might examine different predictors of 
differences in the volume of information sampling and decision thresholds. That is, when do 
we decide to stop searching for evidence and make a judgement depending on different 
initial dispositions or tasks? Also, it might be important to explore how much information is 
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Conclusion 
  In Chapter III, I noted that the sequential sample approach had clear application to 
studies  of  biased  predecision  processes  (Brounstein,  2003)  and  selective  sampling  of 
information described in Chapter I. While these studies had explored the types of evidence 
gathered when biased precision processing occurs, I was unaware of any that have also 
focused on the amount/volume of information required when biased predecision processing 
occurs.  In  Chapter  IV,  therefore,  I  aimed  to  tackle  whether  the  dual-processes,  and  in 
particular the sequential sample model simulations, could apply to this topic. The study in 
this  chapter  explored  this  issue  demonstrating  that  the  early  information  available  to 
decision-makers appears to impact heavily on the evidence that they choose to examine and 
the total amount of evidence they appear to require in judging the item. Despite little in the 
way of obvious motivational reasons, individuals who formed preliminary ratings based on 
the early information appeared to demonstrate selective exposure. This can be explained 
using a dual-process approach, in particular, the three principles of hypothetical thinking 
(Evans, 2007a). These findings support the view that dual-process theory is beneficial in 
understanding the JDM. Furthermore, the results align with the predictions based on the 
simulations in Chapter III providing support for the sequential sample approach to default 
interventionism and the role of the type 3 processing in JDM.  
 
Summary Points 
o  In the domain of biased predecision processing, dual-process explanations relating 
decision  processes  have  been  somewhat  neglected  in  favour  of  motivational 
accounts.  
o  In this experiment, I show evidence of biased predecision processing in a task which 
might  not  be  expected  to  produce  such  a  bias  under  the  current  motivational 
accounts. Indeed, the motivational accounts do not seem to represent the findings of 
examining strongly dissonant information. However, a dual-process account could 
explain the results. 
o  The  biased  predecision  processing  literature  does  not  consider  deliberation 
time/evidence  volume  as  a  measure  of  early  informational  biases.  However,  the 
simulations in Chapter III indicate that evidence volume may be related to selective 
sampling  of  information.  This  experiment  took  the  novel  step  of  assessing  the 
amount of evidence gathered as a way of testing the model and an indication of 
evidence for type 3 processing in biased predecision processing.  104 
 
o  The  sequential  sample  model  correctly  predicted  that  increased  selectivity  of 
information should tend to be associated with a decrease in the amount of evidence 
examined and the correlated measure of deliberation time.  
o  However, the experiment also showed an important limitation with the sequential 
sample  model,  in  that  it  could  not  represent  the  nuances  associated  with  this 
selective exposure as it currently models evidence gathering simply by an average 
drift rate. This limitation is addressed in Chapter VII. 
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Chapter V – Empirical Chapter 
“Thinking isn't agreeing or disagreeing. That's voting.” 
- Robert Frost (American poet, 1874-1963) 
 
The  previous  study  demonstrated  some  initial  support  for  the  sequential  sample 
model by predicting how selective exposure to information can impact on evidence volumes 
and  deliberation  times  (evidence  of  type  3  processing)  in  line  with  the  simulations  in 
Chapter III. However, this was only one of the predictions based on the simulations. I also 
argued that the sequential sample model could also account for manipulations of type 3 
processing,  thereby  predicting  the  extent  to  which  early  type  1  versus  and  late  type  2 
processing should impact on choices based on manipulations of a satisficing threshold. In 
particular, I proposed that the effect of time pressure could be accounted for via the concept 
of a satisficing threshold in a sequential sample model and that increased reliance on default, 
type 1, responses could be modelled in this fashion. Indeed, one of the main features of the 
sequential sample model is how it accounts for a congruency effect of type 1 and type 2 
processing in choice accuracy, a prediction that will be tested in this chapter.  
Importantly, while time pressure has been shown to result in an increase in biases 
associated  with  type  1  processing  generally,  the  use  of  a  sequential  sample  model  to 
represent this effect has not been attempted.  As outlined in  Chapter III, one of the key 
benefits of this quantitative approach is that it is not restricted to diametric predictions (i.e. 
present versus absent categories of time pressure), rather it is able to make predictions along 
a range of time pressure levels. Therefore, it is possible to examine whether the sequential 
sample model predictions of choice behaviour over a range of levels of time pressure reflects 
empirical  data.  Specifically,  this  chapter  seeks  to  assess  the  descriptive  validity  of  the 
sequential sample  model  approach  to  dual-process congruency  effects  (i.e. the  extent to 
which the model can reflect the empirical behaviour patterns relating to congruency effects) 
when type 3 processing is manipulated over a continuous (as opposed to diametric) range of 
time pressures. This serves to fulfil the aims set out in Chapter III regarding simulation 
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Bounded Multi-Attribute Decision-Making: Type 3 Processing and Time Pressure 
Mediating Type 2 Operations and Type 1 Responses
7 
Abstract 
This study tests the sequential sample model predictions from Chapter III regarding 
the effect of a range of time pressures on type 1 and type 2 processing during decision 
making. Forty-six participants were required to make investment decisions under four levels 
of time pressure. In each decision, participants were presented with stereotype (type 1) cues 
which were either congruent or incongruent with the analytical (type 2) information. The 
congruency conditions allowed the examination of the extent to which decisions were based 
upon the type 1 vs. type 2 information, and to see if this was affected by the varying degrees 
of time pressure. As expected, the overall accuracy was reduced with greater time pressure 
and accuracy was higher when the stereotype and analytical cues were congruent than when 
they were incongruent. Consistent with past studies, the results showed that under high time 
pressure participants used more stereotype cues than at other time pressures. Importantly, the 
sequential sample model could account for the patterns of behaviour over the four levels of 
time pressure with reasonable effectiveness (measured by R-squared statistics). I see this as 
evidence for the sequential sample model having some future potential for predicting when, 
and to what degree, the effects of type 1 biases may be observed over varying degrees of 
time pressure.  
Introduction 
  Some of the most important decisions we make are important because they are made 
under time pressure. Understanding how time pressure can affect choices, judgements, and 
conclusions, is an important topic for consideration. This chapter examines the relationship 
between time pressure and information usage and assesses the extent to which transitions in 
dual-processes  may  be  modelled  quantitatively.  In  particular,  this  study  continues  the 
exploration into quantitative modelling of type 3 processing, this time examining how we 
can model its role in the mediation of type 1 and type 2 processing. 
Time Pressure 
Time  pressure  is  assumed  to  be  experienced  when  the  time  available  for  the 
completion  of  a  task  is  perceived  to  be  shorter  than  normally  required  for  the  activity 
                                                       
7 Adapted from a published article: Fraser-Mackenzie, P.A.F. & Dror, I.E. (2011). Dynamic reasoning 
and time pressure: Transition from analytical operations to experiential responses. Theory and 
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(Svenson & Edland, 1987). Research has shown that in response to time pressure we can: 
increase our processing speed of individual items, increase selectivity of information by both 
type and volume (Ben-Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Wallsten, 1993), and manipulate the strategies 
we employ (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  
Due to these effects, time pressure can have a dramatic effect on our ability to make 
optimal  judgements  and  increases  human  error  (e.g.  Freund  et  al.,  1985;  Kruglanski  & 
Freund,  1983;  Dror,  Busemeyer,  &  Basola,  1999).  Studies  have  demonstrated  that 
individuals appear to rely on more simple reasoning strategies which are prone to cognitive 
biases such as: primacy effects in impression formation, anchoring in probability judgements 
(Freund et al., 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). A striking finding was the tendency to use 
more ethnic stereotyping (Freund et al., 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). One standpoint 
is that individuals appear to be forced to use simplified, suboptimal heuristics to compensate 
for the loss of the ability to perform normative strategies. This evidence was used to argue 
the  case  for  motivated  reasoning  (Kunda,  1990),  whereby  contextual  factors  such  as 
accuracy motivation and external pressures affect our decision strategies. An alternative to 
the motivational explanation is a cognitive explanation, based on dual-process theory. 
As the default type 1 processing is quicker and more suited to providing answers 
when there is little time available, this type of processing appears to be relied on under 
increased time pressure. Whereas type 2 processing is better suited to situations in which 
there  is  adequate  decision  time.  Therefore,  it  has  be  theorised  that  in  response  to  time 
pressure and a general reduction in our ability to perform time consuming type 2 processes, 
the automatic type 1 processing responses may have a greater effect on our judgements and 
choices. Support for this view is found in the findings of increased belief bias under time 
pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005).  
It is possible, therefore, that this may provide an explanation for increased used of 
stereotyping under time pressure (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Support of this view is found 
in early theories of stereotyping suggesting that stereotypes can occur spontaneously (cf. 
Bargh,  1999;  Devine,  1989).  Subsequent  research  showed  that  measures  of  stereotype 
impressions depend on the prejudice, goals, cognitive resources, and learned associations of 
the  individual  (Gilbert  &  Hixon,  1991;  Kawakami,  Dovidio,  Moll,  Hermsen,  &  Russin, 
2000; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). These findings strongly echo the 
default-interventionist account that the stereotypes, as a type 1 response, may depend on a 
combination  of  strength  of  initial  type  1  response  and  in  particular  the  role  of  type  3 
processing and the satisficing principle. The aim of this study is two-fold. Firstly, the study 
will investigate the relationship between time pressure and the use of stereotype information 
over  more  analytical  information.  Secondly,  it  will  investigate  the  extent  to  which  the 108 
 
simulation  predictions,  in  Chapter  III,  regarding  the  relationship  between  satisficing 
threshold manipulation (time pressure) and the congruency of type 1 and type 2 information 
on choice accuracy, reflects the relationships observed in the empirical data. 
A Model of Dynamic Reasoning  
In Chapter III, I introduced a sequential sample model which aimed to capture this 
shift  between  the  two  types  of  processing  based  on  some  of  the  concepts  of  default-
interventionism. The general prediction is that given a high decision threshold (i.e. under no 
time pressure), more type 2 evidence accumulation is possible and the initial type 1 bias has 
a  smaller  overall  impact  resulting  in  a  more  analytical  approach  across  participants. 
However, if the analytical, type 2 processing is limited by a lower decision threshold (i.e. 
under time pressure), then the early, type 1 processing will have a greater overall impact on 
the  final  outcome  representing  a  greater  reliance  on  stereotyping  approach  across 
participants. As discussed in Chapter III, the effect of the type 1 processing of stereotype 
information may be represented by the initial preference state, z, parameter. This may be 
seen as the resting activation of the deliberative system before analytical processing begins. 
The effect of time pressure may be modelled using the threshold, θ, parameter which limits 
the amount of analytical evidence collected. The interaction between these two parameters, z 
and θ, represents the likelihood that choices will be more predicted by type 1 vs. type 2 cues.  
In summary, the modelling mechanism involves type 1 activation of stereotyping 
information as a default response, but the predictiveness of that type 1 response depends 
whether there is enough time for type 2 processing intervention. As type 3 processing allows 
only as much type 2 processing as required, or is allowed by environmental constraints, time 
pressure can be modelled via the satisficing threshold parameter. This mechanism strongly 
echoes the view that stereotypes that are activated initially can be reduced over time as 
“interaction” (type 2 processing) occurs (Kunda, Davies, Adams, & Spencer, 2002). Thus, as 
Kunda points out, there is a difference between stereotype activation, i.e. type 1 processing 
occurring, and stereotype application, i.e. type 1 processing playing a role in choice, (Kunda 
& Spencer, 2003). 
Given  this  theory,  it  is  possible  to  make  predictions  concerning  the  effect  of 
congruency between type 1 and type 2 cues on decision outcomes using a sequential sample 
model to represent this dynamic reasoning process under various levels of time pressure. 
Simulations 4 and 5 in Chapter III demonstrated the predicted effect of congruency of type 1 
and type 2 processing responses under a single threshold level. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate whether the magnitude of the congruence effect in empirical data reflects the 
model estimates based on satisficing thresholds by time pressure. 109 
 
In studies of time pressure, participants are usually only presented with two levels of 
time pressure: present and absent. This diametric methodology only has the ability to display 
the two ends of the transition process, so providing a polarised view of the relationship 
between time pressure and the relationship between type 1 and type 2 processing. This study 
aims to explore this relationship more fully by using more levels of time pressure. The aim 
therefore, is to establish whether the predicted choice characteristics based on the sequential 
sample model reflect those found in the data. It is hoped that this will reveal more than the 
traditional studies of time pressure while also testing the descriptive validity of the model. 
Experiment 
  The study offered participants a number of two-choice investment proposals. Each 
choice had eight cues which could be used to make the decision. One cue was a more type 1 
orientated cue; a positive or negative picture of the company boss. The rest of the cues were 
more type 2 processing orientated; numerical attribute information which could be compared 
using analytical operations. The methodology went further than other studies by exploring 
how strategy usage changes over a number of levels of time pressure rather than simply 
examining the two ends of the spectrum.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 46 undergraduate students were recruited via an intranet website and were 
rewarded with course credits. There were 35 female and 11 male participants and they were 
between the ages of 18 and 29 years (M =19.85, SD = 2.39).  
Design 
  The participants were asked to decide which of two investment proposals they felt 
would  be  most  beneficial  to  them  (see  Figure  1  for  an  example)  on  each  trial.  Each 
investment figure (row 1) ranged between £14,000 and £170,000. Each return (row 2) was 
3.4 times the investment on all occasions. The years of experience (row 3) ranged between 
1.7 and 15 years. Participants were instructed that the years of experience were positively 
related to chance of success. The credit rating (row 4) ranged between one and nine, low 
numbers indicating poorest credit rating and high indicating good credit rating. Participants 
were instructed that credit rating was positively related to success. The percentage market 
share (row 5) ranged between 5% and 95%. Participants were instructed that market share 
was positively related to chance of success. The number of competing companies (row six) 
ranged  between  one  and  ten.  Participants  were  informed  that  the  number  of  competing 
companies was negatively related to chance of success. Finally, a copyright (percentage of 110 
 
the world) (row 7) ranged between 5% and 95%. Participants were informed that this was 
positively related to chance of success.  
 
Figure 1. An example of a trial 
The  intended  dependent  measure  of  strategy  usage  was  the  accuracy  of  choices 
compared to the rational choice. Accordingly, counterbalancing was used to ensure that the 
same level of accuracy could not be achieved through simple heuristics, i.e. just choosing 
one or two factors, or through systematic guessing (e.g. always selecting the left option). 
The  trials  were  counterbalanced  as  follows.  Each  return  was  3.4  times  greater  than  the 
investment  figure  and  the  highest  return  was  counterbalanced  within  participants  to  be 
congruent with the optimal solution on half  of the trials. In all investment choices, one 
investment was better in three out of five of the other data factors (success factors), equal on 
one factor, and worse on a fifth. These values were counterbalanced between trials using a 
5x5 latin square design so that a participant could not use one factor to perform at an optimal 
level. In addition, whether the optimal solution was on the left or the right of the trial was 
also counterbalanced. There were four trial blocks, A, B, C and D, each containing 20 trials. 
Each  block  was  used  for  a  level  of  time  pressure,  and  the  order  of  the  blocks  was 
counterbalanced between participants leading to 24 permutations. This meant that we could 
be sure that it was time pressure, and not differences in complexity of the trial blocks, which 
caused any effect found. 111 
 
  Despite the careful counterbalancing, the design does not account for systematic 
weighting  of  cues  in  the  decision  space.  It  may  be  quite  possible  that  different  people 
perceive certain attributes to be more important than others whether or not they have high 
validity within the trial set. In order to overcome this potential problem participants were 
paired so that two participants saw exactly the same order of blocks and hence the same 
analytical cues in the exact same order. It was expected that the more type 2 processing that 
was employed (i.e. driven by analytical cues), the greater the level of agreement between 
pairs on the same trials where there might not be between participants across different trials, 
due to this weighting issue. 
In addition to the analytical cues, participants were also shown a stereotype cue. 
This cue was a picture of the businesses CEO which was either positive (smartly dressed 
business person appearance) or negative (stigmatised or stressed appearance). As mentioned, 
each pair of participants saw the same analytical cues in the same order. However, the 
exception  was  the  stereotype  cues  which  were  switched.  These  stereotype  cues  were 
counterbalanced  between  the  pairs  so  that  the  positive  picture  was  congruent  with  the 
normatively optimal solution in only half the trials and one of the pairs had a congruent trial 
while one had an incongruent trial. The result is that if participants  only employ type 1 
processing  and  ignore  the  analytical  (type  2)  cues  then  we  should  observe  greater 
disagreement between pairs.  
Recall that time pressure is said to be experienced when the time available for the 
completion  of  a  task  is  perceived  to  be  shorter  than  normally  required  for  the  activity 
(Svenson & Edland, 1987). Time pressure, then, is an intrinsically individual experience. 
Therefore, individually adjusted time pressure levels were employed in an attempt to push 
subjective,  individual,  experiences  of  stress  as  close  together  as  possible.  Participants 
underwent five practice trials of which the last three were recorded and the mean time was 
taken to use as their individual base decision time. This acted as a way of metering the time 
pressure levels in each block to that individual participant. In low time pressure, 40% of 
their base decision time was removed. In medium time pressure, 65% of their base decision 
time was removed. In high time pressure, 80% of their base decision time was removed.  
  The main dependent measures were the agreement between pairs and the accuracy 
rates compared to the normative solution. Participants were asked to report how confident 






  Participants were undergraduate students at the University of Southampton rewarded 
with course credits. They were given an information and consent form prior to each task (see 
appendix A for an example) and were fully debriefed after the experiment. The experiment 
was  run on  a computer  program  in  an  experimental  laboratory  which  could present the 
choices as picture stimuli and record responses made on the keyboard. Participants read 
information explaining all the terms and figures used in the decision tasks in layman’s terms 
and  participants  were  encouraged  to  ask  any  questions  they  had  concerning  the  task. 
Participants then underwent the five practice trials to measure their base decision time and 
the  computer  program  worked  out  the individual time  pressure  for  each  block  for  each 
participant. Each of the four blocks, one for each level of time pressure, contained 20 trials 
totalling  80  trials  per  participant.  Participants  made  their  responses  via  a  keyboard  by 
pressing “V” to choose the left option or “N” to choose right option. Under time pressure, 
the choice task was displayed for the allotted individual time pressure value and then the 
information was hidden and they were asked to make their choice as soon as this occurred. 
Under the no time pressure task, the choice stimulus was displayed until they made their 
choice. After each choice was made, participants were asked to report their confidence on 
the 7-point scale.  
 
Modelling 
The probability of choosing choice x over choice y for a sequential sample model 
was as follows (from Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993). 
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Where d represents the valence difference, i.e. the mean change in preference produced by 
each new sample of the information, σ
2 represents the variance of that valence difference, θ 
is the decision threshold, and z is the initial bias from type 1 processing (see Chapter III for 
more information). The model was fitted to the agreement data using a grid search in R to 
determine  the  parameters  which  minimized  the  root  mean  squared  error  (RMSE)  of 
prediction of the aggregate choice proportions. The best fitting parameters for preference 
state drift was as follows: d = 3.12, σ = 5.50. The time pressure thresholds were determined 
using the following: 
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Where k is the proportion of the base decision threshold at no time pressure and c is a 
constant, c = 1.98. For the base decision threshold (no time pressure), θnoTP = 15.98. So for 
low time pressure (40%), k = .6, θlowTP = 11.57; medium time pressure (65%),  k = .35, 
θmediumTP = 7.57; high time pressure (80%),  k = .20, θhighTP = 4.29. The type 1 bias was 
represented by the initial bias; for congruent trials z =.46, for the incongruent trials z = -.46. 
Recall from Chapter III that z was the initial distance already travelled towards/away from 
each of the decision threshold prior to beginning type 2 operations. 
Results 
Figure 2 shows the accuracy of choices for situations where the experiential and 
analytical  cues  were  congruent  and  incongruent.  It  also  shows  the  predictions  of  the 
sequential  sample  model.  The  model  appears  to  reflect  the  mean  behaviour  fairly  well. 
Figure 3 shows the model predictions alongside each participant’s choices. The R
2 values 
show that the model is relatively effective at describing the data. The figures appear to show 
a  greater  effect  of  time  pressure  on  accuracy  in  the  incongruent  condition  than  in  the 
congruent condition. 
 
Figure 2. The effect of time pressure on accuracy under congruent and incongruent 
conditions. Time pressure is shown as the proportion of the individual participant’s base 
decision time removed in each condition.  
 
A  two-way  repeated-measures  ANOVA  showed  that  as  time  pressure  increased, 
accuracy decreased, F(1.79, 79.07
8)
 = 58.13, p < .001. Bonferroni post hoc tests showed that 
while  there  was  no  significant  difference  between  the  no  time  pressure  and  low  time 
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pressure trials (p > .05), all other comparisons were significant (p < .05). Furthermore, the 
ANOVA showed that there was an effect of experiential cue congruency on accuracy rates. 
In  that,  when  the  picture  cue  was  congruent  with  the  optimal  solution,  participants 
performed better than when the picture was incongruent F(1, 44) = 4.82, p < .05. Despite 
Figure 2 appearing to show an interaction, the ANOVA did not find a significant interaction 
between time pressure and congruency on accuracy, F(2.6,144.4) = 1.95 p > .05. However, 
at this stage we do not have any information regarding the types of cues used in each level of 
time pressure. 
 
Figure  3.  The  model  predictions  (dark  thick  line)  alongside  the  best  fitting  lines  for 
individual participant data (light thin lines). R
2 values for the congruent and incongruent 
conditions are shown in the figure. 
 
In order to estimate how individuals used the range of analytical cues and stereotype 
cues in this experiment, the mean choices (i.e. “V” or “N”) for each trial were regressed by 
the different choice attributes (cues) for each level of time pressure. After excluding the 
investment  cue,  the  model  accounted  for  a  significant  amount  of  the  variance  in  the 
participants’ choices; (R
2=.949) F(7,159) = 404.0, p<.001, under no time pressure; (R
2=.919) 
F(7,159) = 247.1, p<.001, under low time pressure; (R
2=.827) F(7,159) = 103.8, p<.001, 
under  medium  time  pressure;  and(R
2=.596)  F(7,159)  =  32.0,  p<.001,  under  high  time 
pressure.  
The  cue  utilisation  data  (Table  1)  shows  that  a  large  number  of  cues  were 
significantly predictive of the final decision in all levels of time pressure. However, despite 
many cues being used in all levels of time pressure, participants’ accuracy decreases (see 
Figure 2) as time pressure increases. Recall that the design controlled out single cues having 
high validity. If participants were all using the full range of cues in each trial decision at 
each level of time pressure, we should observe no significant reduction in accuracy across 115 
 
time pressure conditions. Therefore, we must assume that the accuracy rates (Figure 2) do 
demonstrate a reduction in the number of cues used, and that cue weight results (Table 1) 
demonstrate  a  degree  of  variation,  between  participants  on  the  same  trials  and  perhaps 
within participants across trials, in cue utilisation. Significantly, in contrast to the sequential 
sample model’s predictions, it seems that the stereotype cue was also considered when there 
was no time pressure (see Figure 2 and Table 1). I shall return explain this finding in the 
discussion section of this chapter. 
Recall that the participants were paired so that each pair viewed identical analytical 
cues in the same order but with disagreeing experiential cues. If my hypothesis is correct 
then we should also observe an increase in disagreement between pairs as time pressure 
increases  (Table  2)  as  the  use  of  stereotype  cue  diverges  pair  consensus.  A  repeated 
measures ANOVA showed a significant increase in disagreements between pairs as time 
pressure increased, F(2.28, 50.10) = 34.82, p < .001. Bonferroni post hoc tests showed that 
that while there was no difference between the no time pressure and low time pressure trials 
in agreement (p > .05), all other comparisons were significant (p < .05). 
 
Table 1. The regression weights of the cues determined by linear regression. 
Time 
Pressure  Picture  Return
1  Experience  Credit 
Market 
Share  Competition  Copyrights 
None  0.041*  0.039*  0.423**  0.338**  0.399**  0.404**  0.527** 
Low  0.020  0.039  0.413**  0.387**  0.406**  0.382**  0.468** 
Medium  0.028  0.074*  0.384**  0.267**  0.476**  0.365**  0.412** 
High  0.167**  0.188**  0.235**  0.152*  0.384**  0.224**  0.481** 
Cue Validity  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7 
1 Due to statistical redundancy the investment variable was removed from the models 
Table  2  also  shows  the  mean  confidence  levels  reported  on  each  trial  by  the 
participants.  A  repeated  measures  ANOVA  showed  that  the  effect  on  confidence  was 
significant F(1.67, 73.24) = 69.88, p < .001. Bonferroni post hoc tests showed that while 
there was no significant difference between the no time pressure and low time pressure trials 
in confidence (p > .05), all other comparisons were significant (p < .05). Thus, it seems that 
participants  were  fairly  confident  in  their  judgements  and  only  exhibited  a  shift  in 
confidence  when  time  pressure  was  high.  This  decrease  in  confidence  may  be 




Table 2. The mean confidence in each decision and pair agreement with the mean time 
allowed in each level of time pressure. 
 
Discussion 
Inspired  by  some  of  the  aspects  of  default-interventionism,  a  sequential  sample 
model was used in order to account for the effects of a range of time pressures on type 1 and 
type 2 processing. Consistent with model and the simulations in Chapter III, when the type 1 
and type 2 cues were incongruent, accuracy was lower than when they were congruent. 
Importantly,  this  congruency  effect  was  greatest  at  high  time  pressure,  an  effect  also 
predicted by the model. Furthermore, the R
2 values (coefficient of determination) for the 
sequential sample model predictions for the choice data revealed a reasonably effective fit of 
about .28 for both congruent and incongruent trials. The findings suggest that this sequential 
sample modelling approach has some future potential for capturing the general relationship 
between  type  1  and  type  2  processing  over  a  range  of  time  pressures.  These  findings 
contribute to past studies into the effects of time pressure on strategy usage (Ben-Zur, & 
Breznitz, 1981; Wallsten, 1993; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). The increased use of 
experiential  processing  under  high  time  pressure  is  consistent  with  past  studies  into 
motivated reasoning (Freund et al., 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kunda, 1990). 
A  limitation  of  the  sequential  sample  model  is  that  it  failed  to  account  for  the 
increased  use  of  type  1  processing  in  no  time  pressure  compared  to  low  time  pressure 
conditions.  This  is  an  important  limitation  of  the  sequential  sample  model  which,  as 
discussed in the Chapters III and IV, is a simplified representation of some of the dual-
process literature. Therefore, the failures of this model do not necessarily reflect weakness in 
dual-process theory, but rather more likely, failures in the quantitative model to capture the 
nuances of dual-process theory as a whole. In particular, in the sequential sample model, its 
structure means that type 1 processing can always be overridden by type 2 processing given 
an infinitely high threshold. However, the degree of volitional control in overriding type 1 
Time  Mean Time  Pair Agreement  Confidence 
Pressure  (seconds)  N  M  SD  N  M  SD 
None  16.72  23  16.87  4.44  46  5.50  0.90 
Low  10.03  23  16.00  4.06  46  5.40  0.86 
Medium   5.85  23  14.30  4.18  46  5.00  0.91 
High   3.34  23  10.87  2.78  46  3.95  1.20 117 
 
processing  does  depend  on  the  task.  For  example,  Evans,  Handley  and  Bacon  (2009) 
revealed that instructions designed to inhibit the belief bias effect failed to remove the bias 
in conditional inference. Furthermore, in contrast to findings that time pressure increased 
belief bias in a syllogistic reasoning task (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005), this increase in 
belief bias did not occur in a conditional inference task. Therefore, it is not true to say that 
intervention  from  type  2  processing  can  always  remove  the  effects  from  default  type 1 
processing as is implied by the sequential sample model shown in Chapter III. Indeed, type 2 
processing often relies on type 1 processing for some tasks. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter I and  II, the correct assessment of  risk information has been shown to  rely on 
emotional (type  1)  processes  (Shiv,  Loewenstein,  Bechara,  Damasio,  &  Damasio, 2005; 
Berthoz,  2006;  Damasio,  1994;  Bechara,  Damasio,  Tranel  &  Damasio,  1997).  This 
limitation will be returned to in Chapter VII. 
A further question which remains as a result of this study is the extent to which 
these results are due to within participants effects (i.e. a weighted input from both systems 
into each choice), or across participants effects (i.e. time pressure increases the likelihood 
that  participants  will  switch  to  an  entirely  experiential  strategy).  The  model  and  the 
methodology were aimed at determining whether there is a global increase in type 1 cue 
usage overall and could not discriminate between these different levels of causation. Another 
important limitation is that this study does not involve competitive modelling analysis, e.g. 
comparing two models to determine which one is the best predictor. Rather this study simply 
assessed  the  ability  of  the  model  to  account  for  the  shape  of  the  data.  Competitive 
assessment of the model is considered in the next chapter. 
In conclusion, while a more complex version of the sequential sample model would 
be required if we are to capture more of the nuanced effects relating to dual processes, the 
results  shown  that  even  in  its  very  simplistic  form,  it  can  perform  relatively  well  at 
accounting choice behaviour over a range of time pressures. In chapter VII I consider the 
various limitations of the sequential sample model, and outline how it may be improved to 
better capture other aspects of dual-process theory and reflect the broader JDM literature. 
 
Summary Points 
o  Under  default-interventionism,  type  3  processing  is  hypothesized  to  mediate  the 
extent to which individual rely on the default, type 1, processing or allow more time 
consuming type 2 intervention to occur. 
o  The simulations in Chapter III predict that greater time pressure should result in 
greater reliance on type 1 processing.  118 
 
o  While increased use of type 1 processing under time pressure is represented in the 
literature,  the  experiment  in  this  chapter  tested  the  extent  to  which  the  model’s 
predictions  over a  range of  time  pressures (continuous  predictions) reflected the 
behavioural data. 
o  The experiment revealed that the predicted choice behaviour did reflect the general 
changes in empirical data over the four levels of time pressure. 
o  However,  while  the  general  patterns  of  behaviour  could  be  represented  by  the 
model, the model failed to account for the use of type 1 processing in no time-
pressure  compared  to  low  time-pressure  condition.  As  such  behaviour  could  be 
explained via dual-processes, this demonstrates a further limitation based on the 
simplicity of the mode which needs to be addressed in Chapter VII. 
o  Furthermore, while the sequential sample model can account for congruency effects, 
it is unclear as to whether it is a better model than the alternative, race model, 
approach. Competitive modelling would improve the case for the sequential sample 
model mechanism outlined in Chapter III. 
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Chapter VI – Empirical Chapter 
“We don't see things as they are, we see things as we are.”  
- A. Nin (1903 - 1977) 
In the previous chapter, I focused on the congruency effect of type 1 and type 2 
processing under various levels of time pressure. This chapter continues the investigation of 
the congruency effect but this time also examining whether the specific mechanism used to 
predict  these  effects  (sequential  sample  /  tug  of  war)  mechanism  is  a  more  effective 
predictor than an alternative mechanism (race model) (see discussion in Chapter III). Thus, 
while the previous chapter only tackled the descriptive validity of the model, i.e. the extent 
to which the model estimated behaviour appeared to reflect the shape of the empirical data, 
this chapter seeks a more competitive modelling approach. Therefore, this chapter seeks a 
more  rigorous  assessment  of  the  model  mechanism  as  a  valid  representation  of  JDM 
processes. As discussed in  Chapter III, the race model only allows early information to 
reduce the distance to the congruent threshold (congruency effect). The race model does not 
allow early-informational biases to impact to impact negatively on the opposite threshold 
(i.e. no incongruency effect is predicted). The sequential sample model, on the other hand, 
makes  a  bolder  prediction  that  not  only  does  a  type  1  bias  reduce  the  distance  to  the 
congruent threshold, it will also extend the distance to the negative threshold (i.e. it predicts 
both a congruency and incongruency effect). These competing predictions are tested in this 
Chapter. The null hypothesis is that we should not observe an effect of a type 1 bias on the 
distance to the opposite decision threshold (race model prediction). If I do find a significant 
effect on the opposite threshold then we can reject this null hypothesis (and the race model 
mechanism) in favour of the sequential sample model mechanism described in Chapter III. 
In addition to testing this question of congruency/incongruency effects, the previous 
study focused on the effect of reducing decision thresholds through time pressure. This study 
is complementary, therefore, as it  focuses on manipulations of type 3 processing in the 
opposite direction – the effect of an increased satisficing threshold level through motivation 
manipulation.  In  particular,  I  explore  the  role  of  motivated  accuracy  on  the 
congruency/incongruency  effect  and  the  extent  to  which  the  sequential  sample  model 
correctly predicts empirical data. The model makes two predictions related to motivated 
accuracy. The first is that type 1 biases should have a reduced effect. The second is that 
motivation  to  be  accurate  should  impact  on  type  3  processing  and  therefore  we  should 
observe this in the volume of evidence required before a decision is made (i.e. increased 
deliberation times/RTs). Thus, this study also continues the work of Chapter IV on the use of 
response times as evidence of type 3 processing. 120 
 
Bounded Visual Search: Expectation Biases and Motivated Accuracy on Visual 
Search Performance 
Abstract 
Participants  performed  a  visual  search  “war  game”  in  which  participants  had  to 
decide whether to state that an enemy threat was present or absent in a display of distracters. 
Continuing the theme of early informational biases and the role of type 3 processing in 
mediating the biasing effects, this study examines the role of accuracy motivation (theorised 
to impact on type 3 processing) and cues eliciting expectation (an early informational bias) 
regarding search outcome on individuals’ judgements. Prior to each trial, participants were 
shown a threat-level cue designed to elicit an expectation regarding the likelihood of target 
presence;  either  present,  absent,  or  neutral  (non-informative).  The  results  of  the  first 
experiment showed that the valence of the expectation resulted in an interaction between 
miss errors and false alarms, as well as influencing hit response times and the decision to 
stop searching. This persisted whether or not the cue was a valid indicator of actual target 
presence. In a second experiment a payoff for accuracy was introduced. This motivation 
removed the effect of the cue on error rates whilst generally increasing RT; an accuracy-
speed trade off. More importantly, however, whilst the effects on error rates were removed, 
the  interaction  in  the  RTs  was  still  observed.  This  finding  supports  the  outweighing 
mechanism used in the sequential sample model, rather than a system which takes type 1 
responses  totally  “offline”.  Critically,  the  demonstration  of  an  incongruency  effect 
demonstrates  support  for  the  sequential  sample  mechanism,  rather  than  the  race  model 
mechanism which would not predict any incongruency effect.  
Introduction 
In the real world the act of visual search seldom occurs in a vacuum devoid of 
cognitive factors such as emotion, expectation and motivation. Consider a visual searcher 
who expects a target to be present; an x-ray image of a patient previously diagnosed with 
cancer, a “Where’s Wally?
9” game, a key in the place we last recall leaving it, a ridge 
characteristic from a forensic fingerprint from the prime suspect. Now consider a search in 
which it is fairly certain that a target is not present; a medical image of a healthy patient, a 
baggage x-ray image at an airport owned by an elderly lady, or a ridge characteristic from a 
forensic print taken from an unlikely suspect. Would the search effort (type 3 processing) 
always be the same across these contexts? These cognitive factors are rarely considered in 
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visual search research beyond finding ways to control them out through experimental design. 
Therefore it is unclear as to how these higher-level cognitive processes can impact on visual 
search  performance.  Accordingly,  I  consider  whether  the  sequential  sample  approach 
introduced in Chapter III may be a useful tool for predicting these kinds of factors in the 
domain of visual search decision-making. 
Expectation as Type 1 Priming of Responses 
There are a number of expectations we might have concerning a forthcoming search, 
the effects of which would fall under the category of automatic processes. Priming usually 
refers to some process which elicits increases in target saliency (Egeth, 1977; Julesz, 1986; 
Moraglia, 1989) or guides attention (Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003), either due to the 
stimuli  themselves,  having  learnt  task  specific  cues,  or  having  been  informed  of  some 
knowledge concerning the search task. Posner and Snyder (1975) describe the effects of 
priming on stimulus response tasks. In their experiment it was found that cues presented 
before a stimulus-response task decreased response times (RTs) even when the cues were of 
low validity (the cue was correct only 20% of the time). This showed that repeated pairing of 
the cue and the stimulus resulted in priming without any expectation (Reisberg, 1997). It 
was also found that when the cues were of high validity (the cue was predictive 80% of the 
time), the RTs were even faster than the low validity trials. Posner and Snyder also provided 
misleading cues. These cues were not neutral but indicated that a different stimulus would 
appear. The effects of the misleading cues were negligible when compared to neutral cues 
under low validity trials. This suggested that priming the “wrong” response did not always 
negatively  impose  on  RTs,  i.e.  the  priming  of  one  type  of  stimulus  did  not  appear  to 
influence the sensitivity to others. However, during high validity trials, the misleading cues 
significantly increased the RTs. It was suggested that the high validity cue also brought 
about a certain level of expectation and hence explicit aspects onto the perceptual task. It 
seemed that this explicit priming of one response appeared to take away some sensitivity 
towards the alterative response (Reisberg, 1997). This suggests that an expectation that a 
target is going to be present or absent in a search area may affect our response sensitivity in 
a way which biases response probability towards one judgement over the other. 
If  one  considers  this  initial  expectation  of  target  presence/absence  as  a  type  1 
processing bias on subsequent searching, then the reduction in response sensitivity to the 
opposite  response  is  in  line  with  the  congruency/incongruency  effects  predicted  by  the 
sequential sample model outlined in Chapter III. The question, therefore, is whether this 
initial expectation of target presence/absence impacts on choice behaviour in line with other 
predictions  of  type  1  biases  described  by  the  model.  For  example,  does  a  manipulated 122 
 
increase in satisficing threshold, which should reduce the impact of the type 1 response, 
reduce the impact of a cue eliciting the expectation of target presence/absence? 
Although the focus is on the effect of expectation of target presence, it may be 
useful to briefly describe studies examining implicit priming of target presence; the target 
prevalence effect. This is an effect on search performance as a result of experiencing certain 
levels of target prevalence over many trials. Wolfe, Horowitz, and Kenner (2005) found that 
a target presented on 1% of trials was less likely to be detected than a target presented on 
50% of trials. In addition, Wolfe et al. (2005) observed that RTs for target-absent trials 
became  more  rapid  as  target  prevalence  was  reduced.  This  was  attributed  to  a  speed-
accuracy trade-off, with RTs in low prevalence search becoming so rapid for target-absent 
responses that the observer is essentially responding before they have allowed themselves a 
sufficient period of time to detect the target (Chun & Wolfe, 1996). 
The detailed nuances of the prevalence effect are still under examination (see Wolfe, 
Horowitz, Van Wert, Kenner, Place, & Kibbi, 2007; for review). However, it does appear 
that the effect is intricately tied to RTs. It is possible that the RTs are a result of some 
internally-limiting process which results in observers responding “absent” more rapidly, but, 
for the time being, it is uncertain why this is the case (Wolfe et al., 2007). However, in terms 
of the simulations in Chapter III, this phenomenon appears to be in line with a reduction in 
the distance to the congruent threshold and type 3 processing. 
Thresholds in Decision-Making and Visual Search 
In visual search, an important topic of interest is the decision to stop searching and 
make a present/absent decision. This topic has close parallels to type 3 processing discussed 
throughout  this  thesis  and  the  idea  of  satisficing  thresholds.  One  of  the  most  thorough 
examinations of the decision to stop searching was Chun and Wolfe’s (1996) solution based 
upon Wolfe’s (1989, 1994, 2007) Guided Search model. Their theory states that searchers 
will check as many target-like stimuli as exceed a threshold. By “threshold”, the mean that 
the  stimuli  appear to  be  relevant/similar  to  the  search  target.  This  is  different  from  the 
satisficing threshold I describe in Chapter III. Once all the targets which meet this criterion 
have been checked, and a target is not found, then searching stops. Accordingly, searching 
does not have to be exhaustive, i.e. searching all items in the visual scene, but can vary 
depending upon the level set by the criterion.  
Chun and Wolfe (1996) then considered that there may be effects of motivational 
factors such as cost of error on this stop-search mechanism. This was tested through two 
groups of participants, one in which the cost of error on their overall score was large, and 
one in which it was small. The “conservative” group had a higher cost of error than the 123 
 
“liberal” group and were shown to have similar RTs for target trials but higher RTs during 
blank trials. Furthermore, miss error rates for the liberal group were 2.5 times greater than in 
the conservative group and false-alarm rates, although to a lesser extent, were also increased. 
Although  it  was  not  discussed  by  Chun  and  Wolfe,  the  idea  of  type  3  processing  and 
motivational  factors  on  search  performance  clearly  echos  the  studies  of  motivation  on 
decision processes and the rich literature relating to thinking dispositions (Cacioppo, Petty, 
Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). 
Accordingly, the sequential sample model approach I considered may be useful for 
understanding  these effects.  In  fact,  sequential sample  models  have  been  used  in  visual 
search. Ward and McClelland (1989) were among the first to relate a sequential sample 
model (termed a diffusion model) to visual search, using a parallel search paradigm. They 
proposed that each item in a display has a corresponding detector, all of which accumulate 
evidence for or against the hypothesis that their item is a target. Each detector has a resting 
activation, similar to the type 1 bias parameter z, and a “present” and “absent” threshold. If a 
single detector reaches the positive threshold, then a “present” decision is made; once all 
items reach the negative threshold, an “absent” decision is made. Thus, in a similar way to 
Chun and Wolfe’s (1996) idea, modulation of these thresholds determines RTs and accuracy 
rates.  
The main difference is that whereas the Chun and Wolfe’s model varies the number 
of target-like items examined, Ward & McClelland’s model varies the number of samples of 
visual  information  that  are  required  for  each  item  before  it  is  said  to  be  a  target  or  a 
distracter. I shall return to this difference in the discussion, nevertheless, both models use a 
threshold to represent a speed-accuracy trade off. Given a low threshold, less visual evidence 
is required before a verdict is made resulting in quicker RTs but increased error rates. Given 
a desire to make a more accurate decision, the thresholds will increase resulting in slower 
RTs but more accurate searches as judgements are made using more samples of information. 
Chun  and  Wolfe  (1996)  and  the  many  theories  of  bounded  rationality  and  motivated 
reasoning suggest that motivational factors may influence this decision threshold. Therefore, 
grounded in these theories is a single parameter (mean detector threshold level, θ) which can 
represent the motivation to either perform a long, accurate search or a short, more error-
prone search. Figure 1 shows a depiction of the effects of a shift in thresholds on RTs 
showing how the increase in threshold from  θ1 to  θ2 results in a global increase in the 
number of samples required for judgement. This increase in the volume of evidence gathered 
will reduce error rates in both target present and target absent trials, resulting in an speed-
accuracy tradeoff. 124 
 
 
Figure 1. A representation of the effects of thresholds on evidence gathering and accuracy-
speed tradeoffs, an effect of accuracy motivation. 
Expectations and resting activations: Sequential Sample versus Race Model 
Mechanism 
Whilst the speed-accuracy tradeoff aspect of the model may be useful for the effects 
of accuracy motivation, an initial expectation of target presence/absence may also relate to 
performance, acting as a type 1 processing bias. The sequential sample model introduced in 
Chapter III proposes that the bias towards one hypothesis (e.g. present conclusion) may 
negatively impact on the distance to the opposite threshold (e.g. absent conclusion). See 
simulations 4 and 5 in Chapter III and Figure 2a. However, an alternative possibility is that 
expectation may not influence the resting activations. Rather, the threshold distances may 
vary independently of each other - a form of race model (see Chapter III). This would be 
displayed by positive effects on the congruent response but no effect on the incongruent 
response  performance  (see  Ratcliff  &  Smith,  2004,  for  review).  This  study  can  help 
determine which model is the best predictor of expectation on search performance. 
In summary, this study aims to examine whether the sequential sample model can 
predict the role of early information regarding target presence/absence under motivated and 
unmotivated conditions. In particular, I focus on the predicted incongruency effect which is 
predicated by the sequential sample model but not by race model mechanism. The study will 



























Figure 2. (a) A sequential sample model of expectation bias: the effects of a shift in resting 
activations, z1 to z2, on the evidence required for each response; an effect of expectation of 
target presence (congruency effect for the present decision but incongruency effect for the 
absent decision). (b) A race model of expectation bias: the shift from θ 1 to θ 2 only affects 
the congruent outcome and does not impact on the opposite (absent in this case) threshold. 
 
Experiment 1 
Expectation Cue as a Type 1 (z) Bias 
This first study examines whether providing a cue prior to a search trial will result in 
behaviour  predicted  by  the  sequential  sample  model.  According  to  the  simulations  in 
Chapter III, a cue eliciting an expectation that the target is present should result in a shift in 
the initial preference state (P(0), z) towards the “present” threshold. With this we should 









































However, if we observed longer correct rejection RTs then we have evidence in favour of 
the sequential sample model but not the race model. This will be associated with reduced 
miss rates (target present trial (TPT) errors) but increased false alarm rates (target absent 
trial (TAT) errors). 
Participants performed a visual search task searching for a specific single target 
amongst distracters. Prior to each trial, participants were presented with a cue designed to 
elicit an expectation concerning target presence. If a decision-maker is aware that a cue has 
little or no validity (i.e. it is unhelpful), then they may tend to ignore  it and the resting 
activations may not be influenced. Therefore, two groups were tested: one group had cues of 
high validity (the cue is predictive of target presence), another group had low validity cues 
(the cue is predictive of target presence in only 50% of trials). Unfortunately, this has a 
potential to make analysis difficult. If only the valid cue group reveal an effect, it may be 
difficult to determine whether the effects are a result of the cues or the bottom-up effects of 
the actual prevalence of the target (see section on the target prevalence effect above). The 
invalid group isolates the effects of the cue but this may lead to no effect of the cue as 
participants may fail to believe the cue to be useful. Therefore, a solution is to use a mixed-
block design to limit the target-prevalence effect; i.e. all cues are presented within each 
block  rather  than  between  blocks.  This  should  reduce  the  likelihood  that  the  target 
prevalence effect will confound results in the valid group, whilst at the same time making it 
more difficult for searchers to determine the actual validities in the invalid group. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants were recruited, aged between 18 and 43 (M=22.0, SD=6.0). 
There were 20 female and 12 male participants in the group and they were all students at the 
University of Southampton. Participants were rewarded with class credits. 
Design 
There were two independent variables. The first was the expectation cue presented 
prior to each trial which was varied within participants and had three levels: Expect Present, 
Neutral or Expect Absent. The second was whether the target presence across trials meant 
that the cues had high validity or not. The high validity group experienced target prevalence 
which agreed with the expectation cue; i.e., in expect-present trials the target was present 
70% of the time, in neutral trials 50% of the time, and in expect-absent trials 30% of the 
time. The low validity group had 50% present and 50% absent trials across all trials. The 
design was a mixed block design in that a different cue may be provided in each trial in a 127 
 
random order. This means that it is possible to isolate the effects of top-down priming as 
without the cue prior to the trial, even in the valid group, the experienced target presence 
would be 50% across all blocks, see (Table 1). Response times, and whether the searchers 
chose to press the “present” or “absent” response button, were analysed. Note that although 
we have referred to the groups as high and low validity, the 50% trials are in fact valid for 
both. Hence, the 50% trials act as a control, or measure of consistency between groups, and 
aid our ability to isolate the real effects of validity on choices. 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants were undergraduate students at the University of Southampton rewarded 
with course credits. The experiment was carried out in an experimental laboratory. They 
were given an information and consent  form prior to each task (see appendix  A for an 
example) and were fully debriefed after the experiment. Participants took part in a visual 
search game, searching for a specific schematic of an airplane target amongst an array of 
distracters. The stimuli consisted of JPEG images taken from hand drawn schematics which 
were manipulated using photo editing software to ensure they each had similar levels of 
luminance and line thickness. Each image could be displayed in four different orientations, 
with the nose of each plane pointing either at the 0, 90, 180, or 270 degrees of orientation. 
Each  trial  had  a  set  size  of  12  images,  with  three  images  displayed  in  each  of  four 
orientations. The target was randomly assigned to each orientation across trials. Despite the 
planes being different sizes in real life, each image was the same dimensions: height 176 by 
width 184 pixels, to eliminate any size-based pop-out. 
A bank of target planes was chosen by excluding planes which appeared to stand out 
from the rest in a short pre-study. Out of a bank of 55 images, 20 potential targets were 
selected based on similarity of image, number of engines and wing design. Then a group of 
five  participants  were  asked  to  identify  any  image  which  appeared  to  stand  out  as 
particularly different in design to the others. The four most outstanding planes were kept as 
distracters but removed from the potential target list. Thus there were two banks: a target 
bank of 16 planes and a distracter bank of 39 planes. Each participant was asked to search 
for the same single target throughout the experiment and the target was counterbalanced 
across the  32 participants. To attempt to ensure consistency of complexity across trials, 
seven  distracters  were  from  the  distracter  bank  and  five  were  from  the  target  bank 












Participants were informed that they were playing a game where they had to protect 
the City of London by identifying a specific enemy airplane target which may or may not be 
present. In each trial, participants were shown a reminder of the target image in the 0 degree 
orientation for 4000ms. They were then shown the expectation cue. This was a threat level 
for the forthcoming trial which was either: “expect present” (a red image stating “High 
Threat Level” linked with an alarm sound cue), “neutral” (a blue image stating “Medium 
Threat Level” with a soft tone sound cue), or “expect absent” (a green image stating “Low 
Threat Level” with a small bell sound cue). The high threat level was said to be associated 
with over 70% present trials, the medium threat level was said to be associated with 50% 
present trials, the low threat level was said to be associated with over 70% absent trials. 
Participants then pressed the space bar when they were ready to begin, whereupon the screen 
displayed  the  stimulus.  This  remained  visible  until  the  participant  responded  by  either 
pressing the “N” keyboard button for present or “V” keyboard button for absent. After 30 
practice trials both groups were presented with four blocks of 42 trials. Table 1 displays the 
trial distributions for each group depending upon the cue presented prior to each trial.  
Results 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for error rates by both groups. Figure 3 
shows the error rates in target present and target absent trials across both groups depending 
upon the cue presented before each trial. The results showed a significant interaction 
                                                       
10 There were originally 896 neutral trials, however, there was a data error in blocks 3 & 4 for this 
trial type and so these data were not recorded. 
Validity   
Expect 
Absent  Neutral 
Expect 
Present  Total 
High 
Absent  640  224  256  1120 
Present  256  224  640  1120 
Total  896  448  896  2240 
Low 
Absent  448  224  448  1120 
Present  448  224  448  1120 
Total  896  448
10  896  2240 129 
 
between the cue and the type of error, F(1.26, 37.87
11) = 5.51, p < .05. This interaction was 
not affected by the validity groups, F(1.26, 37.87) = .637, p > .05. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the high and low validity groups for error rates. 
    Misses  False Alarms 
Validity   
Exp 








M  .213  .170  .093  .048  .158  .144 
SE  .059  .045  .023  .021  .050  .069 
Low 
M  .204  .200  .080  .079  .100  .172 




Figure 3. Error rates during target present trials (TPTs) and target absent trials (TATs) from 
both groups.  
The interaction revealed that different types of error were being made depending 
upon the cue valence. There was an effect of cue on the false alarm rates, i.e. in target absent 
trials, F(1.33, 39.90) = 4.10, p < .05. The test for contrasts between cues found a positive 
linear relationship between cue and false alarm rates, F(1, 30) = 4.64, p < .05, Bonferroni 
post-hoc tests could not reveal a significant difference between the individual cues (p>.05 
for all). Notably, although greater expectation of target presence resulted in increased false 
alarm rates, this also led to a decrease in misses, F(1.52, 45.73) = 5.97, p < .01. The test for 
                                                       
11 In cases in which it was necessary, due to significant Mauchly’s tests, the degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. In the other cases the original degrees of 
freedom were used. 130 
 
contrasts between cues found a negative linear relationship, F(1, 30) = 9.316, p < .01, and 
Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed a significant difference between the expect-present and 
expect-absent cues (p < .05), the expect-present and neutral cues (p < .01), but not between 
the neutral and expect-absent cues (p > .05).  
In terms of signal detection theory (Table 3), there was no significant effect of the 
cues presented to participants on d-prime, F(1.54, 46.09) = 2.44, p > .05. Equally, there 
were no differences between the validity groups on effect of cues on d-prime, F(1.54, 46.09) 
= .42, p > .05. This indicates that there was no effect of the cues or difference between the 
groups on the ability to detect a target or not. However, there was a significant effect of cue 
on the response criterion, F(1.47, 43.98) = 6.11, p < .01. This indicates a bias towards one 
decision over another. Again, there was no difference between groups on this response bias, 
F(1.47, 43.98) = 2.40, p > .05, or an interaction between validity group and cue, F(1.47, 
43.98)=1.32,  p>.05.  Bonferroni  post  hoc  tests  revealed  a  significant  difference  between 
expect-present  and  expect  absent  cues  (p  <  .05)  however,  the  neutral  cue  was  not 
significantly different from either of the other two cues (p > .05).  
Table 3. Mean (SE) signal detection theory values for each validity group under each cue. 
  d-prime  criterion 





























Figure 4. Response Time data for correct and incorrect responses during target 
present trials (TPTs) and target absent trials (TATs). 131 
 
Figure 4 shows the RT data from the study for both correct and incorrect responses 
under the different cues for both target present and target absent trials. The results for the 
correct responses revealed an interaction between correct rejection (TATs) and hit (TPTs) 
RTs, F (1.36, 39.34) = 11.43, p < .001, which was not significantly different between the 
two  validity  groups.  As  may  be  expected,  overall,  hit  RTs  were  quicker  than  correct 
rejection RTs, F (1, 29) = 95.44, p < .001, and there was an effect of cue on hit RTs, F (2, 
60) = 5.44, p < .01, which was not significantly different between the two validity groups, F 
(2, 60) = 1.93, p > .05. Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that hit RTs were quicker after the 
expect-present cue than the neutral cue (p < .001); no other comparisons were significant, (p 
> .05). There was also an effect of cue on correct rejection RTs, F (1.21, 35.15) = 11.19, p < 
.001, which was not significantly different between validity groups, F (1.21, 35.15) = .70, p 
>  .05.  This  effect  was  linearly  related  to  cue  valence,  F  (1,  29)  =  11.50,  p <  .01,  and 
Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that correct rejection RTs were slower after the expect-
present cue than both the neutral cue (p < .001) and the expect-absent cue (p < .01). There 
was no significant difference between the correct rejection RTs between the neutral and the 
expect-absent cue (p > .05)
12.  
  These results appear to show that, consistent with the  sequential sample  model 
predictions, searchers are quicker to correctly identify the target  when they expect that the 
target will be present and the   signal detection theory  results clearly show this to be a 
response  bias  effect.  Importantly,  consistent  with  both  the  sequential  sample  theory 
predictions  and  Posner  and  Snyder’s  (1975)  findings,  correct  rejection  RTs  increase  as 
expectation of target presence increases. This suggests that the decision to stop searching 
does  indeed  vary  depending  on  the  expectation  of  target  presence.  As  predicted  by  the 
sequential sample model, but not the race model, this bias towards the “present” threshold 
also results in a bias away from the “absent” threshold resulting in more evidence being 
required  before  the  absent  threshold  is  reached  by  the  accumulation,  increasing  RTs. 
Essentially, the results showed that an expectation influenced both the expected outcome 
threshold  distance  (shortened)  as  well  as  the  opposite  hypothesis  threshold  distance 
(lengthened). This significant effect shows that the sequential sample model, rather than race 
model, mechanism was correct. 
As we did not observe any effect of cue validity on this effect, it appears as though 
participants were not aware of the validities of the cues in each case. Indeed, the fact that the 
effects of the cues on error rates were found after the first block with an interaction between 
                                                       
12 As the error rates were relatively small, we have only limited number of data points for false alarm 
and miss rates and so we did not find any significant effects in this data set. 132 
 
misses and false alarms depending upon the cue, F(1.65, 51.21) = 7.862, p < .01, suggests 
that validity was believed from the outset. This shows that experience of validity is not 
necessarily required for biases in resting activation to occur; a cue which is believed to be 
valid is enough. This clearly shows higher level processes in the bias rather than some 
degree of stimulus-response learning based on feedback. 
Experiment 2 
Thresholds (θ) ￗ Resting Activations (z) 
Given that expectation influences searching in a way which is consistent  with the 
sequential sample model approach, it is possible to make further predictions concerning 
these effects and type 3 processing. In the last experiment, participants were given no reward 
or motivational cues other than to respond as accurately and quickly as possible. However, 
Chun & Wolfe (1996) discovered that payoffs resulted in significant effects on both target 
absent trials RTs as well as error rates. According to their theory this motivation mediated 
the threshold and thus determined the level of speed-accuracy trade off. As a result, there 
may be an interaction between the resting activations and the threshold levels. Based on the 
theory that motivated accuracy may impact on type 3 processing, i.e. satisficing thresholds, 
it  is  predicted  that  the  sequential  sample  model  may  also  be  useful  in  predicting  these 
effects. 
The  general  relationship  between  early  type  1  biases  and  satisficing  thresholds, 
predicted by the sequential sample model, is that a bias in resting activation has a greater 
effect when the thresholds are low than when they are high (see the simulations in Chapter 
III). Accordingly, if motivation increases the satisficing threshold, then the bias will have a 
reduced effect. The sequential sample model predicts a reduction in the magnitude of the 
congruence/incongruency effect on both accuracy and RTs. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants were recruited, aged between 19 and 43 (M=24.5, SD=7.5). 
There were 19 female and 13 male participants in the group and they were all students at the 
University of Southampton, rewarded with class credits. 
Design  
As we observed no significant difference between the valid and invalid cues, and the 
invalid design allows for more misleading cue trials for analysis, this study replicated the 133 
 
invalid condition, i.e. in every expectation cue condition the target appeared 50% of the 
time. Again, note that the neutral cue is valid as it has been before and thus acts as the 
control. Under this design we can be sure that the effects are wholly due to the cue and 
implicit effects of experiencing variation in actual target prevalence are removed and are not 
affected by experiencing different prevalence rates. One group were not given any payoff for 
accuracy (non-motivated); the second group were informed that they would be financially 
rewarded depending upon their accuracy (motivated). 
Procedure 
Participants were undergraduate students at the University of Southampton rewarded 
with course credits. They were given an information and consent form prior to each task (see 
appendix A for an example) and were fully debriefed after the experiment. The experiment 
was carried out in an experimental laboratory. The motivated participants were rewarded 
with £5 if they had a low enough error rate (both misses and false alarms below 98%), and 
the participant who had the least errors overall would receive £50. In the event of a tie, the 
participant with the fastest overall RT out of the competitors would win. The rest of the 
procedure and design were identical to the last study. 
Results 
Figure 5 shows the error rates of motivated and unmotivated participants. The non-
motivated group showed an almost significant effect of cue on error rates which interacted 
across target present and target absent trials, F(1.18,17.62) = 3.38, p= .078. There was an 
effect of cue on miss rates, F(2,30) = 3.29, p = .05, and Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed 
that non-motivated searchers were less likely to miss the target when they expected it to be 
present, p < .05. No other comparisons were significant. In contrast, motivated participants 
made fewer errors overall when compared to the non-motivated group, F(1,29) = 6.91, p < 
.05. This decrease was found in both target present trials (misses) F(1,30) = 6.47, p < .05, 
and target absent trials (false alarms) F(1,30) = 6.59, p < .05. While motivated participants 
still made more miss errors than false alarm errors, F(1,15) = 14.23, p < .01, there was now 
no effect of cue on error rates F(1.46,20.43) = .959, p > .05.  134 
 
 
Figure 5. Error rates for both the motivated and non-motivated groups. 
Signal detection theory results (Table 4) show that there was no difference between 
the groups in d-prime F(1,30) = 1.84, p > .05, and no effect of cue on d-prime for either the 
non-motivated F(2,30) = 1.57, p > .05, or the motivated group, F(2,30) = .88, p > .05. There 
was no effect of cue on d-prime overall (i.e. across both groups), F(2,60)=2.123, p>.05, or 
an  interaction  between  groups  and  cue,  F(2,60)=.776,  p>.05.  There  was  a  significant 
interaction between groups and cue in criterion estimates, F(1.64,49.07) = 4.752, p<.05. It 
was revealed that while there was an effect of the cue on SDT criterion estimates in the non-
motivated group, F(2,30) = 4.83, p < .05, this effect was not present in the motivated group, 
F(2,30) = .29, p > .05. This suggests that the cue only significantly influenced response 
biases when participants did not have heightened motivation levels. This effect in the non-
motivated group was linear F(1,15) = 5.24, p < .05, such that a cue eliciting an expectation 
of presence led to a negative bias (more false alarms than misses) whereas neutral or absent 
expectations led to a positive bias (more misses than false alarms). 
 
Table 4. Mean (SE) signal detection theory values for each motivation group under each cue. 
  d-prime  criterion 




























As discussed, the sequential sample approach predicts that RTs should increase with 
accuracy motivation as more samples are required to meet the thresholds. The results (see 135 
 
Figure 6) showed that there was a significant effect of motivation on correct response RTs
13, 
F(1,30)  =  4.687,  p  <  .05,  such  that  motivated  participants  took  significantly  longer  to 
respond than non-motivated participants (p < .05).  
 
Figure 6. RT data for correct responses in the motivated and non-motivated group. 
There was a significant interaction between the cue and correct response RTs in the 
non-motivated condition, F(2,30), = 3.749, p < .05. Importantly, although the effects of the 
cue were removed in the error rates, this interaction persisted even in the motivated group 
correct  response  RTs,  F(2,  30),  =  10.15,  p  <  .001.  There  was  a  significant  difference 
between groups in target absent trial RTs, F(1,29), = 6.396, p < .05 and correct rejection RTs 
in the motivated condition were affected by the cue F( 2, 28), = 12.05, p < .001. Bonferroni 
post hoc tests revealed that, consistent with experiment 1, correct rejection RTs were longer 
in the high expectation condition than in the medium (p < .01) or low (p < .01) conditions, 
although there was no significant difference between low and medium correct rejection RTs 
(p > .01). Thus, an expectation of a target being present again increased the search times in 
target absent trials. The hit RTs for the target present trials were significantly influenced by 
the cues F(2, 30), = 3.36, p < .05. Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that although this effect 
was  not  significant  between  individual  cues  (p  >  .05  for  all  comparisons),  there  was  a 
significantly linear trend of cue and RT, F(1, 15), = 4.67, p < .05, such that the greater the 
expectation  of  target  presence  the  shorter  the  RT.  The  results  suggest  that  motivated 
participants have not removed their biases by ignoring the cues, but rather the error rate 
measure is unable to detect the now reduced effects. However, the RT measure is sensitive 
enough to show that the expectation bias still persisted even in the highly motivated group. 
These are consistent with the sequential sample models predictions. 
                                                       
13 Again, due to the motivated condition there was little RT data from error responses. 136 
 
Discussion 
In two experiments it was shown that a cue presented prior to a visual search task 
which elicits an expectation of target presence has an effect consistent with the sequential 
sample model, but not the race model, predictions. Specifically, expectations appear to bias 
the distance to each alternative’s satisficing thresholds so that searchers make confirming 
responses based upon less visual evidence than they would otherwise (congruency effect), 
and  make  disconfirming  responses  on  more  information  than  they  would  otherwise 
(incongruency  effect).  In  addition,  the  hypothesis  that  motivation  manipulations  would 
influence this effect was also tested. The study supports this view by demonstrating that 
accuracy motivation reduces the overall error rates, as well as the biasing effect of the cues 
on the types of error made, at the expense of longer RTs. This finding provides further 
support  of  the  criterion  view  of  type  3  processing  and  supports  the  use  of  satisficing 
thresholds as a way of modelling at least some of the aspects of this type 3 processing. 
However, it was also shown that the effect of motivation was not a process of ignoring cues, 
as the influence on hit and correct rejection RTs persisted even when error rates were no 
longer affected. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that while expectation still influenced 
resting activations in motivated searchers, this bias-threshold effect was not high enough for 
this  to  significantly  influence  error  rates.  Figure  7  shows  how  motivation  mediates  the 
effects of expectation through the resting activation and threshold relationship. This finding 




Figure 7. Both figures show a case in which the resting activation is biased towards the 
“present” threshold, z =.05. This bias is stronger when the threshold is low, θ=1.0, than 
when it is high, θ=5.0. 
Parallel, Serial or Hybrid?  
Although the results have been explained using a sequential sample model approach, 
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be applied to other models of visual search (e.g. Humphreys & Müeller, 1993; Pashler, 
1987; Grossberg, et al., 1994), all of which appear to need some threshold-based component 
which  can  vary  our  effort  between  trials  (Chun  &  Wolfe,  1996).  These  models  can  be 
broadly separated into serial (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994) and parallel (Ward & 
McClelland, 1989; Humphreys & Müeller, 1993) groups. According to serial models, the 
change in RTs would indicate variations in the number of items examined, and thus misses 
are the result of searches stopping before the target is observed. However, false alarms are 
more difficult for these models and can only be accounted for by guessing effects (Chun & 
Wolfe, 1996). On the other hand, parallel models argue that the changes in RTs represent 
variation in the number of samples used to judge each item. Thus, misses occur as a target is 
processed but not marked as a target due to a limited accumulation not meeting the threshold 
before the absent response threshold. False alarms, on the other hand, occur when target-like 
stimuli accumulate towards the present threshold (due to their similarity) and this erroneous 
accumulation is enough to make a choice when the threshold is low enough. 
In this study it was impossible to determine whether expectation and motivation 
influenced the number of items examined (i.e. a serial search effect) or that all items were 
examined but that fewer samples of each items were taken (i.e. a parallel search effect). 
Indeed,  this  question  may  be  impossible  to  solve  as  both  may  be  true.  Wolfe  (2007) 
describes an asynchronous diffusion model in which both parallel and serial processes can 
occur simultaneously. The analogy used is that of a car wash, in which a number of items 
can be washed at the same time but the overall search process is serial. During visual search, 
the parallel component has a specific capacity, K, thus the K+1 item cannot be examined 
until one of the items under processing leaves the bottleneck. Yet, even this third hybrid 
model would predict the same overall findings on RTs and error rates given variations in 
resting activations and thresholds.  
Bounded Visual Search 
  I take the results of these studies as evidence of the role of type 3 processing in 
visual search decision-making. These results point towards a bounded view of visual search 
where  contextual  cues  can  influence  both  response  biases  and  the  overall  effort  that 
searchers are willing to expend before they make their judgement. Thus, in the same way 
that  Chun  and  Wolfe  (1996)  observed  that  searchers  vary  their  thresholds  over  time  in 
response to correct and incorrect response, searchers also appear to vary their thresholds 
depending upon their expectations of target presence and the motivation to be accurate. This 
may  be  seen  as  a  dynamic  and  ongoing  attempt  to  balance  search  effectiveness  and 
efficiency, i.e. the modulation of satisficing thresholds for different situations. Under low 138 
 
satisficing  threshold  conditions,  the  individual  relies  more  on  the  early,  contextual 
expectation cues, and makes more rapid decisions. Under a high satisficing threshold, the 
individual  relies  less  on  the  early,  contextual  expectation  cues,  and  performs  a  more 
thorough but time consuming search. It is important to note that, just as discussed in Chapter 
V regarding stereotype activation versus application (see Kunda et al., 2002; 2003), in both 
low and high motivation situations the initial bias is still active.  
Future Directions 
  This  chapter  examined  whether  or  not  the  sequential  sample  model  mechanism 
outlined in Chapter III can effectively predict the role of early contextual cues on visual 
search performance under different degrees of accuracy motivation. There are a number of 
future directions. For example, the study did not provide feedback to decision-makers. If this 
was incorporated then we might observe an effect of feedback on the strength of valid and 
invalid cues. Indeed, such feedback may entirely remove the effects found in this study. 
However, in the real world, such consistent feedback is rare, and indeed some real world 
searchers  use  biases  in  their  response  criteria  to  account  for  this  lack  of  feedback.  For 
example, forensic fingerprint examiners deem the cost of a miss as lower than the cost of 
falsely identifying an innocent individual (false positive), hence they report choosing absent 
more frequently than present in more difficult prints (Charlton, Fraser-Mackenzie, & Dror, 
2010).  
This  study  also  examined  how  searchers  vary  the  volume  of  information  they 
require prior to choice, yet the volume of information available to them was consistent. 
Variations in set size (number of distracters in the search) affects the volume of evidence 
available to searchers and would be expected to affect drift rates (mean travel of preference 
state across all detectors), and so further studies might examine how all three parameters 
(drift rate, z biases, and thresholds), interact within this bounded search paradigm and the 
extent to which it is predictive of behaviour. A further aspect linked to drift rate is the 
complexity  of  stimuli;  participants  were  offered  complex  stimuli  (images  of  airplanes), 
whereas, in a simple task in which discriminability is quick and easy, the role of expectation 
and  resting  activations  may  be  limited  unless  thresholds  are  very  low  (e.g.  under  time 
pressure).  These  variations  in  drift  rates  may  help  account  for  the  phenomenon  of 
asymmetry in search (see Wolfe, 2001). Indeed, the study only manipulated the thresholds in 
one direction from a non-motivated state level to a higher, motivated, level. Time pressure 
appears  to  decrease  decision  thresholds  which  would  have  the  potential  to  increase  the 
effects of biases on error rates (e.g. Dror, Busemeyer, & Basola, 1999, see also Chapter III).  139 
 
  Finally, given that expectation and motivation are both associated with real world 
search tasks, it might be important to explore the extent to which these factors affect real 
world  searching  such  as:  medical  diagnosis,  forensic  finger-print  analysis  (e.g.  Dror, 
Charlton, & Peron, 2006), and errors in military identification tasks (e.g. Ashworth, & Dror, 
2001; British Army, 2005).  
Summary Points 
o  Given  the  recent  interest  into  visual  search  decision-making,  on  account  of  its 
application to important real-world issues, understanding the potential role of early 
informational biases and type 3 processing seems important.  
o  Again, I demonstrate that dual-process approaches have much to offer the domain, 
this  time  predicting  shifts  in  signal  detection  parameters  based  on  motivational 
incentives (acting on type 3 processing) and expectation cues (early-informational 
biases). 
o  As the sequential sample model predicts an incongruency effect, whereas the race 
model does not, experimental design manipulations enabled competitive analysis 
between the two dynamic modelling approaches. The results were in favour of the 
predictions made by sequential sample approach and not the race model.  
o  In addition, again as predicted in the simulations in Chapter III, accuracy motivation 
(acting  on  type  3  processing)  was  shown  to  limit  the  effect  of  these  early 
informational cues on decision outcomes. 140 
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Chapter VII – Discussion Chapter 
“As soon as questions of will, or decision, or reason, or choice of action arise, 
human science is at a loss.”- (American Philosopher, 1928 - ) 
 
Introduction 
This thesis began with an interest in the role of early versus late information in 
JDM.  The  literature  suggested  that  our  initial  impressions  can  play  a  special  role  in 
deliberation. The consideration of type 1 processing in this phenomenon is a fascinating 
concept but one which I believe is under represented in quantitative models of JDM. For 
many years researchers focused on the question of whether individuals tend to follow or 
diverge  from  normative  models  (see  Stanovich,  2011,  and  his  discussion  of  the  Great 
Rationality  Debate).  While  this  was  an  important  step  in  our  understanding  of  our 
capabilities  and  limitations,  many  of  the  prominent  JDM  models  are  little  more  than 
adaptations from normative models. The adaptations in the models reflect these divergences 
in JDM behaviour from normative models but nevertheless are still heavily reliant on the 
normative  model  primitives.  As  I  discuss  in  Chapters  I  and  III,  this  “deconstructive” 
approach does not result in theories of cognitive process, but rather simply accounts of the 
degree  of  divergence  from  what  would  be  expected  if  a  normative  strategy  had  been 
undertaken.  
I  believe  that  the  focus  towards  these  static-quantitative  models  and  towards 
decision strategies has resulted in a neglect of some important cognitive processes which 
occur outside of working memory, i.e. type 1 processing (Evans, 2009) and the neglect of 
some of the more recent proposals such as default-interventionism and type 3 processes. The 
initial idea employed in Chapter II was to examine how a quantitative JDM model, prospect 
theory, could be enhanced by considering and dual-process concepts to better account for 
choices. However, in doing so, I felt that the constraints of using a static-economic model to 
understand what appears to be a dynamic cognitive process was too limiting  would not 
sufficiently  represent  the  more  recent  dual-process  literature.  For  this  reason,  my  thesis 
changed  course  in  Chapter  III,  taking  a  more  constructive,  rather  than  deconstructive, 
approach to  quantitative modelling  and  the  consideration  of  dynamic,  rather than  static, 
processes via a sequential sample modelling approach. 
I also focused on more recent dual-process theory proposals; in particular, the recent 
consideration of a third type of processing (type 3 processing) and the role of the satisficing 
principle in relation to the theory of default-interventionism. This third processing system 
had clear implications for predicting the role of early/type 1 versus late/type 2 processing 142 
 
and I considered the use of decision thresholds as a way of representing some of the aspects 
of this concept. Importantly, the consideration of this third processing system provided an 
alternative  to  the  dominant,  toolbox,  theory  of  adaptive  decision-making  and  a  priori 
strategy selection – a criterion-oriented adaptive decision mechanism.  
The Development and Testing of the Sequential Sample Approach 
The dynamic-quantitative model was based on sequential sample models and aimed 
to capture only four characteristics related to default-interventionism: (1) the temporal aspect 
of deliberation, (2) the default type 1 response (associated with early information), (3) the 
interventionist type 2 responses (associated with subsequent information), and (4) type 3 
processing in the form of a satisficing threshold. While these four characteristics clearly did 
not reflect all the nuances of dual-process theory, if this highly simplified model could be 
demonstrated to be useful for JDM purposes, this preliminary investigation could form the 
basis of the development of a more complex quantitative model based on more features from 
dual-process theory.  
Based on this model, in Chapter III, I produced some simulations predicting certain 
behavioural outcomes depending on the values inputted into the sequential sample model. 
There were four main aspects relating to these predictions and the model mechanisms which 
were tested through empirical studies (see Table 1). Chapter IV focused on aspect 1 and 
whether the simulated effect of selective exposure to information would indeed result in 
effects on total evidence volumes and deliberation times (evidence of type 3 processing 
effects). The focus on evidence volumes and type 3 processing has tended to be neglected in 
the literature regarding biased predecision processing due to an emphasis on motivational, 
rather than cognitive process, models. Chapter V focused on aspects 1, 2 and 3, and the 
predicted response of type 3 processing to four levels of time pressure. This time, however, 
the experiment assessed whether the predicted relationship between these various levels of 
time pressure and the congruency of type 1 and type 2 processing on choice behaviour could 
be captured by the model. The results showed that the model could capture the overall 
relationship between various levels of time pressure and the congruency effect. Some degree 
of divergence from model predictions in the no time pressure condition highlighted that a 
more complex model would be needed to capture all the aspects of dual-process theory; 
nevertheless, the model demonstrated reasonable R
2. Chapter VI focused on aspects 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 assessing the predicted response of type 3 processing to motivation manipulation on 
the  congruency  effect  and  also  the  hypothesised  incongruency  effect.  As  the  observed 
incongruency effect would not be expected under an alternative race model mechanism, this 143 
 
study demonstrated further support for the way that the sequential sampled modelled type 1, 
early-informational, biases. 
 
Table 1. The four aspects relating to the sequential sample model mechanism and the 
simulation predictions which were assessed in the empirical studies of this thesis from 
Chapter IV onwards. 
Aspect  Description 
(1) Type 3 Processing Effects  The simulations correctly predicted that we ought to be 
able to observe the effects of type 3 processing in the 
volume of evidence gathered as well as in correlated 
temporal measures (RTs). The model could account for 
the increased reliance on type 1 information under 
time-pressure and the decreased reliance on type 1 
information under accuracy motivation. 
(2) Congruency Effect  The simulations correctly predicted that the 
congruency of type 1 and type 2 processing should 
impact on decision accuracy. 
(3) Continuous Predictions  The model’s prediction of the role of type 1 and type 2 
processing over a range of levels of satisficing 
threshold appeared to match the empirical data with 
reasonable R-squared values. 
(4) Sequential Sample vs. Race 
Model (incongruency effects) 
The sequential sample model outperformed the race 
model correctly predicting an incongruency effect 
which would not be expected under a race model. 
 
  It should be noted that this thesis covered a wide range of JDM domains and a large 
number  of  different  experimental  tasks.  This  approach  has  some  clear  limitations.  In 
particular,  each  Chapter  is  concluded  with  a  number  of  domain-specific  questions  left 
unanswered. I recognize, therefore, that I am unable to provide particularly strong domain-
specific comments. Nevertheless, there are some interesting, albeit limited, domain-specific 
points which can be made based on the experiment outcomes and I cover these first in this 
chapter. Despite the limitation of undertaking a multiple JDM domain approach, there are 
some important benefits associated with this approach. Firstly, the fact that a very simple 
dynamic-quantitative model could be shown to be applicable in numerous different JDM 
domains indicates the power of these few basic default-interventionist concepts. Secondly, it 144 
 
suggests that these concepts are not domain-specific effects but more fundamental aspects of 
cognition that may extend even further into other domains. Clearly, this is a result of the 
decades of work that has gone into dual-process theory but also highlights the opportunity 
cost associated with the neglect of dual-processes in the JDM domain so far (Evans, 2007a). 
Therefore, following the domain-specific comments, I shall then discuss the more general 
implications of the model by looking across the domains and tasks. In particular, I discuss 
how  the  dynamic-quantitative  approach  I  employed  could  be  extended  further,  potential 
mitigating some of the limitations discovered in the empirical chapters. 
Domain-Specific Comments 
Bounded Quantitative Judgements: Prospect Theory and Dual-Processes 
  Chapter II is different from the other empirical chapters because it did not aim to test 
the  sequential  sample  model  introduced  in  Chapter  III.  The  motivation  to  develop  the 
sequential sample model, however, stemmed from the consideration of dual-process theory 
together with a quantitative JDM model – prospect theory. I believe that more can be done 
with respect to synthesizing dual-processes and static-economic approaches. In particular, I 
would be interested to examine the place-value heuristic in more detail. Future investigation 
could assess the factors which act to remove/enhance the use of the place-value heuristic and 
a  greater  examination  of  type  3  processing.  A  particularly  important  hypothesis,  which 
should  be  reasonably  straightforward  to  test,  is  that  increased  involvement  of  type  2 
processing  should  be  expected  to  reduce  place-value  heuristic  assessments.  I  would  be 
interested to examine the role of accuracy motivation or performance payoffs and this effect 
and how this might relate to the findings in Chapter VI (where motivation reduced type 1 
effects,  albeit  without  removing  them  entirely).  If  it  was  the  case  then  the  place-value 
heuristic could be removed through motivation, then it might even be observed that the 
normative model would, in fact, better predict choices than the synthesized model in this 
situation – a complete inversion of the findings in Chapter II. Ultimately, however, the 
results of my thesis appear to suggest that the synthesized model, traditional prospect theory, 
and the normative model are simply possible extremes of behaviour that occur depending on 
type 3 processing. 
The technique of using of prospect theory weighting functions as a measurement of 
dual-process theory effects (experiment 2) also proved useful and could be applied to other 
dual-process  theory  effects.  It  is  my  opinion  that,  although  prospect  theory  is  a  widely 
accepted model of choice, it does not really explain the cognitive processes which lead to the 
characteristic functions in the model. Furthermore, it does not indicate when these functions 145 
 
should/should  not  occur.  Indeed  as  discussed  in  Chapters  I  and  II  this  is  a  problem 
Kahneman and Tversky themselves admit. The emerging research in neuroscience certainly 
points to a dual-process account (see Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, & Just, 2005) and I believe 
more can be done in this regard. For example, I would like to see whether one could develop 
a new model which can predict the changes in weighting value functions based on shifts in 
type 3 processing. For example, can the S-shaped weighting function be fully removed via 
motivation  or,  like  certain  belief-bias  effects,  is  it  a  persistent  bias  which  can  only  be 
mediated to a point. This assessment of the “tolerances” of prospect theory functions would 
be an exciting step forward. 
Bounded Evidence Gathering: Biased Predecision Processing 
  In  Chapter  IV,  I  examined  the  domain  of  biased  predecision  processing.  Dual-
process theory could explain how and why selective exposure could occur in single novel 
item  evaluation.  The  experiment  demonstrated  the  value  of  a  cognitive,  rather  than 
motivational, explanation for some biased predecision processing effects. I concluded that, 
despite the neglect in this domain, dual-process concepts ought to be considered as a viable 
factor in biased predecision process research. In particular, I believe that the notion of the 
singularity principle (Evans, 2007a) and what Stanovich (2011) refers to as serial associate 
processing may play an important role in biased predecision processing, a view which stands 
in contrast to the strong emphasis towards motivational explanations of biased predecision 
processing. There is clear scope for dual-process theory research in this domain and the 
general neglect of the theory represents interesting research opportunities. 
  In particular, it would be interesting to examine the nature of the evidence gathering 
process in more detail. The sequential sample model approach employed in this thesis was 
very limited in this regard and was unable to represent much of the dual-process account that 
I  used  to  explain  the  types  of  evidence  gathered  by  participants.  However,  while  the 
sequential sample model was limited in explaining the types of evidence gathered, it was 
able to predict the reduction in deliberation times and the number of items read in during 
selective  exposure  to  information.  This  was  a  novel  measure  in  the  domain  of  biased 
predecision processing and demonstrates how the consideration of type 3 processing can 
provide new research approaches in some JDM domains.  
Based on this chapter, I see scope for the development of a more nuanced dynamic 
model of biased predecision processing incorporating more of the dual-process literature. 
For example, in contrast to the motivational literature, the participants did appear to be 
considering both the evidence in favour of their initial rating as well as the evidence against 
it.  Evans’  (2006)  heuristic-analytic  theory  shown  in  Chapter  1  (Figure  1)  has  clear 146 
 
implications  for  biased  predecision  processing  research.  Therefore,  a  quantitative  model 
which could represent the  feedback  loop of  Evans’  (2006) heuristic-analytic  model  (see 
Figure 1 in Chapter I) combined with being able to predict the volume of evidence gathered 
over  time  may  prove  an  exciting  new  direction  for  the  biased  predecision  processing 
domain. A final aspect of the task in Chapter IV was the fact that there were five rating 
choices (1-5 stars) and yet the sequential sample model I considered only has two outcomes. 
Thus, there are questions related to how a binary hypothesis model can be extended to better 
account  for  multi-alternative  decision-making.  This important  limitation  deserves  further 
discussion and is considered in the limitations and future directions section of this chapter. 
Bounded Multi-Attribute Decision-Making: Time Pressure and Bias 
In the domain of time pressure in JDM, studied in Chapter V, there is considerable 
emphasis  on  a  priori  strategy  selection  and  the  domineering  adaptive  decision 
maker/toolbox framework. The sequential sample model could predict the effect of time 
pressure on cue usage without a priori strategy selection through a default-interventionist 
approach. Therefore, while the default-interventionist approach to the role of time pressure 
on type 1 and type 2 processing is not new in other domain such as logic and reasoning 
research (Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 2009; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005), the application 
of this approach in a multi-attribute decision task using a quantitative model was novel.  
I feel that the neglect to explain precisely how strategies can be effectively selected 
a  priori  by  the  adaptive  decision-maker  framework  provides  room  for  alternative 
conceptualisations – in particular, the criterion-oriented mechanism outlined in Chapter III 
and the concept of type 3 processing. Here also, there is scope for more research.  One 
potential way of comparing strategy-oriented versus criterion-oriented mechanisms would be 
to  examine  the  effects  of  sudden,  unexpected,  time  pressure  on  cue  usage  and  choice 
performance. The reason being that sudden unexpected time pressure would presumably 
result in poor performance if a priori strategy selection was employed. This is because the 
selected strategy would not match the sudden change in environment brought about by the 
onset  of  new  time  constraints.  Whereas,  if  deliberation  occurs  as  outlined  in  a  default-
interventionist manner as presented in the sequential sample model, then the preferences 
states  gathered  up  until  that  point  (beginning  more  heuristically  and  finishing  more 
normatively) would provide an optimized response to any level of  sudden unexpected time 
pressure. This presents itself as an interesting future direction as a response to the findings 
and issues in Chapter V. 
An important limitation of the sequential sample model was its ability to capture the 
presence  of  bias  under  no-time  pressure  conditions.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  V,  this 147 
 
limitation is clearly due to the simplicity of the model as such a finding can be accounted for 
via dual-process theory. Therefore, as I discussed in Chapter V, it is important to note that 
the failures of this model do not necessarily reflect weakness in dual-process theory. Rather 
it reflects limitations of the quantitative model in its ability to capture the nuances of dual-
process theory as a whole. For example, there are some tasks which appear to be stubborn 
sources of type 1 bias (see Evans, Handley & Bacon, 2009) and the sequential sample model 
I used does not differentiate between types of tasks. A potential future direction therefore, 
would be to attempt to capture the interplay between different types of type 1 biases and 
volitional control.  Indeed, Stanovich’s (2011) taxonomy of cognitive biases with respect to 
the reflective mind (type 3 processing) would provide an interesting basis for developing 
such a quantitative model of time pressure. 
Bounded Visual Search: Motivation and Biases 
In  the  domain  of  visual  search  decision-making,  dual-process  literature  is  also 
neglected. This is perhaps unsurprising as many vision theorists appear to limit their scope to 
the study of low-level cognitive processes. However, I believe that higher-level cognitive 
factors, such as expectation and motivation, are critical to visual search performance and 
highly relevant in the more applied domains related to visual search. One area of particular 
interest, which relates to the findings of Chapter VI, is that of the target-prevalence effect 
(see Wolfe, Horowitz, Van Wert, Kenner, Place, & Kibbi, 2007, for review). Many theories 
used to explain this effect relate to low level explanations of perceptual sensitivities (i.e. 
non-volitional explanations). However, the fact that I demonstrated shifts in signal detection 
theory beta values based on motivational and expectation cues indicates that higher level 
cognitive factors could be equally involved. Furthermore, the fact that the expectation bias 
had an effect in both the valid and invalid conditions indicates that it was not the learnt 
validity of the cues that resulted in the bias but rather the expectation of validity. 
The notion of type 3 processing and the idea that search effort can be bounded 
seems an interesting new direction for the domain of visual search. A major question in the 
domain is how individuals decide when to stop searching for a target (Chun & Wolfe, 1996). 
This decision has clear parallels with evidence gathering issues discussed in Chapter IV and 
the tradeoffs associated with accuracy versus efficiency. Furthermore, given that our visual 
system employs a great deal of top-down processing, assessing the extent to which we can 
remove biases through motivation or increase the potential for bias under time constraints 
seems an interesting domain. Indeed, given that many important jobs involve a degree of 
decision-making and visual search (e.g. Airport baggage security, medical x-rays, forensic 148 
 
fingerprint analysis) assessing the potential for bias and volitional control seems incredibly 
important.  
Limitations of the Sequential Sample Model and Future Directions 
As discussed above, I see dual-process concepts, and especially the recent proposal 
of type 3 processing, as being useful for a much broader range of domains than it is currently 
used. The application of a quantitative model to represent some of the aspects related to type 
3 processing, by implication, may also be useful. However, in this thesis I discovered some 
important limitations with the modelling approach I employed. In particular, it was generally 
found that the type 2 processing captured by the model was highly simplistic. In the model, 
type 2 processing and deliberation over time was represented simply by an average drift rate. 
Therefore, in many experiments, while dual-process theory could explain the results there 
was a gap between these explanations and the manner in which the model attempted to 
capture them. This was necessary to preserve a parsimonious approach in the early stage. 
However, based on the results of this thesis, I believe that some of the deeper aspects of type 
2  processing  could  be  captured  in  a  sequential  sample  model  through  a  more  complex 
mechanism. The first would be to attempt to form some connection between the strategy-
oriented  mechanisms  of  the  adaptive  decision-maker  framework  (Payne,  Bettman  & 
Johnson, 1988, 1993) that I discussed in Chapter III and the criterion-oriented mechanism 
used to account for type 3 processing in the current model. The second would be to include 
some more principles from the dual-process literature as discussed in Chapters IV and V. 
This new model could then be assessed in further experiments. 
Lee and Cummins Model of Adaptive Decision-Making 
As discussed in Chapter III, the host of studies performed by Payne, Bettman and 
Johnson (1988, 1993) and those reviewed by Kunda (1990), showed that decision-makers 
adapt their type 2 strategies according to the time available. As far as I am aware, Lee and 
Cummins (2004) were the first to propose a formalisation adaptive strategy selection under a 
sequential  sample  model  paradigm.  In  their  model  they  considered  that  Payne  and 
colleagues’  (1988,  1993)  view  of  decision-making  and  its  various  strategies  might  be 
modelled using a sequential sample framework. They posited that different choice cues may 
have different levels of validity, and we might use this as a guide for our strategy selection.  
From Lee and Cummins (2004), cue validity for the ith cue is the sum of the correct 
decisions made by the ith cue (+1) divided by the total number of decisions made by the ith 
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Using  equation  2,  the  log-odds  of  each  decision  can  be  determined,  where  vi 
indicates the validity input for the ith cue. The first sum is across all cues favouring choice 
A, and the second sum is across all cues favouring choice B. 
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Given positive log-odds, the decision-maker selects choice A over choice B. Given 
negative log-odds, the decision-maker selects B over choice A. A log-odds of zero results in 
a  random  guess.  Lee  and  Cummins  (2004),  in  accordance  with  the  motivated  reasoning  
literature (Kunda, 1990), argued that we tend to limit our cognitive effort, and they argued 
that we ought to do this by using high validity cues first. Therefore, a simple analytical 
strategy may be employed by using only the highest validity cue. This decision strategy is 
the  take-the-best  heuristic  (TTB)  (Gigerenzer  &  Todd,  1999;  Gigerenzer  &  Goldstein, 
1996). If, however, we examined all the cues irrespective of the validities, our decision 
strategy approximates the normative rational (RAT) strategy. 
The  critical  step  taken  by  Lee  and  Cummins  (2004)  was  the  inclusion  of  an 
accumulative paradigm derived from sequential sample models. With this, decision-makers 
can vary which strategy they use through manipulations of  a decision threshold. As the 
decision-makers process the information from high validity cues down to low validity cues, 
they form preference states which accumulate over time. The threshold determines both the 
strategy that was employed and the point at which searching stops and the choice is made. 
Given  a  low  threshold,  the  preference  state  generated  from  the  initial  cues  (TTB-like 
strategy) may be enough to make a choice representing a quick heuristic-style decision. 
Given  a  high  threshold,  more  preference  states  must  be  accumulated  both  increasing 
decision  time  and approaching  the  RAT  model.  Such  a theory  was  able  to  successfully 
differentiate between TTB and RAT decision-makers. 
A subsequent study by Bergert and Nosofsky (2007) provided further support for 
such a hybrid model. Importantly, however, Bergert and Nosofsky went further than Lee and 
Cummins by relaxing some of the assumptions of the strong forms of TTB and RAT which 
they  felt  were  not  psychologically  plausible.  Firstly,  they  relaxed  the  assumption  that 
individuals  are  always  able  to  learn  to  use  optimal  feature  weights  and  allowed  for 
individuals  to  occasionally  make  mistakes  in  their  assignment  of  weights  to  cues  (e.g. 
Newell & Shanks, 2003). Indeed, they were keen to point out that calculating cue validities 150 
 
for each dimension requires a great deal of memory capacity and experience within the 
domain  (e.g.,  Newel,  2005).  Bergert  and  Nosofsky  proposed  a  generalised  probabilistic 
approach to cue ordering. In order to do this, they simply suggested that the probability that 
a  cue  will  be  inspected  would  approximate  the  weight  of  the  cue,  thus  the  original 
deterministic  cue  ordering  would  now  be  probabilistic  depending  on  a  response  scaling 
parameter, ʳ. 
Both Bergert and Nosofsky (2007) and Lee and Cummins (2004) allow a variation 
in strategy to arise from one simple model depending on the decision threshold. Lee and 
Cummins’s  (2004)  version  represents  the  more  prescriptive  version  and  Bergert  and 
Nosofsky’s (2007) version represents the more descriptive version. Thus, in the same way 
that the sequential sample model introduced in this thesis represented a shift from more type 
1 oriented responses to more type 2 oriented reasoning; the Lee and Cummins approach can 
model shifts from more heuristic type 2 strategies to more normative type 2 strategies. A low 
threshold would mean a more simplistic/heuristic type 2 strategy, whilst a high threshold 
would mean a more complex type 2 strategy. Furthermore, the freeing of the cue weights by 
Bergert  and  Nosofsky  (2007)  means  that  ordering  could  occur  through  both  intentional 
strategy and the more generalised assumption of random attention effects described by the 
strict sequential sample models.  
Integrating My Approach with the Lee and Cummins Approach 
Importantly, this approach eliminates the optimisation problems with the traditional 
adaptive decision-maker approach I outlined in Chapter III with regards to a priori strategy 
selection. Decision-makers do not have to select a certain strategy but can simply increase 
their strategy complexity over time, by considering more cues, until the threshold is met. 
Although Lee and Cummins do not refer to it in the same terms, their threshold mechanism 
is essentially a mechanism for mediating type 3 processing, just as it is in the model I 
presented in Chapter III. In comparison to the sequential sample approach I applied, the Lee 
and Cummins approach is not a model of dual-processes, but rather only models type 2 
processing  strategy  selections.  While  the  sequential  sample  model  I  employed  broadly 
separated early versus late information based on type 1 and type 2 responses, the integration 
of  initial  type  1  processing  biases  with  Lee  and  Cummins’  (2004)  more  sophisticated 
representation of type 2 strategy adaptation would be a potentially useful next step.  
Figure  1  shows  this  proposed  development.  In  the  sequential  sample  model 
described in this thesis (Figure 1A), a drift rate summarises all type 2 processing. However, 
this type 2 processing could be replaced by Lee and Cummins (2004) theory (Figure 1B) to 
generate a more nuanced representation of type 2 processing in JDM. Importantly, this new 151 
 
version of the model (Figure 1C) would describe how it might be possible to shift from a 
type 1 response to a more type 2 driven, but still heuristic processing (e.g. TTB) behaviour, 
all the way to a fully normative type 2 approach (e.g. RAT) simply through the manipulation 
of a single threshold parameter based on the satisficing principle. 
 Integrating Hypothetical Thinking Principles  
One issue I discovered with the sequential sample model was that the impact of type 
1 processing was only captured as a shift in the z parameter. However, as discussed in some 
of the dual-process explanations of the experimental findings, type 1 processing can have a 
much greater effect than simply biasing response tendencies (see Stanovich, 2011 for an 
extensive review of these effects). One in particular is the notion that type 1 processing can 
direct  type  2  processing  attention  (Evans,  2007a;  Stanovich,  2011).  Stanovich  (2011) 
describes this as serial associative processing whereby the processing may be slow, effortful, 
and deliberate (indicating type 2 processing) but automatic connectionist links are made 
(type  1  processes)  leading  the  mind  from  thought  to  thought.  Thus,  while  evidence 
processing might involve type 2 processing, the direction of attention or choice of what 
evidence to examine first might be directed, in part, type 1 processing.  
The sequential sample model proposed in this thesis could not represent this and the 
Lee and Cummins extension only allows the ordering of cues for examination to be achieved 
via some assessment of validity. Therefore, I propose that, in addition to type 1 processes 
affecting the z parameter, the type 1 processing could also be allowed to impact on the Lee 
and Cummins (2004) mechanism via the relevance and singularity principle by determining 
the order in which cues are examined. Both Bergert  and Nosofsky (2007) and Lee  and 
Cummins  (2004)  considered  the  assessment  of  cue  validity  as  determining  the  order  in 
which cues are examined. However, dual-process theories such as the relevance principle 
could also play a role in this ordering of cues such that the TTB heuristic is not just driven 
by a formal estimation of cue validity, as indicated by Bergert and Nosofsky (2007) but also 
by type 1 processes and the initial mental model (see Figure 1C). With this mechanism in 
place, the role of early type 1 processing would not simply be to push preference states 
towards or away from certain choices, but the initial preference state could be allowed to 
influence the focus of the early type 2 processing. The concept of serial associated cognition 
with a focal bias, seem to be important in evidence gathering and seems relevant to Chapter 
IV.  Therefore  determining  whether  these  concepts  can  be  integrated  with  the  kind  of 
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Figure 1. A depiction of (A) the sequential sample model from this thesis, (B) Lee and 
Cummins sequential sample model of adaptive decision making, and (C) how both could be 
combined by using a Lee and Cummins (2004) approach to type 2 processing and including 
other aspects (see below) such as Evans’ (2007a) singularity and relevance principles (both 
shown as dotted, rather than, solid lines). 
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The consideration of the impact of type 1 processing on the direction of type 2 
processes  echoes  Tetlock’s  (1983)  earlier  biased  assimilation  interpretation  of  primacy 
effects discussed in the introduction (Chapter I). This theory states that people form instant 
impressions  based  on  the  information  (i.e.  type  1  processing),  and  then  later  (type  2) 
processing of the information is interpreted according to this mental frame (Tetlock, 1983). 
Thus, the strict separation of type 1 and type 2 processing designated in the original model 
(Figure 1A) perhaps demonstrates the greatest limitation of the sequential sample model 
employed in this thesis. However, developments in the direction shown in Figure 1C may 
begin to overcome this limitation. Indeed, returning to the initial aim of this thesis, such a 
mechanism may provide a fruitful way of approaching the modelling of primacy effects and 
the role of early versus late information in JDM.  
Modelling Expertise 
This new model could also be applied to other JDM research  domains, such as 
examining the role of dual-processes in expert versus novice decision-making. Evidence has 
confirmed that as individuals become more familiar in a domain, they invariably develop a 
more detailed mental model (Hutchinson, Raman, & Mantrala, 1994). For example, Spence 
and Brucks (1997) demonstrated how professional experts tend to employ fewer, but more 
diagnostic (highly valid) attributes when estimating the market value of houses, based on 
multi-attribute descriptions, than novice undergraduates students. Accordingly, experts are 
better  able  to  choose  the  most  appropriate  attributes  when  making  decisions,  whereas 
novices are more likely to consider more attributes and make decisions based on the weight 
of evidence (Hutchinson & Einstein, 2008). For example, Dellaert and Stremersch (2005) 
demonstrated how expertise in computer technology enabled experts to better choose the 
optimal computer components for their needs than novices.  
The dual-process framework seems highly applicable to the domain of expertise in 
decision-making  (see  Evans,  2008).  In  particular,  I  believe  that  the  integration  of  the 
hypothetical thinking principles into the proposed new modelling framework presented in 
Figure 1C may be of use in this domain. Experts are better able to form useful initial mental 
models, based on type 1 processing, and are able to identify high validity cues to examine. In 
terms of the proposed model in Figure 1C, this would result in effective TTB strategies 
driven by a positive focal bias from type 1 processes. Such a decision-process would be 
predicted to reach the satisficing threshold level using fewer cues (just as selective exposure 
did in Chapter IV) but without reduced accuracy. Novices would be modelled as being 
unable to effectively order the information by validity and have poor initial type 1 mental 
models. Therefore, they would simply gather evidence almost randomly over time until the 154 
 
accumulation is sufficient to reach their satisficing threshold. This model would capture why 
it is that novices tend to demonstrate more holistic and broader evaluative strategies and 
experts  demonstrate  more  “surgical”  and  focused  decision  strategies  (Hutchinson  & 
Einstein, 2008) almost without awareness. Figure 2 shows a conceptualization of an expert 
(E) compared to a novice (N) in deciding whether or not to purchase a particular product. 
Note that the mean preference state change, or drift rate, for the expert (DRE) is 
steeper resulting in a quicker decision, and it has a lower standard deviation (SDE) reflecting 
the internal consistency of the highly valid cues he chooses to consider. However, for the 
novice, the deliberation involves consideration of many more cues, reflected by the lower 
drift rate (DRN), which have less internal consistency reflected by the higher variation in 
preference  state (SDN).  Indeed, due to this fluctuation,  the  novice  almost  disregards the 
product for purchase on considering the second attribute (P2). Figure 2 demonstrates how 
some of the important characterizations of experts and novices can be represented by this 
conceptualization. Importantly, it also could be of value in understanding how a novice 
might gradually improve performance over time (i.e. learning/developing expertise). As they 
begin to be better able to form useful initial mental models from type 1 processing, and also 
direct their attention towards the most diagnostic attributes (early type 2 processing), they 
would be predicted to improve their deliberation times and accuracy. Testing these models’ 
predictions  regarding  novice  and  expert  decision-making  would  be  another  interesting 
research direction stemming from the work in this thesis. 
 
 




Extending to Multi-Alternative Decision-Making 
An important limitation of the sequential sample model outlined in this thesis, and 
indeed the Lee and Cummins extension proposed in this chapter, is the fact that it can only 
model  one  hypothesis  at a  time.  This  results  in  a model  which  can  at  most  distinguish 
between  two  choices.  The  question  remains,  therefore,  as  to  how  best  to  model  multi-
alternative decision-making. One solution would be to introduce extra dimensions for each 
choice such that, rather than modelling the preference for one choice over another (i.e. a 
two-dimensional  choice),  the  preference  state  could  be  across  three,  four,  five,  etc. 
dimensions, one for each alternative. However, while this would seem the logical step, this 
may  contravene  some  principles  of  dual-process  theory.  For  example,  Evan’s  (2007) 
singularity principle argues that we do not consider all alternatives in parallel (i.e. what 
would  be  modelled  using  a  multidimensional  sequential  sample  model)  but  rather,  we 
consider one hypothesis at a time. Indeed, Chapter IV, which focused on the theories relating 
to biased predecision processing, certainly supports this view as individuals tend to focus on 
only one early favourite versus the rest rather than considering all alternatives equally.  
Accordingly, a solution might be to consider a nested or iterative sequential sample 
model approach in which individuals select an initial favourite alternative (perhaps based on 
type  1  processing)  from  all  the  available  alternatives.  This  early  favourite  is  evaluated 
against the hypothesis that it is the best alternative in a simple two-dimensional sequential 
sample  model;  i.e.  one  threshold  for  confirmation  and  one  for  disconfirmation.  If  the 
preference state reaches the confirmation threshold for that initial alternative then this choice 
will be selected. If the disconfirmation threshold is met then the individual must reconsider 
the options and choose another alternative (i.e. form a new hypothesis to test). This would be 
modelled  via  another  subsequent  sequential  sample  model  within  the  same  decision 
deliberation. The number of dual-alternative sequential sample models required for a single 
choice, would therefore depend on the number of hypotheses generated during deliberation. 
Accordingly, whereas the total deliberation time in a single  multidimensional  sequential 
sample model would be some function of the number of samples taken, in nested sequential 
sample model deliberation, the total deliberation time would be the sum of the samples taken 
by each run of the sequential sample model generated during the choice.  
This nested modelling approach not only reflects the singularity principle but also 
the evidence from the biased predecision processing literature. The literature suggests that 
multi-alternative decisions are not a comparison of all alternatives but rather the evaluation 
of an initial favourite alternative against the alternative hypothesis that it is not the best. This 
nested  modelling  approach  is  perhaps  a  more  accurate  representation  of  Evan’s  (2006) 156 
 
representation shown in Figure 1 in Chapter I whereby single mental models are considered 
one at a time and evaluated against the satisficing principle in an iterative fashion. This 
concept of nesting sequential sample models used in conjunction with the Lee and Cummins 
extension presents some interesting future research directions for the quantitative modelling 
of dual-processes. 
Final Conclusion 
The  dual-process  notion  of  rapid  and  automatic  processing  as  well  as  a  slower, 
effortful consideration of information involving working memory clearly has implications 
for  many  aspects  of  psychology,  and  in  particular  the  psychology  of  judgement  and 
decision-making.  The  advances  in  dual-process  theory,  such  as  the  notion  of  type  3 
processing,  demonstrate  further  avenues  for  understanding  JDM  behaviour  in  this  ever 
advancing theory.   
The  focus  of  this  thesis  has  been  to  apply  the  overarching  principles  of  dual-
processes to a variety of decision-making research applications. In particular, I attempted to 
capture some of the basic elements of default-interventionism in a quantitative manner. The 
empirical studies then tested and demonstrated the extent to which this approach could be a 
useful way of accounting for JDM behaviour. I see this work as an attempt to fulfil Newel’s 
vision of the future of JDM theory whereby rather than choosing from a set of different tools 
(toolbox hypothesis), individuals adjust the parameters of the tool to the situation; a criterion 
based approach he called the “adjustable spanner” analogy (Newel, 2005). Of course, there 
are limitations of the approach employed in this thesis. In particular, the model used was a 
relatively simple representation of only a few basic concepts. Nevertheless, it has formed a 
basis for future, more complex, modelling possibilities and I have described where I see the 
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Appendix A 
Example of an Information and Consent Form 
Information sheet 
I am Peter Fraser-Mackenzie a PhD research student.  I am requesting your participation in a study 
regarding [General description of Study]. [Detailed description of specific tasks and what will be 
required]. Personal information will not be released to or viewed by anyone other than researchers 
involved in this project. Results of this study will not include your name or any other identifying 
characteristics.         
 
Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation at any time.  [For students: 
If you choose not to participate there will be no consequences to your grade or to your treatment as a 
student in the psychology department]. If you have any questions please ask them now, or contact me 
at paffm102@soton.ac.uk 
 
Signature                                 Date 




Statement of Consent 
I                                                   have read the above informed consent form.  
          [participants name] 
I understand that I may withdraw my consent and discontinue participation at any time without 
penalty or loss of benefit to myself.  I understand that data collected as part of this research project 
will be treated confidentially, and that published results of this research project will maintain my 
confidentially.  In signing this consent letter, I am not waiving my legal claims, rights, or remedies.  A 
copy of this consent letter will be offered to me. 
(Circle Yes or No) 
I give consent to participate in the above study.    Yes   No 
                If applicable 
Signature                                 Date 
Name    [participants name] 
 
I understand that if I have questions about my rights as a participant in this research, or if I feel that I 
have been placed at risk, I can contact the Chair of the Ethics Committee, Department of Psychology, 
University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ. 
Phone:  (023) 8059 5578. 
   158 
 
   159 
 
Appendix B 
Decision Field Theory 
This section will describe Busemeyer and Townsend’s (1993) Decision Field Theory as a 
basic example of an accumulative model. It is intended that this section will summarise the concepts 
behind the accumulative paradigm of the decision process and provide a foundation for subsequent 
discussion in relation to the conclusions drawn thus far. 
The  theory  is  an  attempt  to  develop  expected  utility  theory  from  a  normative  theory  to  a  more 
powerful descriptive theory of the decision process and can be broken down into seven sub-models. It 
uses subjective probability weights (Subjective EU Theory). It allows attention to fluctuate between 
choices, not only across trials (Random SEU Theory) but also within trials (Sequential SEU Theory). 
It provides a framework for explaining time pressure, motivated accuracy, and preference reversal 
(Random Walk SEU Theory). It attempts to describe the effects of recency and primacy effects in 
deliberation (Serial SEU Theory), the role of approach-avoidant gradients (Approach Avoidant SEU 
Theory), and finally to make quantitative time-related predictions (Decision Field Theory).  
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
Neumann & Morgenstern’s (1944) Expected Utility Theory (EUT) states that given a two 
choice problem with two potential states there are four outcomes. The expected utility of each action, 
Ai, is the sum of the probabilities of each state, p(Si), multiplied by the payoff gained from that state, 
ui. This  is  referred  to  as  the  valence  of  each  action.  The  difference,  d,  between  the  two  actions 
valences indicates what action should be chosen. 
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory 
As far back as 1713, Jakob Bernoulli observed that probability is a degree of belief or human 
self-awareness, as opposed to the actual state of the world (Berthoz, 2006). Rarely is it true that we 
have  complete  knowledge  of  the  chance  of  each  state  occurring.  Indeed,  Simon  (1983)  rather 
mockingly describes this as Olympian rationality, i.e. that it is closer to the abilities of the gods than 
of  man. Therefore, the first  stage of decision field theory  stipulates that each potential return be 
assigned a subjective probability weight. The payoff of, say 200, from action Ay is given a weight that 
depends on the subjective expectation of event S1 occurring. The weight is denoted w(S1) and is a 
proportion between 0 and 1. Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) propose that this weight reflects the 
amount of attention given to event S1 by the decision-maker at that point in time. This attention 
weight replaces the probability parameter in the expected utility theory. So, for action Ax and Ay the 
SEU would be as follows. 
vx = w(S1)
 ∙ u(-500) + w(S2) ∙ u(+500),                                 [5a] 
vy = w(S1)
 ∙ u(+200) + w(S2)
 ∙ u(-200),                                  [5b] 
d = vx – vy,                                                                 [5c] 
The valence difference, d, between the two indicates the direction of action. So action Ax is 
chosen when d > 0, Ay is chosen when d < 0, and d = 0 results in indecision or random guess.  160 
 
Random SEU Theory 
However, the EUT did not account for within and between trial random differences; it is still 
a  deterministic  model.  Therefore,  it  would  predict  the  same  outcome  on  all  trials,  which  is  not 
empirically supported. Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) argued that fluctuations in attention cause 
random variance as attention is correlated with the subjective estimation of chance. Random SEU 
allows for variation in attention between events across trials. Therefore, the subjective probability 
weight can differ for the same problem on different trials, allowing differing action preferences on 
different trials. The new randomised subjective weight is denoted as W(Si) resulting in a new SEU for 
each  action  called  the  valence  for  action  (Vi). Now,  rather  than  a  valence  difference,  we  have  a 
preference state, P, which can change between trials. 
Vx = W(S1)
 ∙ u(-500) + W(S2) ∙ u(+500),                                     [6a] 
Vy = W(S1)
 ∙ u(+200) + W(S2)
 ∙ u(-200),                                    [6b] 
P = Vx – Vy,                                                               [6c] 
Sequential Sampling SEU Theory 
The Random SEU theory is based upon a single sample of valence difference on any trial. 
Sequential sampling SEU theory turns this static model into a dynamic model by allowing a sequence 
of samples to be taken and accumulated within a trial, thus introducing deliberation and the temporal 
nature of decision-making. Preference can now fluctuate within a single trial and not just between 
them, resulting in multiple preference states in each trial. 
Initial preference state, P(1) = [Vx(1) – Vy(1)],                                       [7a] 
Second preference state, P(2) = P(1) + [Vx(2) – Vy(2)],                        [7b] 
P(n-1) is the preference state after n-1, and [Vx(n) – Vy(n)] is the new valence difference. 
These preference states accumulate until an inhibitory threshold or critical level, θ, is reached. So a 
positive preference state indicates a momentary preference favouring action Ax. However, unlike the 
last two stages, action is not taken when the preference state is merely non-zero, rather, P(n) must 
reach θ. The total number of samples required to meet this threshold is a random variable, N, and 
response time is an increasing function of N. Now the valence difference, d, is representative of the 
mean change in preference produced by each new sample. 
d = ∑[Vx(n) – Vy(n)] = ∑[P(n) – P(n – 1)] = vx – vy,                 [8a] 
The variance of the valence difference is as follows. 
σ
2 = Var[Vx – Vy] = σx
2 + σy
2 – 2 ∙ σxy       [8b] 
Where the variance for action x is, 
σx
2 = Σ[(Vx – vx)
2]              
=w(S1)·[u(-500) – vx]
2 + w(S2)·[u(500) – vx]
2   [8c] 161 
 
The variance for action y is, 
σy2 = Σ[(Vy – vy)
2]              
=w(S1)·[u(200) – vy]
2 + w(S2)·[u(-200) – vy]
2   [8d] 
The covariance for this example is, 
σxy = Σ[(Vx – vx) · (Vy – vy)]            
     = w(S1)·[u(-500) – vx]
2 · [u(+200) – vy]          
                + w(S2)·[u(500) – vx]
2 · [u(-200) – vy]      [8e] 
The probability of choosing action x over action y is
[1], 
Pr(Ax,Ay)=F[2 ∙ (d/σ) ∙ (θ/σ)].                                         [9] 
The threshold, θ, mediates the amount of deliberation required to make a decision. Low 
thresholds result in rapid, error-prone judgements and high thresholds result in slower more accurate 
judgements. Therefore, this model has the ability to represent speed-accuracy trade offs. In addition, 
rather than a decision-maker being faced with a three-choice decision, decide x, decide y, or keep 
deliberating, deliberation automatically occurs until the threshold is met. This means that decisions 
form in a more organic, continuous, and accumulative way.  
Random Walk SEU Theory 
Critically,  Busemeyer  and  Townsend  then  considered  that  not  all  decisions  begin  in  an 
unbiased fashion and, as a result, the start point or anchor, z, might not always begin in a neutral 
position. Therefore, the decision-maker may have an initial bias. This means that the early preference 
states  begin  closer  to  one  threshold  than  the  other,  increasing  the  likelihood  of  it  being  chosen. 
Furthermore, the bias influences response times as there is a shorter distance for the accumulation of 
preference state. 
P(0) = z,                                                                                   
P(n) = P(n – 1) + [Vx(n) – Vy(n)]                                            
              = z + Σk [Vx(k) – Vy(k)], k = 1, 2, …., n,                   [10] 
Figure  4  shows  a  decision  task  in  which  the  information  drives  a  general  drift  towards 
decision x. The figure shows a case when there is a bias towards choice y compared to a case in which 
there is no bias. As a result of the bias, the number of samples required to reach the x-choice threshold 
increases and thus the probability of choosing x decreases. Therefore, the model states that a bias like 
this has an effect on both decision likelihood and response times.  
                                                       
[1] Where F is the standard logistic cumulative distribution function, F(x) = 1/[1+exp(-x)]. 162 
 
 
Figure 1A. A biased and an unbiased decision process. Note that preference reversal occurs when a 
bias exists depending upon the number of samples used to make the decision as dictated by the 
decision threshold, and the quicker correct decision RT without a bias. 
 
 
Linear System SEU Theory 
The linear system theory argues that the order in which information is attended to, affects 
how it is processed. Specifically, the effect of the valence difference depends on whether it occurred 
early  or  late  in  the  deliberation.  This  includes  a  new  parameter,  s,  which  is  the  growth-decay 
parameter. If this parameter is between zero and one then we find a recency effect where there is slow 
preference movement in initial deliberation, yet it increases in speed as the deliberation nears the 
threshold. Whereas, if it is below zero then we find a primacy effect defined by rapid travel towards 
the threshold in early deliberation, yet it slows as it nears the critical value. 
P(n) = (1-s) ∙P(n-1) + [Vx(n) – Vy(n)]                                                    
  = P(n-1) + [ d(n) + ε(n)]                                                        [11]
[2] 
This  can  be  used  to  model  reductions  in  the  weight  of  information  over  time.  Belief 
perseverance  showed  that  participants  weight  early  information  as  more  important  than  late 
information. Therefore, this too can be used to make predictions about cognitive biases. 
Approach-Avoidance SEU Theory 
The approach-avoidance SEU adds another parameter, c, the goal gradient. This is comprised 
of  an  approach  gradient  which  determines  the  effect  of  gains,  and  an  avoidance  gradient  which 
determines the effects of losses, on the preference state as it nears the threshold. The theory stipulates 
that as the deliberation nears the threshold, the consequences of a particular action become more 
salient and there may be differences between gains and losses in this effect. For avoidance-avoidance 
                                                       
[2] ε, refers to the residual where ε= P - d 163 
 
conflicts, c is positive which causes preference state to vacillate between choices, slowing the whole 
deliberation process. For approach-approach conflicts, c is negative which causes preference state to 
progress towards the threshold faster, in turn, increasing decision time. The gradients are incorporated 
as follows. 
P(n) = (1-s) 
. P(n-1) + [Vx(n) – Vy(n)]                                                      
= (1-s) 
. P(n-1) + [ d(n) + ε(n)]                                           
= [1-(s+c)] 
. P(n-1) + [δ+ ε(n)],                                    [12a]
[3]      
 
Where ʴ = (vgainsX – vgainsY) 
. (1 - a 
. θ) + (vlossX – vlossY) 
.  (1 – b 
. θ),     [12b]
[4]     
c = b 
. ( vlossX + vlossY) – a 
. (vgainsX + vgainsY)                             [12c]       
Decision Field Theory 
This is the  final stage of the theory that introduces a time unit, h,  which represents the 
amount  of  time  it  takes  to  retrieve  and  then  process  each  sample  of  valence  difference.  The 
deliberation time, t, is therefore the number of samples, n, multiplied by this time unit parameter, h. 
   P(n) = (1-s) 
. P(n-1) + [Vx(n) – Vy(n)]                                                 
   = [1-(σ+ψ)
 . η] 
. Π(τ - η) + [δ 
. η ε(τ)]                                                 [13] 
 
   
                                                       
[3] δ, refers to the mean valence input and is similar to the mean difference d in the linear updating 
rule, but it includes the effect of approach and avoidance gradient weights, i.e. a positive mean 
valence input results in a positively driven preference state and a negative mean valence input results 
in a negatively driven preference state.  
[4] a is the goal gradient for gains, and b is the goal gradient for losses. These both contribute to the 
goal gradient parameter, c(a,b). 164 
 
   165 
 
Appendix C 
R Code for Simulations in Chapter III 
#R-Code for the sequential sample model of dual-process mediation 






Time (N Samples)",ylab="Preference State",ylim=c(-25,25)) 
 
coefs=NULL 
for(i in 1:100){ 
 
#Set up parameters# 
history=NULL 
s=4 #drift volatility 
d=1 #drift rate 
z=0 #type 1 bias 
T=20 # threshold 
 





#Type 2 Response# 
#Assess whether Type 1 response passes threshold (Feeling of 
Rightness)  
#else perform algorithmic/type 2 thinking over time until threshold 
is met 
 
















































£35 - £40 
  Weight: 86 g (with VORTECH Battery BL-5C)  
  Dimensions: 106 mm x 46 mm x 20 mm  
  Talk time: Up to 2 - 4.5 hours  
  Standby time: Up to 100 - 400 hours  
  Features: Built-in flashlight, Durable cover with anti-slip sides, 
Sleek silicone keymat with large keys, Reminders and alarm 
clock, Changeable Xpress-on™ covers  
  Networks: GSM 900, 1800  
  This is a low cost budget phone with all the basics required for 
making phone calls and texting. The Vortech 1100 phone lets you 
conduct business in confidence and style – in the shops or on the move, during the mid-
morning rush or at midnight. New features like the long-lasting battery and a durable design 
help you work even smarter. 
1 Star reviews  
i.  I absolutely hated this phone. I used to have a nice top of the range phone but had to use 
this as an interim measure. It was a big step down from what I was used to. It was bigger 
and heavier, which is surprising as there was less in it and it looks pretty ugly. I also 
found it difficult to use in loud environments because the sound quality was so bad. In 
the end I got rid of it as soon as I could. I would never get one of these again! Don’t buy 
this phone, it is absolutely horrendous! 
ii.  This phone annoyed me. It didn’t have a colour screen and I hated getting it out in 
public. I always thought people were laughing at me for having such a cheap nasty 
phone. In the end I threw it away, because I was so annoyed with it, and bought a better 
one. It was the first time I had bought a Vortech and did so because I had heard that they 
were a good make. However, on the basis of this phone I might never buy a Vortech 
again. This phone was the worst phone in the world! 
iii.  I could not stand this phone. It was the worst phone I have ever owned. Every time I 
looked at it I wanted to throw it away. I’m just glad that it was so cheap. I would never 
have bought this if it had been any more expensive. It was awkward to use and the text 
button functions took me ages to learn. In the end all I used it for was a nice sized torch. 
In fact if you want a torch and a paper weight all in one then buy this phone! If you want 




2 Star reviews  
i.  I didn’t like this phone very much. I only had it a short while because I had lost my 
other, better one and needed a cheap phone in between. I suppose cheap is what it is. If 
you want a cheap phone that you are not too bothered about then get this one. I suppose 
if you’re just looking for a functional simple phone then this would be fine. For me, 
however, I wanted a phone with more stuff like an MP3 player or even an FM radio 
would be nice. I really didn’t like this phone much. 
ii.  I was not happy with this phone. The first one I bought broke within a few days and I 
had to send it back. The second one I had seemed to work fine, but it was just a bit tacky 
and rubbery. It did the job, although sometimes it  was a little  hard to hear in loud 
situations. I wouldn’t buy this again, unless I had to, just because there are better phones 
around. I know Vortech is a good make, and I suppose it wasn’t too bad, but I would not 
buy it again. There are better ones around. 
iii.  I had trouble liking this phone. It was quite strong and seemed to bounce rather than 
break when I dropped it. But it was not very good. It was made cheaply, which was 
reflected by the price, and as such the sound quality was pretty poor, especially in loud, 
busy places. I could not work out how to use the calendar function and texting was a bit 
of a nightmare. Maybe it was me or maybe the phone but we just could not get on with 
each other! I won’t get it again. 
 
3 Star reviews  
i.  This phone was okay for the short time I owned it. I used it while I was waiting to get a 
better, more expensive one. It was cheap and reliable and did what I needed it for. I 
never really had any problems with it. The battery was pretty long lasting, probably 
because it only had simple things to do, i.e. there was no battery wasting MP3 player or 
anything like that. I was a simple phone with the added benefit of having a torch on it! It 
was okay I suppose, pretty functional; did the job. 
 
ii.  I didn’t mind this phone. It was simple and easy to use, I never had any problem with it. 
I am waiting to get a better one but at the moment I am reasonably happy using it for the 
time being. I mainly used it for just phoning and so it did the job required without any 
fuss. The battery life was fairly good and, seemed a bit sturdier than most, which was 
nice for a change! In all, it was okay as a phone but not special. The torch was quite a 
nice addition but I never really used it! 
iii.  This Vortech was okay. I have had other phones in the past which have been a hell of a 
lot worse, but this was reliable and functional. I use a phone to make phone calls and 
this phone did exactly what I needed it for. Yes there are better phones around with 
better sound quality but they are a lot more expensive. In all this was a simple okay 169 
 
phone which anyone, especially the less technologically minded, me included, can use. 
This phone was okay but nothing really special. 
 
4 Star reviews  
i.  I  really  liked  this  phone  because  it  was  simple  and  reliable.  I  never  once  had  any 
problem with it, and to be honest it was quite nice to have a phone without all those 
extras which I’d never use anyway. The torch was good too; I always found it useful 
when trying to find the key hole for my car at night. In fact the torch might be the only 
accessory I have ever used on a mobile phone. I don’t even know what an MP3 is, let 
alone Bluetooth! I liked this phone, it was good and reliable. 
ii.  I liked this phone a lot. It did everything I asked for from a mobile phone. I could set up 
reminders and write text messages as well as making phone calls. There were even a few 
games that I could play on the train on the way to work! Also it has interchangeable 
covers; I have lots of different ones now. Why spend hundreds of pounds when you can 
have this one? This phone was a good buy in my view. It’s not the most hi-tech but it 
does what I need it for, so I’m happy. 
iii.  I liked this phone. It was so easy to use. Some of the other phones that I have had in the 
past have had so many other things on them, that I had no idea what to do with most of 
them. With this phone it was simple to make phone calls and I could write text messages 
as well. I have bought more expensive phones in the past but they did far more than I, or 
as far as I could see anyone else, needed them for. This one was cheap and cheerful! 
This phone was pretty good overall. 
 
 
5 Star rating  
i.  I absolutely loved this phone. It was my first ever mobile phone and I forged a loving 
relationship with it. I even named it! It was just so simple to use. I was worried that I 
would never manage to use a mobile phone because they seemed so complicated, but 
this one worked like a dream. It even had a torch on it; which was surprisingly useful. 
The screen was large and clear and I could see exactly what I was doing. The buttons 
were big as well. This phone was amazingly good. 
ii.  I  adored  this  phone.  Why  oh  why  do  people  spend  hundreds  of  pounds  on  these 
expensive phones which can practically do washing up yet are impossible to make a 
simple phone call from?! I have used this phone for ages and hope to never have another 
phone again. It is simple and not too bulky. The buttons are big enough to press, unlike 
other phones I could mention, and not only that but I can actually see what I’m doing. I 
absolutely loved this mobile to bits, it’s great! 
iii.  This phone was amazing! I loved it so much I never want to buy another phone again. I 
could do everything I ever needed to do on it. I could make phone calls (the main point 170 
 
of a mobile phone is to make phone calls, not listen to music on!), I could text, and with 
100-400 hours of standby time it is perfect for people who travel around the country a 
lot. If you want a simple, affordable phone then buy this one. I absolutely loved it, it was 
the best phone I have ever had in my life. 
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